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ABSTRACT 
This Article presents a novel resolution of a long-standing circuit 
split on an issue of critical significance to bankruptcy and tort law: 
whether bankruptcy courts may extinguish liabilities of parties that 
have not filed for bankruptcy.  Such “non-debtor releases” are similar 
in effect to a bankruptcy discharge and have become particularly 
common in both mass tort disputes and general insolvencies 
adjudicated through the bankruptcy process.  In this Article, I 
illustrate how an overlooked Supreme Court decision—United States 
v. Energy Resources, 495 U.S. 545 (1990)—offers crucial support for 
the pro-release position.  Energy Resources demonstrates that the 
bankruptcy courts’ “general equitable power” allows them to 
extinguish claims against non-debtors and that such relief is not 
forbidden by any specific provision in the Bankruptcy Code. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ultimate policy of chapter 111 of the Bankruptcy Code2 (“the Code”) is 
the successful reorganization of debtors.3  A successful reorganization is one 
that both rehabilitates the debtor and minimizes creditor forfeitures.4  These 
two aims, while frequently in conflict,5 are promoted by the Code’s complex 
array of provisions—provisions that carefully balance the interests of debtors 
and creditors.6 
In addition to its specific directives, the Code entrusts bankruptcy courts 
with “broad equitable powers to balance the interests of the affected parties, 
guided by the overriding goal of ensuring the success of the reorganization.”7  
This equitable authority emanates primarily from § 105(a),8 which states that 
“[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”9  Another source of 
general equitable power is § 1123(b)(6),10 which permits a chapter 11 plan to 
 
 1 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2000). 
 2 §§ 101-1330.  A fifteenth chapter was added to title 11 as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 801(a), 119 Stat. 25, 134–35 (11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-
1532) (“2005 Act”).  None of the changes to the Bankruptcy Code set forth in the 2005 Act are pertinent to the 
issues discussed in this Article. 
 3 Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 (1993); NLRB v. Bildisco 
& Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984). 
 4 Pioneer Inv. Serv., 507 U.S. at 389. 
 5 See Energy Res. Co. v. IRS (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 230 (1st Cir. 1989) (observing that 
the Bankruptcy Code’s twin purposes—“ensure fair payment to creditors and provide the bankrupt firm with 
an opportunity to make a ‘fresh start’”—are “often conflicting”), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990). 
 6 See In re Whitfield, 290 B.R. 302, 306 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (“The Bankruptcy Code reflects a 
careful balance of debtors’ rights and creditors’ remedies.”); In re Cason, 190 B.R. 917, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
1995) (“The Bankruptcy Code as originally enacted carefully balanced creditors’ property rights and debtors’ 
fresh start.”). 
 7 Pioneer Inv. Serv., 507 U.S. at 389. 
 8 See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 88 (1991) (“In addition, the bankruptcy court retains its 
broad equitable power to ‘issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of [the Code.]’”) (quoting § 105(a); Architectural Bldg. Components v. McClarty (In re Foremost 
Mfg. Co.), 137 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he bankruptcy court has broad equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105(a) . . . .”); Smith v. Omni Mfg., Inc. (In re Smith), 21 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1994) (“From . . . section 
[105] emanate the general equitable powers of bankruptcy courts.”); In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1474 
(1st Cir. 1991) (observing that § 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts broad equitable powers); 2 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01, at 105-5 to 105-6 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (“Section 105(a) . . . is an 
omnibus provision phrased in such general terms as to be the basis for a broad exercise of power in the 
administration of a bankruptcy case.”). 
 9 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000). 
 10 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990); United States v. Prescription Home 
Health Care, Inc. (In re Prescription Home Health Care, Inc.), 316 F.3d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Energy 
SILVERSTEIN GALLEYSFINAL 2/19/2007  2:08:42 PM 
16 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23 
“include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable 
provisions of this title.”11  There is substantial disagreement over the scope of 
the authority conferred by these statutes.12 And the controversy is particularly 
acute in the context of “non-debtor releases.”13 
A key component of debtor rehabilitation is the “fresh start” provided by 
chapter 11’s discharge provision.  Under § 1141(d)(1), the confirmation of a 
plan of reorganization discharges the bankrupt party from all of its 
preconfirmation debts (with limited exceptions).14  The debtor emerges from 
bankruptcy with only the obligations set forth in its plan.15  The plan also is 
binding on all of the debtor’s creditors, including those that objected to its 
approval.16  Pursuant to § 524 of the Code, the discharge benefits the debtor 
alone; the liabilities of guarantors, sureties, joint tort-feasors, shareholders, 
directors, employees, and related companies are not impacted.17  Creditors thus 
generally are free to collect any deficiencies in bankruptcy payments from 
coliable parties and pursue independent claims against insiders and affiliated 
entities.18  However, this is not always so.  While the discharge itself does not 
shield third parties, a substantial number of bankruptcy courts have used the 
general equitable powers conferred by the Code to extinguish claims against 
non-debtors—i.e., to grant “non-debtor” or “third-party” releases.19 
 
Resources recognized the broad equitable powers accorded bankruptcy courts under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6).”). 
 11 § 1123(b)(6). 
 12 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[2], at 105–8 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (“As 
might be expected with a general grant of power such as section 105, the specific line drawing of the 
boundaries of that power are not always clear.”); infra Part II.A. 
 13 See discussion infra Part III. 
 14 § 1141(d)(1)-(3).  Under the recent amendment to the Code, individual debtors—i.e., natural persons—
are generally not entitled to a discharge until they complete all payments under their plan of reorganization.  
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 321(d)(2), 119 
Stat. 95 (adding material to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A)—(B)); id. at § 330(b), 119 Stat. 101 
(adding material to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(C)).  And new exceptions to a corporate debtor’s 
discharge were instituted.  See id. at § 708, 119 Stat. 126 (adding material to be codified at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1141(d)(6)). 
 15 § 1141(a). 
 16 Id. 
 17 See § 524(a), (e).  There is one exception contained in § 524(a)(3), but it is not relevant to the issues 
addressed in this Article. 
 18 In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002). 
 19 See infra Part III.B.  The terms “non-debtor release” and “third-party release” are used interchangeably 
in this Article. 
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For at least eighteen years, the federal courts have been divided over 
whether such releases are permissible.20  The Code does not expressly sanction 
the issuance of non-debtor releases.21  However, “pro-release” courts contend 
that the equitable powers flowing from §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) allow for this 
type of relief.22  And they see no explicit prohibition on releases in the Code or 
elsewhere.23  “Anti-release” courts, as their label suggests, disagree.  Many 
“anti-release” courts have concluded that non-debtor releases run afoul of 
§ 524(e), which provides that the “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not 
affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, 
such debt.”24  They read this language, and the bankruptcy policies underlying 
it, to prohibit third-party releases.25  Other anti-release courts do not believe 
that § 524(e) constitutes a bar.  Instead, they think that §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) simply do not grant sufficient equitable power to permit the release 
of claims against non-debtors.26 
Commentators are also deeply split on the propriety of non-debtor releases.  
They have produced numerous articles defending a variety of pro-release and 
anti-release positions.27 
 
 20 Compare Hat-Hanseatische Anlage v. Sago Palms Joint Venture (In re Sago Palms Joint Venture), 39 
B.R. 9, 9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases), with In re A.H. Robins Co., 
88 B.R. 742, 754–55 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that courts may grant non-debtor releases pursuant to their 
“equitable and inherent” power under the Bankruptcy Code), aff’d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 21 Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (“The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly prohibit or authorize a bankruptcy court to enjoin a non-
consenting creditor’s claims against a non-debtor to facilitate a reorganization plan.”).  There is one exception 
in the Code for asbestos cases.  See generally § 524(g) (setting forth an elaborate procedure for obtaining non-
debtor releases in the asbestos context). 
 22 See infra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.  These courts typically mandate that third-party 
releases satisfy stringent requirements.  See infra notes 284–304 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 277–83 and accompanying text. 
 24 § 524(e). 
 25 See infra notes 165–204 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 205–13 and accompanying text; Part III.C. 
 27 For commentators adopting a “pro-release” view, see Howard C. Buschman III & Sean P. Madden, 
The Power and the Propriety of Bankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 BUS. LAW. 
913, 940–42 (1992) [hereinafter Buschman] (arguing that non-debtor releases are permissible in certain 
circumstances); Kate Inman, Note, All Debts Are Off?—Can the Bankruptcy Process Be Used to Release the 
Debts of Nondebtor Parties, 49 FLA. L. REV. 631, 648–49 (1997) (concluding that “the pro-release      
approach . . . is the better reasoned approach,” because, inter alia, § 524(e) does not expressly bar non-debtor 
releases).  Some commentators approve of non-debtor releases, but only in fairly narrow circumstances.  See 
Hydee R. Feldstein, Reinterpreting Bankruptcy Code § 524(e): The Validity of Third-Party Releases in a Plan, 
22 CAL. BANKR. J. 25, 26–27, 39, 45 (1994) (concluding that “non-debtor releases” are permissible under 
§§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), but referring largely to the discharge of derivative claims that are actually property 
of the estate); John E. Swallow, Note, The Power of the Shield—Permanently Enjoining Litigation Against 
Entities Other than the Debtor—A Look at In re A.H. Robins Co., 1990 BYU L. REV. 707, 709 (1990) (arguing 
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If anything is clear, it is that non-debtor releases are receiving “growing 
judicial acceptance” and are becoming increasingly common in chapter 11 
plans of reorganization.28  Indeed, one commentator has suggested that “the 
practice of approving non-debtor releases is more widespread than the number 
of published judicial opinions would suggest[,]” because appellate challenges 
to plans of reorganization are often mooted by consummation of the plan.29  
And whereas in 2005 the number of corporate bankruptcies finally began 
falling from record levels,30 the recent scandals rocking Wall Street and the 
 
that non-debtor releases are permissible under § 1123(b)(6) (which, at the time, was set forth at § 1123(b)(5)) 
where (1) the plan provides payment in full on all extinguished claims, (2) the non-debtor release is essential to 
the plan, and (3) a substantial majority of creditors support the plan); Kenneth M. Lewis, When are 
Nondebtors Really Entitled to a Discharge: Setting the Record Straight on Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins, 3 
J. BANKR. LAW AND PRAC. 163, 176 (1994) (asserting that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases except (1) where 
creditors receive payment in full under the plan for any extinguished claims, and (2) in certain partnership 
contexts); Helen H. Han, Note, Testing the Limits of Judicial Discretion in Chapter 11: The Doctrine of 
Necessity and Third Party Releases, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 551, 554, 579 (1995) (asserting that bankruptcy 
courts may grant non-debtor releases under § 105(a) only where any released claims are paid in full under the 
plan); Peter E. Meltzer, Getting Out of Jail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Plan Process Be Used to Release 
Nondebtor Parties?, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 41 (1997) (concluding that bankruptcy courts have insufficient 
power under § 105(a) to grant non-debtor releases unless the plan provides for payment in full on the 
extinguished claims immediately upon confirmation of the plan of reorganization).  Finally, others believe that 
non-debtor releases violate the Code.  See Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A 
Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959 (1997) 
(concluding that non-debtor releases are inconsistent with numerous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and 
are thus invalid); Judith R. Starr, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Release Insiders from Creditor Claims in 
Corporate Reorganizations, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 485, 487 (1993) (arguing that § 524(e) prohibits non-debtor 
releases); Peter M. Boyle, Note, Non-Debtor Liability in Chapter 11: Validity of Third-Party Discharge in 
Bankruptcy, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 421, 422, 436 (1992) (same). 
 28 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 961; accord In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2002) (“In the last few years, debtors more frequently are seeking to expand the scope of the discharge to 
include the release of claims against non-debtor third-parties and insiders.”); Buschman, supra note 27, at 943 
(noting “a trend among debtors to provide releases for nondebtors in reorganization plans”); Meltzer, supra 
note 27, at 1 (observing that “the custom of attempting to include releases of nondebtor parties has become 
more and more prevalent”); Han, supra note 27, at 565-66 (“an increasing number of nondebtors seek and are 
granted release from, or injunctions against, liability under the broad equitable powers granted by section 
105(a)”); Inman, supra note 27, at 632 (“[M]any reorganization plans contain release provisions which purport 
to permanently discharge the liability of other parties such as the bankrupt entity’s insiders, partners, plan 
funders, or other individuals or entities . . . .”). 
 29 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 964 n.15.  See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. 
(In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 143–45 (2d Cir. 2005) (ruling that the third-party 
release contained in the debtor’s plan of reorganization was invalid, but that the appeal was mooted by 
consummation of the plan). 
 30 See Dena Aubin, Business failures surge to record, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 2002, § 3, at 1, 4, 2002 
WLNR 12678130 (“U.S. public companies have shattered bankruptcy records for a second straight year as 
accounting fraud and the last decade’s debt spree brought down corporate giants, and experts are bracing for 
more such woes.”); Continued increase in filings for bankruptcy, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 2003, § 2, at 1, 2, 2003 
WLNR 15297516 (noting that the number of bankruptcy filings by businesses decreased in fiscal year 2003, 
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broader American business community are giving rise to precisely the type of 
mass-tort disputes that have inspired courts to approve of non-debtor releases 
in the past.31 
The propriety of third-party releases is thus an issue that cries out for 
Supreme Court guidance,32 particularly since “the bankruptcy court is quickly 
becoming the forum for resolution of many of the largest and most complex 
mass litigations.”33  If the High Court does join the fray, there is a largely 
overlooked decision from which the Justices should seek guidance—the 
Court’s own ruling in United States v. Energy Resources Co. (“Energy 
 
but remained near record levels); Bankruptcies Filed in FY ‘04 Still High But Down From Levels Posted in FY 
‘03, 73 U.S.L.Wk. 2341, 2342 (Dec. 14, 2004) (Vol. 73, No. 22) (observing that fiscal year 2004 chapter 11 
filings were up 2.2% from fiscal year 2003); Patricia Manson, Bankruptcy Filings Drop in Wake of Code 
Rewrite, CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Mar. 24, 2006, § 1, at 24 (“Filings under Chapter 11 . . . registered a 33 
percent decline in 2005 from 2004.”). 
 31 See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 130 
B.R. 910, 918–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (this bankruptcy involved “tens of thousands” of persons with claims 
against the debtors for securities violations; the plan contained a non-debtor release extinguishing claims 
against the debtors’ officers, directors, and others), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); In re A.H. Robins Co., 
88 B.R. 742, 743–44, 754–55 (E.D. Va. 1988) (indicating that A.H. Robins was forced into bankruptcy 
because of thousands of tort actions relating to its Dalkon Shield contraceptive device; the company’s plan of 
reorganization contained a non-debtor release extinguishing all claims the injured tort claimants possessed 
against several third parties), aff’d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Gillman v. Cont’l Airlines (In re 
Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing that circuit courts adopting a “flexible approach” 
to non-debtor releases did so “in the context of extraordinary cases”); In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 9 
(N.D. Okla. 1998) (“The seminal cases under the Bankruptcy Code concerning confirmation of plans that 
include provisions enjoining creditors from pursuing claims against non-debtor third parties were bankruptcies 
resulting from mass tort litigation concerning defective products.”); In re Seatco, Inc., 257 B.R. 469, 473 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) (observing that non-debtor releases have been affirmed “principally in large, 
complex, mass tort-type bankruptcy cases”).  See generally Duane Loft, Note, Jurisdictional Line-Drawing in 
a Time When So Much Litigation is “Related To” Bankruptcy: A Practical and Constitutional Solution, 72 
FORDHAM. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2004) (“The past five years have seen some of the largest bankruptcies in 
history—WorldCom, Enron, Federal-Mogul, just to name a few.  Collapsing into bankruptcy amid allegations 
of fraud or mass tort, these companies precipitated waves of litigation in state courts across America.”) 
(footnotes omitted); accord Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1545 (2005) (“[T]he Enron scandal was followed by revelations of 
accounting fraud and insider self-dealing at several large corporations, nearly all of which were thereafter 
pushed into bankruptcy: Adelphia Communications, Global Crossing, Tyco International, and WorldCom.”). 
 32 See Inman, supra note 27, at 631 (observing that the propriety of non-debtor releases is “attractive” for 
Supreme Court review because of the split in the circuits); Meltzer, supra note 27, at 2 (“The issue [of non-
debtor releases] may attract the attention of the Supreme Court in view of the split in the circuits and the 
attention of Congress in connection with its ongoing review of the Bankruptcy Code.”); see also NAT’L 
BANKR. REVIEW. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 535 (1997) (“Current law offers little 
guidance to the parties and the courts on whether nondebtor release provisions may be included in a settlement 
or plan of reorganization and subsequently enforced by an injunction.”). 
 33 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 965. 
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Resources”).34  Energy Resources held that bankruptcy courts may use their 
equitable powers under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) to compel the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) to allocate a chapter 11 debtor’s tax payments to 
those tax liabilities chosen by the debtor.35  In this Article, I argue that the 
Supreme Court’s holding and rationale in Energy Resources demonstrate that 
the pro-release courts and commentators have the better view of §§ 105(a), 
1123(b)(6), and 524(e).36  I thus conclude that bankruptcy courts have the 
power to issue non-debtor releases,37 though only in fairly narrow 
circumstances.38 
 
 34 495 U.S. 545 (1990). 
 35 Id. at 548–49. 
 36 See infra Part V. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See infra Part III.B.4.  This Article does not address whether bankruptcy courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction over claims that are extinguished by non-debtor releases.  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) & (b) 
(2000) (granting subject matter jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters to federal district courts); § 157(a) 
(permitting bankruptcy matters to be referred to bankruptcy courts).  The focus here is only on the bankruptcy 
courts’ power to issue third-party releases once jurisdiction is established.  See generally Inman, supra note 27, 
at 633 n.6 (“This Note focuses on the bankruptcy courts’ power to issue permanent injunctions rather than 
jurisdiction issues.”); Wasserman v. Immormino (In re Granger Garage, Inc.), 921 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(§ 105(a) is not a jurisdictional provision). 
A number of courts have confused the concepts of jurisdiction and power.  See, e.g., Seaport 
Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc.), 113 B.R. 
610, 615 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (mistakenly claiming that the Ninth Circuit held in Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. 
Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624–25 (9th Cir. 1989), that bankruptcy 
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to grant non-debtor releases when in reality the Ninth Circuit held that 
bankruptcy courts do not have the power to provide such relief).  The difference must therefore be kept in 
mind.  Ironically, the Ninth Circuit explained the distinction quite cogently in American Hardwoods: 
Subject matter jurisdiction and power are separate prerequisites to the court’s capacity to act.  
Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to entertain an action between the parties 
before it.  Power under section 105 is the scope and forms of relief the court may order in an 
action in which it has jurisdiction. 
Am. Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 624; see also In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1989) 
(“Consequently, while a bankruptcy court may have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute between 
nondebtors, it may lack the statutory authority to enter a particular type of relief, such as a nondebtor 
discharge.”); accord In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 476 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 
280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); Buschman, supra note 27, at 921; Meltzer, supra note 27, at 13. 
A bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over disputes between non-debtors, the type involving claims 
extinguished by third-party releases, flows from its “related to jurisdiction.”  See § 1334(b) (providing that 
federal district courts have jurisdiction “of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to 
cases under title 11”) (emphasis added); § 157(a) (permitting “any or all” bankruptcy matters to be referred to 
bankruptcy courts); Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.5 (1995) (“Proceedings ‘related to’ the 
bankruptcy include . . . suits between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate.”).  The Third 
Circuit set forth the generally-accepted test for “related to jurisdiction” in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 
(3d Cir. 1984).  See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01[4][c][ii][B], at 3-25 to 3-36 & n.85 (Lawrence P. King 
ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004).  Explaining that “Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the 
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Part I of this Article sets forth a brief taxonomy of non-debtor releases.  
Part II provides general background on the Code provisions that are central to 
the validity of such releases.  Then, Part III surveys the split in the courts, 
outlining both the pro-release and anti-release lines of authority.  It also 
presents some important arguments raised by commentators. 
Part IV contains a thorough recitation of Energy Resources.  In addition to 
discussing the holding and rationale of the Supreme Court, this Part sets forth 
background information on the relevant tax laws and synopses of (1) the 
underlying bankruptcy, district, and circuit court decisions and (2) the briefs 
filed in the Supreme Court.  The summaries of the lower court opinions and the 
 
bankruptcy courts,” the Third Circuit held that those courts have “related to jurisdiction” over all claims that 
“could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.”  Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994.  
The federal courts of appeal have interpreted this standard in disparate ways.  Buschman, supra note 27, at 
927–28 (collecting authorities); 1 COLLIER ¶ 3.01[4][c][ii][B], at 3-25 to 3-36 & n.85.  That disagreement is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that many anti-release courts—anti-release in terms of bankruptcy 
power—found jurisdiction over claims extinguished by third-party releases they ultimately struck down.  See, 
e.g., Am. Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 624 (holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over a creditor’s 
claims against the shareholder-guarantors of the debtor because execution of the creditor’s judgment would 
deprive the shareholder-guarantors of any incentive to continue running the debtor, which “could conceivably” 
affect the administration of the debtor’s estate) (internal quotation marks omitted); Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 
B.R. at 502–03 (finding jurisdiction over a creditor’s claim against the debtor’s shareholder where the 
shareholder made a financial contribution to the estate as part of the plan of reorganization).  See also Celotex, 
514 U.S. at 309–10 (holding that the bankruptcy court had “related to jurisdiction” to temporarily bar 
judgment creditors of the debtor from attempting to execute against the debtor’s sureties—several insurance 
companies—where (1) such executions would have destroyed any possibility that the debtor and its sureties 
could settle related insurance coverage disputes, and (2) such a settlement was essential to the formulation of a 
feasible plan of reorganization) (noting that this conclusion was consistent with court of appeals decisions 
finding jurisdiction over non-debtor disputes in several cases involving third-party releases) (citing Am. 
Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 623, and Oberg v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 828 F.2d 1023, 
1024–26 (4th Cir. 1987)); Inman, supra note 27, at 633 n.6 (“It is usually easy to establish jurisdiction [over 
non-debtor disputes] because bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over all actions that could have any 
conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate.”).  But see In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 12–14 (N.D. 
Okla. 1998) (holding that bankruptcy courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to issue non-debtor 
releases, even where the third-party contributes assets for distribution to creditors as part of the plan, because 
any litigation against the non-debtor after confirmation cannot affect the estate); In re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 
163 B.R. 64, 67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (“[W]e know of nothing which gives the bankruptcy court jurisdiction 
to adjudicate claims between two non-debtor third parties.”); Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1033–80 (offering a 
sustained, multifaceted argument that bankruptcy courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to issue non-
debtor releases); Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revising Jurisdictional 
Precepts and the Forgotten Calloway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L. J. 1 (1998) (same).  See generally 
Robert B. Chapman, Bankruptcy: Eleventh Circuit Survey, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1199, 1251 (2002) (suggesting 
that the Pacor test extends the bankruptcy court’s “related to” jurisdiction beyond the constitutional 
boundaries of federal judicial power set by Article III). 
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Supreme Court briefs are included because they help illustrate the significance 
of Energy Resources to the non-debtor release debate. 
Part V contains the main argument of this Article.  In it, I assert that Energy 
Resources provides compelling support for the legitimacy of non-debtor 
releases.  Finally, the Conclusion offers some closing thoughts. 
I. A TAXONOMY OF NON-DEBTOR RELEASES 
While there are several types of non-debtor releases, courts are not always 
careful to distinguish them.39  Thus, this Part contains a brief taxonomy of 
third-party releases. 
A. Involuntary Non-Debtor Releases of Direct Claims 
The focus of this Article is non-debtor releases that extinguish a creditor’s 
direct claims against a non-debtor over the creditor’s objection—i.e., 
involuntary non-debtor releases of direct claims.  Such releases come in 
various forms.  First, a debtor’s chapter 11 plan of reorganization may contain 
a section providing that certain claims against third parties are released.40  
Second, a bankruptcy court might permanently enjoin a creditor from 
prosecuting its claims against a non-debtor.41  Such an injunction effectively 
extinguishes the creditor’s claim because the creditor is forever prohibited 
 
 39 See, e.g., In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 42–43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (mistakenly 
applying the standards used to assess releases of direct claims to a release of derivative claims); In re Master 
Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 934–35 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (failing to distinguish different 
types of non-debtor releases from each other and from related forms of relief). 
 40 See, e.g., Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1049 (5th Cir. 1987) (plan contained a 
provision expressly releasing a creditor’s claim against a guarantor of the debtor); In re Digital Impact, Inc., 
223 B.R. 1, 4 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (plan provided that the debtor’s principal was released from all claims relating 
to the debtor). 
 41 See, e.g., Landsing Div. Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate 
Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1990) (prior to confirmation of the plan, the bankruptcy court entered 
a permanent injunction enjoining a creditor of the debtor from prosecuting its claim against a non-debtor), 
modified, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. 
Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 622 (9th Cir. 1989) (prior to confirmation of the plan, the debtor sought a 
permanent injunction enjoining a creditor from pursuing a state court lawsuit against guarantors of the debtor’s 
obligation to the creditor); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Bechtle (In re Labrum & Doak), 237 
B.R. 275, 283, 305–08 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (bankruptcy court issued a postconfirmation permanent 
injunction barring creditors of the debtor-partnership from seeking deficiency judgments against partners that 
had contributed assets to the estate pursuant to a settlement with the debtor); Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, 
168 B.R. at 932 (plan contained an injunction barring any creditor or equity holder of the debtor from suing a 
non-debtor regarding any transaction between the non-debtor and the debtor). 
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from attempting to recover from the non-debtor.42  Third, a reorganization plan 
may include both a release of third parties and a permanent injunction barring 
creditors from attempting to collect from the released parties on the 
extinguished claims.43  Each of these types of non-debtor releases has the same 
basic impact. 
Involuntary non-debtor releases of direct claims also vary in scope.  Some 
are quite narrow.  To illustrate, a bankruptcy court may issue a permanent 
injunction barring an individual creditor from pursuing a single cause of 
action.44  Other non-debtor releases are broader.  The release in In re Dow 
Corning Corp. prohibits all women injured by Dow Corning’s silicone breast 
implants from suing the company’s shareholders for their injuries.45  
Additionally, the release requested in In re Digital Impact, Inc. would have 
barred anyone from suing the debtor’s principal for any claims related to the 
debtor.46  Finally, some releases purport to extinguish all of a non-debtor’s 
liabilities.47  This type of release provides the third party with relief that is 
 
 42 W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 600 (“By permanently enjoining [the creditor’s] actions against [the 
non-debtor], the bankruptcy court, in essence, discharged [the non-debtor’s] liability.”); Meltzer, supra note 
27, at 4 n.7 (explaining that permanent injunctions and releases have the same effect and thus that the terms 
will be used interchangeably in the article); Inman, supra note 27, at 633 n.7 (“A permanent injunction 
preventing a creditor from suing a third party is, in effect, a discharge of the third party’s liability.”); see also 
Digital Impact, 223 B.R. at 12 (holding that a non-debtor release “is equivalent to issuing a final adjudication 
of the merits” of the released claims); accord also Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1070. 
 43 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 475 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (plan both released certain 
claims against Dow Corning’s shareholders and enjoined holders of the released claims from attempting to 
recover against the shareholders), rev’d in part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 
157 B.R. 726, 729, 731 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (plan contained both a release of all claims against the debtor’s 
co-venturers, a former part-owner of the debtor, and an insurance company that was related to the debtor, and a 
permanent injunction barring prosecution of the released claims). 
 44 W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 598 (bankruptcy court permanently enjoined the debtor’s attorney 
from executing upon a lien against the debtor’s bank); Am. Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 622 (debtor sought a 
permanent injunction prohibiting a creditor from enforcing a state court judgment against the debtor’s 
shareholder-guarantors). 
 45 Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. at 475; see also In re Sybaris Clubs, Int’l, Inc., 189 B.R. 151, 153 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (provision in the proposed plan of reorganization contained a permanent injunction 
barring “all persons” from prosecuting any action against the debtor’s insiders, a shareholder, and several 
affiliated entities relating to the sale of notes and debentures issued by the debtor). 
 46 In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998); see also Deutsche Bank AG v. 
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(release in the plan of reorganization purported to extinguish all claims against various corporate insiders 
related to the debtor or its subsidiaries). 
 47 See, e.g., Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(provision in the debtor’s plan granted a “global release” of all claims to, inter alia, the debtor’s children and a 
business he owned); In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (chapter 11 plan 
stated that “[p]ursuant to § 1141 of the Code, confirmation of this Plan shall also discharge all claims against 
Debtor’s equity Interest holders or Affiliates”). 
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similar in scope to the bankruptcy discharge granted to the debtor, and is thus, 
in effect, a “non-debtor discharge.”48 
Involuntary non-debtor releases of direct claims differ from each other in 
another critical way.  Some are part of chapter 11 plans that, by their terms, 
provide the dissenting creditor with full payment on the extinguished claims.  
Third-party releases of claims paid in full are often denoted “channeling 
releases” because the claims against the non-debtors are “channeled” to the 
estate for full payment.49  Other reorganization plans extinguish claims through 
non-debtor releases without providing for payment in full to the creditors.50  In 
those bankruptcies, the third-party release constitutes an “actual release” 
because at least part of the creditor’s claim is discharged without 
compensation. 
Dow Corning’s bankruptcy offers a good example of a channeling release.  
Under the plan of reorganization, all women who purchased the company’s 
silicone breast implants are to be paid in full for their injuries.51  Since their 
claims against Dow Corning’s shareholders flow from the same harm, the 
women also will receive full compensation on their causes of action against the 
owners.52 
 
 48 Indeed, such releases are actually broader than a discharge because certain liabilities of a debtor are 
non-dischargeable under § 523(a) of the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2000); see also Brubaker, supra note 27, at 
1000 (“In fact, non-debtor releases have been used to grant many individuals discharge from debts that could 
not, or at least arguably could not, be discharged through an actual bankruptcy filing by the non-debtor.”). 
 49 Digital Impact, 223 B.R. at 9; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 754 (E.D. Va. 1988) 
(concluding that where A.H. Robins’s plan paid all Dalkon Shield claimants in full, the non-debtor release 
extinguishing the claims of the injured women against third parties was within the courts equitable power to 
“channel claims to a specific res”), aff’d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989); see also infra notes 228–40 and 
accompanying text (containing a further discussion of “channeling”).  But see In re Am. Family Enters., 256 
B.R. 377, 386–87, 390–92, 405–08 (D.N.J. 2000) (referring to a non-debtor release as a “channeling” release 
even though the plan did not provide for payment in full on the extinguished claims).  See generally Brubaker, 
supra note 27, at 1036–38 (contending that non-debtor releases bear little resemblance to traditional 
“channeling” injunctions). 
 50 See, e.g., Mellon Bank v. M.K. Siegel, 96 B.R. 505, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (plan stated that payment to a 
creditor of the debtor was “in full settlement” of all of the creditor’s claims against the debtor and a guarantor 
even though the plan only provided the creditor with $10,000 of the $17,000 owed); In re Mkt. Square Inn, 
Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 65–66 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (plan stated that the debtor’s shareholder would release his 
individual claims against the debtor’s lessor; the shareholder’s claims would not have been paid in full under 
the plan). 
 51 In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. 396, 415–16 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 52 See Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 653 
(6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the implant purchasers sued Dow Corning and its two shareholders for their 
injuries); Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 415–16 (holding that all of the released claims are to be paid in 
full). 
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Most bankruptcies in which a plan of reorganization contains a third-party 
release and provides full payment on the extinguished claims mirror Dow 
Corning—the debtor and the released third party are co-obligors of some 
type.53  That is because payment in full on a claim against a debtor eliminates 
the claimant’s rights against any codebtor (e.g., a guarantor or a jointly and 
severally liable tort-feasor) through the prohibition on double recovery.54  If 
the debtor and third party are not co-obligors, payment in full is only possible 
where the creditor receives additional compensation beyond any plan 
distributions intended to satisfy its claims against the debtor. 
B. Voluntary Non-Debtor Releases of Direct Claims 
A plan of reorganization may contain a clause stating that creditors can 
obtain additional payment from a non-debtor if they agree to release their 
claims against the third party.55  This is a “voluntary” or “consensual” non-
debtor release.  The legality of such provisions has little bearing on whether a 
bankruptcy court may extinguish a third party’s liability over its creditor’s 
objection, the issue addressed in this Article.  The validity of a consensual 
release is primarily a question of contract law56 because such releases are “no 
different from any other settlement or contract.”57  Accordingly, as long as the 
release satisfies the requirements for a binding agreement—i.e., offer, 
acceptance, and consideration—the vast majority of courts believe it is 
perfectly valid under the Code.58  The few decisions that have adopted a 
 
 53 See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 700–01 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(plan provided Dalkon Shield claimants with payment in full for their injuries and enjoined them from suing 
any tort-feasors jointly and severally liable with the debtor for the same harm); In re Eller Bros., Inc., 53 B.R. 
10, 11–12 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (plan provided payment in full to a creditor and released the guarantor of 
the debtor’s liability). 
 54 See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 28 (2003) (“The law abhors duplicative recoveries; in other words, a 
plaintiff who is injured by reason of a defendant’s behavior is, for the most part, entitled to be made whole, not 
to be enriched.”) (footnote omitted). 
 55 See, e.g., In re Resorts, Int’l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 460 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990) (plan contained provisions 
enabling creditors to release all claims against several non-debtors in exchange for additional compensation); 
In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (same). 
 56 Feldstein, supra note 27, at 25 n.6 (explaining that the validity of consensual releases is largely a 
question of contract law); Starr, supra note 27, at 487 (observing that in the case of consensual releases, “the 
bankruptcy court simply approves a tripartite settlement among the debtor, the creditors, and the insider and 
does not use the discharge power in a manner forbidden by the Code”); Inman, supra note 27, at 638 
(“Because the release with consent approach is more of a contract issue, it is outside the scope of this 
discussion . . . .”). 
 57 In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997). 
 58 In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1046–47 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that consensual non-debtor 
releases do not violate § 524(e) and are permissible under the Code); In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 
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contrary position59 all rely upon a Seventh Circuit case60 that was subsequently 
overturned.61 
C. Non-Debtor Releases of Derivative Claims and Rights Under a Debtor’s 
Insurance Policies 
Certain types of involuntary non-debtor releases are also beyond the scope 
of this Article.  The first is a release of derivative (rather than direct) claims—
i.e., shareholder derivative claims.  Such claims are actually property of the 
estate rather than property of the debtor’s creditors or shareholders.62  Thus, 
the release of derivative claims involves a different set of issues from a release 
 
14–15 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (holding that bankruptcy courts do not have the power to grant involuntary non-
debtor releases, but may issue voluntary third-party releases where such provisions comply with general 
principles of contract law); In re AOV Industries, Inc., 31 B.R. 1005, 1010 (D.D.C. 1983) (concluding that 
consensual non-debtor releases are not barred by § 524), rev’d in part on other grounds, 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986); In re Cent. Jersey Airport Servs., Inc., 282 B.R. 176, 182–83 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002) (holding that a 
voluntary release does not implicate § 524(e)); Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. at 506–07 (holding that 
involuntary non-debtor releases are not permissible, but stating in dicta that voluntary releases are valid); In re 
Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 730–31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (stating in dicta that voluntary non-
debtor releases are valid); Resorts, Int’l, 145 B.R. at 460 (permitting voluntary non-debtor releases to be 
included in the debtor’s plan because such releases are “purely contractual between the parties to the release” 
and thus do not run afoul of § 524(e)); In re Apex Oil Co., 118 B.R. 683, 701 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) 
(concluding that consensual non-debtor releases do not violate § 524(e)); Monroe Well Serv., 80 B.R. at 334–
35 (stating in dicta that involuntary non-debtor releases violate § 524(e), but holding that “a plan provision 
permitting individual creditors the option of providing a voluntary release to nondebtor plan funders does not 
violate 11 U.S.C. § 524(e)”); see also Feldstein, supra note 27, 25 n.6 (“A voluntary, creditor-by-creditor 
election to release nondebtors in exchange for additional consideration is permissible under the bankruptcy 
code and valid under state law.”).  The courts are split on how consent to a non-debtor release must be shown.  
According to some, voting in favor of a plan is insufficient to manifest assent; the creditor must expressly sign 
off on the release.  See, e.g., Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. at 507.  Other courts think a mere vote in favor of 
a reorganization plan is sufficient.  See, e.g., Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d at 1045–47 (holding that a vote for 
confirmation of the plan is sufficient to indicate acceptance of a voluntary non-debtor release); In re After Six, 
Inc., No. 93-11150DAS, 1994 WL 45471, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 1994) (approving of provisions 
releasing a large number of non-debtors from all claims held by those voting for the plan); In re W. Coast 
Video Enters., Inc., 174 B.R. 906, 911 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (same).  For a thorough discussion of 
consensual non-debtor releases, see generally Meltzer, supra note 27, at 33–39. 
 59 See, e.g., Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that bankruptcy courts do 
not have the authority to release claims against non-debtors even if the creditors consent to such action); In re 
Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 486 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (same). 
 60 Union Carbide v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that under the Bankruptcy Act 
creditor approval cannot effectuate a non-debtor release), overruled by Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d at 1046–
47.  See, e.g., Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. at 486 (citing Union Carbide in holding that consensual third-
party releases are invalid). 
 61 Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d at 1046–47 (overturning Union Carbide). 
 62 Sobchack v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 17 F.3d 600, 604 
(2d Cir. 1994); In re Texaco, Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), appeal dismissed by 92 B.R. 38 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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of a creditor’s direct rights against a non-debtor.63  Indeed, the resolution of 
derivative claims is expressly provided for in the Code,64 and bankruptcy 
courts may issue permanent injunctions to protect any such resolution.65 
The second type of distinguishable involuntary non-debtor release is one 
that eliminates a party’s rights under an insurance policy owned by the debtor, 
such as the interests of a co-insured or a tort claimant injured by the debtor’s 
conduct.66  An insurance company often will not settle with a debtor unless the 
compromise terminates all of its duties under the policy at issue.  In such 
circumstances, compromise is impossible without a release of all co-insureds’ 
or tort claimants’ rights against the insurer.  Some courts have approved of 
non-debtor releases that extinguish these rights and channel the claims to the 
proceeds of the debtor’s settlement with the insurance company.67  A debtor’s 
 
 63 See In re Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 304 B.R. 395, 418 n.26 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004) (distinguishing 
authorities holding that § 524(e) proscribes the involuntary release of a creditor’s claims against a non-debtor 
because the release in the debtor’s plan of reorganization only extinguished claims belonging to the estate); 
Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 277–79 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding 
that § 524(e) did not apply to a permanent injunction in the plan because the provision only barred lawsuits 
asserting derivative claims; explaining that the court did not need to consider whether a non-debtor release of 
direct claims is permissible because such a release is “even broader than the one at issue here”); Huddleston v. 
Nelson Bunker Hunt Trust Estate, 117 B.R. 231, 234 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (concluding that the court did not need 
to address whether a release in the plan violated § 524(e) because the provision only extinguished derivative 
claims), aff’d, 935 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991); Texaco, 84 B.R. at 900–01 (stating in dicta that § 524(e) bars the 
extinguishing of direct claims against non-debtors, but holding that it does not prohibit the release of derivative 
claims because such claims belong to the estate). 
 64 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (2000) (“[A] plan may . . . provide for . . . the settlement or 
adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate . . . .”); see also In re General 
Homes Corp., 134 B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (implying that § 524(e) does not bar releases of 
derivative claims because § 1123(b)(3)(A) expressly allows for the extinguishing of such claims). 
 65 Ionosphere Clubs, 17 F.3d at 602–04 (affirming an order of the bankruptcy court enjoining the 
debtor’s preferred stockholders from suing certain managers of the debtor for breach of fiduciary duty and 
tortious interference because the claims were derivative, belonged to the estate, and thus were extinguished as 
part of a settlement between the debtor and the managers); In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 886 F.2d 921, 929 
(7th Cir. 1989) (“The power of the court under [section 105(a)] . . . includes the power to issue an injunction 
enjoining third parties from pursuing actions which are the exclusive property of the debtor estate and are 
dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement.”). 
 66 See generally In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 233–42 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (discussing 
the nature of an injured party’s interest in the insurance policies of the tortfeasor). 
 67 See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 90–91 
(2d Cir. 1988) (permanently enjoining a co-insured from suing the debtor’s insurance companies for any 
claims relating to policies that were subject to a settlement between the debtor and its insurers); Dow Corning 
Corp., 198 B.R. at 244–47 (permanently enjoining all parties tortiously injured by the debtor’s products from 
bringing claims against the debtor’s insurers relating to policies that were subject to a settlement between the 
debtor and its insurers).  But see In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 133 B.R. 973, 976–79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(holding that the court did not have sufficient power under § 105(a) to grant a non-debtor release, as part of a 
settlement between the debtor and its insurance company, that extinguished the contractual rights of a co-
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insurance policies are generally property of the estate.68  Accordingly, a tort 
claimant’s or a co-insured’s claim under these policies is often, in essence, a 
claim against the estate itself.  Releasing such rights is altogether different 
from releasing a creditor’s claim against an independent third party, such as a 
guarantor.69 
Despite these distinctions, derivative and insurance releases do involve 
several of the same issues as releases of direct claims against non-debtors.70  
Accordingly, some derivative and insurance cases are discussed below.71 
 
insured under the policy because, inter alia, the co-insured’s rights were not part of the debtor’s estate), aff’d, 
149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 68 Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 92; Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Maness, 101 F.3d 358, 362 (4th 
Cir. 1996); Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1987); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Jasmine, Ltd. (In re Jasmine, Ltd.), 258 B.R. 119, 128–29 (D.N.J. 2000); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000) 
(providing that a debtor’s estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case,” with minor exceptions).  But see Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 260 B.R. 769, 
785–86 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (discussing a split in the courts regarding whether the proceeds of certain 
types of insurance policies constitute estate property). 
 69 See In re Elsinore Shore Assoc., 91 B.R. 238, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (distinguishing Johns-
Manville, the leading insurance release case, because the claims at issue there were against property of the 
estate, whereas Elsinore Shore Associates requested the enjoining of claims against independent third parties); 
Brubaker, supra note 27, at 962 n.3 (“This article will not discuss . . . insurance injunctions.  Insurance 
injunctions involve property of the estate issues that are not implicated by broader non-debtor releases.”).  See 
generally Charles A. Beckham, Jr., It’s All an Unsecured Claim to Me: The Tortious Interference of 
Bankruptcy Law with Liability Insurance Proceeds, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 779 (1991); Barry L. Zaretsky, 
Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 373 (1989). 
 70 Some courts and commentators have suggested that a third type of release is distinct from the non-
debtor releases at issue here—those shielding partners in a general partnership from the partnership’s creditors.  
See, e.g., In re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (distinguishing releases of 
general partners in a debtor-partnership from a plan provision releasing a claim by the debtor’s shareholder 
against a creditor of the debtor); Brubaker, supra note 27, at 962 n.3 (“Likewise, partners’ liability to a debtor-
partnership for partnership deficiencies make non-debtor partner releases and injunctions, which protect 
individual partners from partnership creditors, unique and beyond the scope of this article.”); Buschman, supra 
note 27, at 932 (concluding that injunctions in favor of individual partners of a general partnership are 
distinguishable from injunctions on behalf of guarantors); Lewis, supra note 27, at 174–76 (arguing that non-
debtor releases in partnership cases are unique because the general partners are responsible for all of the 
partnership’s debts and thus “such assets in essence constitute property of the debtor’s partnership estate”).  
However, most courts apply (correctly, in my view) the same standards to partner releases and other non-
debtor releases.  See, e.g., Seaport Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert 
Park Auto Parts, Inc.), 113 B.R. 610, 612, 614–16 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990); Greer v. Gaston & Snow (In re 
Gaston & Snow),  No.: 93-CV-8517(JGK), 93-CV-8628(JGK), 1996 WL 694421, at *2, *5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
4, 1996); Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 149–51, 
156–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Bechtle (In re Labrum & Doak), 237 B.R. 
275, 305–08 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 685–87 
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1992).  Thus, this Article does not distinguish between nonpartner and partner releases. 
 71 See, e.g., supra notes 216–40 and accompanying text.  As Professor Brubaker wisely cautioned, 
however, one must be careful not to confuse the various types of releases and “indiscriminately” rely upon 
decisions in one context as authority in another.  See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 962 n.3; see also In re Forty-
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D. Provisional Injunctions Shielding Non-Debtors 
There is one final type of chapter 11 relief that must be distinguished from 
an involuntary non-debtor release of direct claims.  Some reorganization plans 
contain postconfirmation injunctions or releases that only temporarily or 
conditionally prohibit a creditor from pursuing claims against third parties.  
For example, the plan in In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. restrained 
creditors from taking legal action against any co-obligors of the debtor for five 
years.72  In In re Mac Panel Co., the plan included an injunction and a release 
barring a creditor from prosecuting the debtor’s shareholders as long as the 
debtor complied with the plan of reorganization, under which the creditor was 
to be paid in full.73  Any deviation from the plan terminated the injunction and 
voided the release to the extent a deficiency remained.74  Unlike non-debtor 
releases, such provisions do not actually extinguish the liability of a third 
party.  Thus, in the event that the debtor does not pay the creditor’s claim in 
full—whether by design or because the debtor was unable to comply with a 
plan that, by its term, provided full compensation—the creditor may seek its 
shortage from the third party.  One court has aptly characterized temporary or 
conditional injunctions and releases of this type as “provisional injunctions.”75 
To be sure, a provisional injunction, when combined with the debtor’s 
payments to the creditor under the plan of reorganization, may effectively 
release the creditor’s claims against a third party.  If the debtor pays the 
creditor in full before the injunction is terminated, any claim the creditor had 
against a codebtor is discharged by the prohibition on double recovery.76  But 
 
Eight Insulations, 133 B.R. 973, 976–79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (distinguishing a release of the derivative 
rights of a party claiming insurance proceeds through the debtor from a release of the direct rights of a party 
actually insured under the policy, and holding that § 105(a) may only be used to grant the former type of 
relief), aff’d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 72 113 B.R. 610, 612, 615 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990). 
 73 No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *8 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000). 
 74 Id.; see also In re Seatco, Inc. 257 B.R. 469, 474 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) (plan temporarily enjoined 
any creditor with an allowed claim from proceeding against the debtor’s officers and directors, inter alia, for 
collection of the allowed claim as long as the debtor complied with the terms of the reorganization plan; 
apparently, the injunction was to expire upon consummation of the plan, permitting collection efforts against 
the directors and officers to recover deficiencies). 
 75 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 743 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (using the term 
“provisional injunction” in reference to a hypothetical postconfirmation temporary injunction that would 
restrain a creditor from pursuing a non-debtor only until the assets available under the plan are exhausted), 
rev’d, 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 76 See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 28 (2003) (“The law abhors duplicative recoveries; in other words, a 
plaintiff who is injured by reason of a defendant’s behavior is, for the most part, entitled to be made whole, not 
to be enriched.”) (footnote omitted); see also In re Shaw Aero Devices, Inc., 283 B.R. 349, 353 (Bankr. M.D. 
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whereas a non-debtor release extinguishes the creditor’s claim immediately, a 
provisional injunction, like those in Rohnert and Mac Panel, does not eliminate 
the third party’s liability until the creditor has in fact received full payment. 
The fundamental difference, then, between a provisional injunction and a 
non-debtor release is that the former places the risk of plan failure—the risk 
that the debtor will default on its plan obligations—on the non-debtor, while 
the latter places the risk on the creditor.77  A provisional injunction is thus a 
less extreme remedy than a non-debtor release, and if a court believes that such 
an injunction is invalid, it likely holds the same view with respect to non-
debtor releases.78 
As I noted above, the focus of this Article is involuntary non-debtor 
releases of direct claims, which I shall henceforth refer to simply as “non-
debtor releases” or “third-party releases.” 
II. THE EQUITABLE AUTHORITY AND DISCHARGE PROVISIONS OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE 
The validity of non-debtor releases turns on the scope and interplay of the 
Code provisions that (1) invest bankruptcy courts with equitable powers, and 
 
Fla. 2002) (upholding a provisional injunction and observing that once the debtor has paid the creditors in full, 
the creditors’ rights against a guarantor of the debtor’s obligations will be extinguished). 
 77 See Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. at 743 (explaining that, unlike a provisional injunction, a non-
debtor release places undue risk upon the creditor barred from suing); cf. In re Mac Panel, No. 98-10952C-
11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000) (“Because VPC will receive full payment 
of its claim over time, however, the court finds that it is appropriate to condition the injunction on Mac Panel 
meeting its obligations to VPC under the Modified Plan.”).  A provisional injunction still places some risk on 
the creditor.  There is no guarantee that the non-debtor will be available to satisfy any deficiency not paid by 
the debtor when the provisional injunction expires.  In the absence of an injunction, the creditor could collect 
immediately from the non-debtor, eliminating any such risk.  See In re Prussia Assoc., 322 B.R. 572, 598–99 
(Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2005) (observing that because the primary guarantor shielded by the provisional injunction 
in the debtor’s plan was seventy-four years old, there was a reasonable chance that the guarantor would die 
before the injunction expired, preventing the creditor from recovering in the event that the debtor defaulted on 
its plan obligations). 
 78 Admittedly, it is not always easy to distinguish a non-debtor release from a provisional injunction.  
See, e.g., In re Sybaris Clubs Int’l, Inc., 189 B.R. 152, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (plan provided for payment 
in full, permanently enjoined prosecution of certain claims against the debtor’s shareholder and stated that the 
injunction would be lifted in the event of a material default, but did not specify whether failure to pay a 
released claim in full constituted such a default; if lack of full payment was not a material default, then the 
provision was a non-debtor release rather than a provisional injunction).  And courts sometimes apply the same 
legal standard to each.  See, e.g., Mac Panel, 2000 WL 33673757, at *9 (applying to a provisional injunction 
the test that pro-release courts generally use in assessing the validity of a release). 
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(2) define the scope of the debtor’s discharge.  Part II contains an overview of 
these statutes. 
A. Sections 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) and the General Equitable Powers of 
Bankruptcy Courts 
Bankruptcy courts have long been regarded as courts of equity.79  Section 
105(a) is the primary source of their general equitable power.80  It states that 
“[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”81  The statute is “similar in 
effect to the All Writs Statute,”82 which provides that the “Supreme Court and 
all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages 
and principles of law.”83  But § 105(a) also codified “any powers traditionally 
exercised by a bankruptcy court that are not encompassed by the All Writs 
Statute”84 and expanded these powers beyond those granted in prior 
bankruptcy laws.85 
 
 79 See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) (“The Bankruptcy Court is a court of 
equity . . . .”); accord Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966); U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 331 
U.S. 28, 36 (1947); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304–05 (1939). 
 80 See supra note 8. 
 81 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000). 
 82 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 316 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273; accord In re G.S.F. 
Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 n.6 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting the House Report). 
 83 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). 
 84 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 317 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6274. 
 85 “Section 105(a) is derived from section 2a(15)” of the Bankruptcy Act.  H.R. REP. No. 95-595 at 316, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6273.  Section 2a(15) provided that bankruptcy courts may “[m]ake such 
orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to those specifically provided, as may be 
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act; provided, however, that an injunction to restrain a 
court may be issued by the judge only.”  11 U.S.C. § 11a(15) (repealed 1979). 
Section 105(a) is considered broader than former § 2a(15) because § 105(a) uses the phrase 
“necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title” instead of “necessary for the 
enforcement of the provisions of” the Act.  The addition of “or appropriate” implemented a 
congressional purpose that bankruptcy courts be able to deal comprehensively with bankruptcy 
cases. 
Meltzer, supra note 27, at 13 n.41 (emphasis added); accord 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.LH[2], at 105–
106 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1998) (“Section 105 is much broader than former Section 2a(15), and 
constituted a major departure from that law . . . .”); Boyle, supra note 27, at 426 (“[S]ection 105(a) 
contemplates greater equitable powers than those embodied in its predecessor, section 2(a)(15).”); see also 
Bird v. Carl’s Grocery Co. (In re NWFX, Inc.), 864 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[Section 105(a)] is even 
broader than Section 2a(15) of the Bankruptcy Act from which it is derived.”); Johnson v. First Nat’l. Bank of 
Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983) (observing that § 105(a) “is in certain respects broader in scope 
than its predecessor”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Allied Stores Corp. (In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.), 133 
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Section 105(a) enables bankruptcy courts to issue numerous types of 
orders.86  Perhaps the most significant are injunctions.  For example, the statute 
permits a bankruptcy court to prohibit third parties from distributing assets that 
may belong to the estate.87  Section 105(a) also empowers bankruptcy courts to 
temporarily enjoin lawsuits that are exempt from the automatic stay,88 
including legal actions between non-debtors.89  Stays of litigation involving 
third parties “have been justified when [both (1)] the non-debtor’s undivided 
attention is required” for the development of a chapter 11 plan and (2) the 
court concludes that a lawsuit would distract the third party, hampering the 
reorganization effort.90  Courts have also granted “non-debtor stays” when 
necessary to protect the estate from judgments that would collaterally estop the 
 
B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (“The legislative history of Section 105 indicates that the limitations 
on equitable powers of the Bankruptcy Court were expanded . . . .  Congress recognized that the increased 
powers and jurisdictions of the new Bankruptcy Court required that the Bankruptcy Judge be permitted 
equitable powers in fulfilling his substantive duties to protect the estate, creditors, and debtors in a bankruptcy 
action.”). 
 86 See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 105.03-.04 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996, 
1999, 2000, 2004, & 2005) (containing an extended discussion of the powers of bankruptcy courts under 
§ 105(a)); Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting The Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power Under Section 105 Of The 
Bankruptcy Code: The All Writs Act And An Admonition From Chief Justice Marshall, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 793, 
794 (2003) (“[B]ankruptcy courts have used this Code section to allow for an enormous array of orders.”) 
(referring to § 105(a)). 
 87 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.03[5][a] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004). 
 88 Landsing Div. Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 
922 F.2d 592, 599 (10th Cir. 1990), modified, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 
105.03, at 105–23 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996 & 2000) (“The most notorious use of section 105 
has been to seek to enjoin actions which, for one reason or another, are not stayed by the automatic stay of 
section 362.”); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 342 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298 (indicating 
that § 105 grants bankruptcy courts the power to stay actions not covered by the automatic stay); S. REP. No. 
95-989, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837 (same).  Under § 362(a), the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition operates as an automatic stay which bars nearly all debt collection efforts against the debtor or the 
property of its estate.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (b) (2000). 
 89 W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 601 (“[A] temporary stay prohibiting a creditor’s suit against a non-
debtor . . . during the bankruptcy proceeding may be permissible to facilitate the reorganization process in 
accord with the broad approach to nondebtor stays under section 105(a) . . . .”); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. 
Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Section 105(a) 
empowers the court to enjoin preliminarily a creditor from continuing an action or enforcing a state court 
judgment against a nondebtor prior to confirmation of a plan.”) (citing A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. 
Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994, 1002–03 (4th Cir. 1986)); Brubaker, supra note 27, at 970 (“The propriety of . . . 
temporary non-debtor stays in certain circumstances has gained widespread acceptance in the courts . . . .”). 
 90 In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 13 n.6 (N.D. Okla. 1998); accord Brubaker, supra note 27, at 
970; see also Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 979 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[A] temporary 
injunction is sometimes needed to protect non-debtors (e.g., a corporate debtor’s principals and managing 
officers) whose time and energy should not be diverted to collateral lawsuits and away from the effort to 
reorganize the debtor.”); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 105.03[1][a], 105.03[1][b][i] (Lawrence P. King ed., 
15th ed. rev. 1996, 1999, & 2000). 
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debtor.91  However, non-debtor stays are atypical; most third-party litigation 
does not sufficiently impact the administration of the bankruptcy case to 
warrant such relief.92  As a general matter, courts temporarily enjoin 
proceedings against third parties only when it is shown that the stay is essential 
to the debtor’s reorganization.93 
Non-debtor stays must not be confused with non-debtor releases94 or 
provisional injunctions.  Stays delay actions against a third party until the 
lawsuit will no longer impair the debtor’s effort to reorganize.95  Such orders 
do not extend past confirmation of the debtor’s plan and thus do not expressly 
or implicitly extinguish claims.96  Third-party releases, however, permanently 
bar attempts to collect from the non-debtor.97  And provisional injunctions, 
while not eliminating liability, also continue after confirmation.98 
 
 91 Am. Film Tech., Inc. v. Taritero (In re Am. Film Tech., Inc.), 175 B.R. 847, 850–54 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1994) (holding that stays of litigation against managers in their official capacity are valid because the 
judgment in such a lawsuit would have collateral estoppel effect on the corporate debtor); see also Inman, 
supra note 27, at 632 n.5 (“There is a general consensus that § 105(a) empowers courts to issue temporary or 
preliminary injunctions barring suits against nondebtor third parties in order to preserve the debtor estate.”). 
 92 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.03[1], at 105–24.1 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2000) 
(noting that actions against third parties “normally would not concern the estate”). 
 93 See, e.g., Rustic Mfg. Inc. v. Marine Bank Dane County (In re Rustic Mfg., Inc.), 55 B.R. 25, 31–32 
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (preliminarily enjoining a creditor from prosecuting a state court action against 
several guarantors of its loan to the debtor until the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, where the court 
found that the lawsuit would lead to “a major disruption in the debtor’s progress towards reorganization” 
because it would seriously distract the guarantors, who were also the sole shareholders of the debtor, from 
operating the business and might lead to the creditor obtaining the guarantors’ shares); see generally 2 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 105.03[1]-[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996, 1999, 2000, & 2004) 
(offering an extensive analysis of non-debtor stays). 
 94 See Gillman v. Cont’l. Airlines (In re Cont’l. Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 217 n.17 (3d Cir. 2000) (“the 
entry of a temporary injunction or extension of the automatic stay during the pendency of a bankruptcy        
case . . . is quite a different matter” from a non-debtor release); In re Sybaris Club Int’l, Inc., 189 B.R. 152, 
157 & n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (distinguishing non-debtor releases from non-debtor stays because the former 
extend “beyond confirmation of the bankruptcy case”); Starr, supra note 27, at 487 (“A discharge differs from 
a temporary stay of litigation in that a stay does not strip a creditor of its claim but merely suspends the 
creditor’s ability to pursue them.”). 
 95 Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 979 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Digital Impact, Inc., 
223 B.R. 1, 13 n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998). 
 96 Digital Impact, 223 B.R. at 13 n.6; Brubaker, supra note 27, at 970 (“[S]upplementary non-debtor 
stays do not extend beyond plan confirmation.”); see also Monarch Life Ins., 65 F.3d at 979 (noting that non-
debtor stays “normally lapse—at the latest—following confirmation of the chapter 11 plan”). 
 97 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text; see also Starr, supra note 27, at 487 (“A discharge 
differs from a temporary stay of litigation in that a stay does not strip a creditor of its claims but merely 
suspends the creditor’s ability to pursue them.”) 
 98 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
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Most § 105(a) injunctions issued in chapter 11 cases expire prior to or upon 
confirmation of the debtor’s plan of reorganization.99  However, it is well-
established that during a bankruptcy proceeding, courts may grant injunctions 
that extend beyond confirmation.  For example, as previously noted, § 105(a) 
may be used to permanently bar third parties from attempting to assert claims 
that are property of the estate and have been extinguished pursuant to a 
settlement.100  In addition, when a debtor sells an asset “free and clear” 
pursuant to § 363(f) of the Code,101 the bankruptcy court may permanently 
enjoin a creditor from attempting to enforce any interest it previously 
possessed in the property, such as a lien.102 
Bankruptcy courts may also employ § 105(a) to issue injunctions 
subsequent to confirmation.  Indeed, even the Ninth Circuit, the leading 
judicial opponent of third-party releases, has noted that “[s]ection 105(a) 
permits the court to issue both preliminary and permanent injunctions after 
confirmation of a plan to protect the debtor and the administration of the 
bankruptcy estate.”103  But the types of postconfirmation injunctions that have 
anything approaching universal assent are granted in narrow circumstances, 
 
 99 See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.03 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996 & 2000) 
(identifying various types of § 105(a) injunctions, most of which are issued during the pendency of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy and terminate prior to or upon confirmation of the debtor’s plan). 
 100 In re Energy Coop., Inc., 886 F.2d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The power of the court under    
[§ 105(a)] . . . includes the power to issue an injunction enjoining third parties from pursuing actions which are 
the exclusive property of the debtor estate and are dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement.”); see also 
Sobchack v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 17 F.3d 600, 602–04 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (affirming an order of the bankruptcy court enjoining the debtor’s preferred stockholders from suing 
certain managers of the debtor for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference because the claims were 
derivative, belonged to the estate, and thus were extinguished as part of a settlement between the debtor and 
the managers) (no citation to § 105(a)); supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (taxonomy discussion of 
derivative releases). 
 101 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000). 
 102 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that bankruptcy 
courts may use § 105(a) to issue an injunction barring a creditor from seeking to enforce an interest in property 
purchased from the debtor under § 363(f) where the injunction is “necessary and appropriate to give the ‘free 
and clear’ aspect of § 363(f) meaning”); P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc. v. Virginia (In re P.K.R. Convalescent 
Ctrs., Inc.), 189 B.R. 90, 96 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (“Accordingly, § 105[(a)] authorizes this court to enjoin 
any act to collect an interest in the bankruptcy estate in contravention of a court order to sell the property free 
and clear of all interests under § 363(f)(5).”); see also Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000) (“And 
thus when an asset of the estate is sold by the trustee in bankruptcy free and clear of any liens, the court can 
enjoin a creditor from suing to enforce a preexisting lien in the asset.”) (no citation to § 105(a)).  For a more 
thorough discussion of § 363(f), see infra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
 103 Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 625 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); accord United Model Distribs., Inc. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. (In re United 
Model Distribs., Inc.), No. 90 B 24281, No. 91 A 1120, 1992 WL 503595, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 1, 1992) 
(same). 
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and then only after a substantial showing of necessity.104  For example, courts 
have used § 105(a) to enjoin creditors from attempting to collect on a 
discharged debt105 and to protect the qualified immunity granted to members of 
the official creditors’ committee in the debtor’s bankruptcy.106 
In addition to injunctions, bankruptcy courts may use § 105(a) to, inter alia, 
disallow state court judgments obtained via fraud,107 recharacterize claims as 
interests,108 grant substantive consolidation,109 appoint legal representatives for 
classes of claims,110 allocate payments made to the IRS to specific tax 
liabilities of the debtor,111 and marshal estate assets.112  Marshaling assets 
“refers to the equitable power of a court to require a creditor with two discrete 
sources of payment to exhaust the one specified by the court before seeking 
 
 104 See Spiers Graff Spiers v. Menarko (In re Spiers Graff Spiers), 190 B.R. 1001, 1012 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1996) (holding that bankruptcy courts may enter postconfirmation injunctions under § 105(a) “only where 
necessary to protect plan implementation from powerful activity by third parties that directly impedes the 
plan”). 
 105 See, e.g., Polysat, Inc. v. Union Tank Car Co. (In re Polysat, Inc.), 152 B.R. 886, 896 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1993) (enjoining a creditor from prosecuting a state court action regarding a discharged debt); Askew v. 
Channel (In re Askew), 61 B.R. 87, 89 (Bankr S.D. Ohio 1986) (same). 
 106 See, e.g., Polygram Distrib., Inc. v. B-A Systems, Inc. (In re Burstein-Applebee Co.), 63 B.R. 1011, 
1018–20 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (permanently enjoining the debtor’s principal’s state court tortious 
interference and defamation action against the creditors’ committee for actions taken by the committee during 
the course of the bankruptcy because such lawsuits would have a chilling effect on the administration of 
bankruptcy estates).  Section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code mandates the creation of an official committee to 
represent the interests of unsecured creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).  Section 1103, which sets forth 
the duties of official committees and their members, see § 1103(a), (c), “has been interpreted to imply both a 
fiduciary duty to committee constituents and a limited grant of immunity to committee members.”  In re PWS 
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 246 (3d Cir. 2000) (collecting authorities).  This “immunity covers committee 
members for actions within the scope of their duties.”  Id; accord 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1103.05[4][a] 
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2002) (“A member of an official committee has a qualified immunity 
from legal action for matters relating to the performance of the committee’s duties.”).  But it does not extend to 
“willful misconduct or ultra vires acts.”  PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d at 246; accord Philip v. L.F. 
Rothschild Holdings, Inc. (In re L.F. Rothschild Holdings, Inc.), 163 B.R. 45, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 107 Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 108 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.04[4][e] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (collecting 
authorities). 
 109 Id. ¶ 105.04[2], at 105–63 (noting that “recently courts have focused on section 105’s language to 
justify” substantive consolidations).  Substantive consolidation “is the merging of the assets and claims of two 
or more estates.”  Id.  For a fuller discussion of substantive consolidation, see generally 2 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.09 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1998 & 2005). 
 110 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.04[4][a] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004). 
 111 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 548–49 (1990); see infra Part IV. 
 112 Me. Assoc. v. United States (In re Morahan), 53 B.R. 489, 492 (D. Me. 1985); In re Corso Stein 
Enters., Inc., 79 B.R. 584, 586–87 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.04[3] (Lawrence 
P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004); see also C.T. Dev. Corp. v. Barnes (In re Oxford Dev. Ltd.), 67 F.3d 683, 
686–87 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that bankruptcy courts have the authority to apply the equitable doctrine of 
marshaling of assets under federal bankruptcy law, but failing to cite § 105(a)). 
SILVERSTEIN GALLEYSFINAL 2/19/2007  2:08:42 PM 
36 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23 
repayment from the other.”113  It is employed to prevent the creditor from 
destroying the rights of a junior claimant where the latter has access to only 
one of the two funds.114 
Section 105(a) is not the only source of equitable authority in the Code.  
Bankruptcy courts also derive equitable power from § 1123(b)(6),115 which 
states that a chapter 11 plan may “include any other appropriate provisions not 
inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”116  Section 1123(b)(6) 
is more limited in scope than § 105(a) because the former may only be used to 
include items in a plan reorganization.117  A bankruptcy court may employ 
§ 105(a), however, at any time after the filing of a bankruptcy petition, 
including postconfirmation.118  Section 1123(b)(6) is nonetheless an important 
source of authority, and courts have used it to include numerous types of 
provisions in chapter 11 plans, such as reporting requirements, debt retirement 
schedules, and tax payment allocations.119 
 
 113 2 COLLIER ¶ 105.04[3]. 
 114 See Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233, 236 (1963) (“The equitable doctrine of marshalling [of 
assets] rests upon the principle that a creditor having two funds to satisfy his debt, may not by his application 
of them to his demand, defeat another creditor, who may resort to only one of the funds.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); C.T. Dev. Corp. v. Barnes (In re Oxford Dev. Ltd.), 67 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 1995) (“If a 
senior lienor has a lien that extends to and covers two funds or potential funds, and if a junior lienor has 
recourse to only one of those funds to satisfy the debt due him, the senior lienor may be required to exhaust the 
fund available to him exclusively before proceeding against the fund that is also available to the junior 
lienor.”). 
 115 See United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (holding that § 1123(b)(6) is 
“consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority 
to modify creditor-debtor relationships”). 
 116 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) (2000). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 548–50 (affirming the use of § 105(a) to allocate IRS payments to 
specified tax liabilities of the debtor fourteen months after confirmation of the plan of reorganization); see 
generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 105.03-.04 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996, 1999, 2000, 
2004, & 2005) (discussing numerous pre and postconfirmation uses of § 105(a)). 
 119 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1123.02[6] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004); Energy Res., 
495 U.S. at 548–50 (tax payment allocation provisions). 
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The bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers are, of course, not unlimited.120  It 
is well-established that § 105(a) may not be used in a manner that is 
inconsistent with another section of the Bankruptcy Code.121  And the plain 
language of § 1123(b)(6) imposes a similar restriction on the use of that law.122  
Orders issued under § 105(a) may also be invalid if they contravene the clear 
dictates of federal statutes located outside the Bankruptcy Code that address 
bankruptcy issues.123 
Nonetheless, the precise contours of the equitable powers granted by the 
Code are not clear.  There are two general positions regarding the scope of 
§ 105(a),124 the principal statute. 
 
 120 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) (“The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize 
free-wheeling consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the equities relate to the success 
of the reorganization.”); Architectural Bldg. Components v. McClarty (In re Foremost Mfg. Co.), 137 F.3d 
919, 924 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he district court was correct in noting that, although the bankruptcy court has 
broad equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), those powers are not unlimited.”); 2 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[2], at 105-7 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (“[I]t should be universally 
recognized that the power granted to the bankruptcy courts under section 105 is not boundless and should not 
be employed as a panacea for all ills confronted in the bankruptcy case.”). 
 121 Noonan v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (“The bankruptcy court may not utilize section 105(a) if another, more particularized Code 
provision . . . impedes the requested exercise of equitable power.”); Smith v. Omni Mfg., Inc. (In re Smith), 21 
F.3d 660, 666 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Bankruptcy courts cannot use their equity power under Section 105(a) . . . to 
negate substantive rights or remedies that are available” under the Code); Chiasson v. J. Louis Matherne & 
Assocs. (In re Oxford Management, Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he powers granted by 
[§ 105(a)] . . . must be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.”) (a bankruptcy 
court may not employ § 105(a) to alter the priority of claims as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2000)); In re 
Plaza de Diego Shopping Ctr., Inc., 911 F.2d 820, 830–32 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Even as a court of equity, 
however, the bankruptcy court’s equitable discretion [under § 105(a)] is limited and cannot be used in a 
manner inconsistent with the commands of the Bankruptcy Code.”) (holding that a bankruptcy court may not 
use § 105(a) to appoint a trustee because 11 U.S.C. § 1104(d) (2000) (at the time, 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1988)) 
expressly granted that right exclusively to the U.S. trustee); 2 COLLIER ¶ 105.01[2], at 105-7 (“Section 105 
does not allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy        
Code . . . .”). 
 122 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) (2000) (chapter 11 plan may “include appropriate provisions not inconsistent 
with the applicable provisions of this title”) (emphasis added). 
 123 See, e.g., Rice v. United States (In re Rice), 78 F.3d 1144, 1151 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e believe that [a 
bankruptcy court’s equitable] powers must be exercised in a manner consistent with federal statutes addressing 
the conditions under which discharges may be granted, even where those statutes are not part of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 292f(g) (2000), which permits the complete discharge of Health 
Education Assistance Loans only where denial of such a discharge would be unconscionable, prohibited the 
bankruptcy court from using § 105(a) to partially discharge the debtor’s education loans where denial of a 
complete discharge was not unconscionable); see also infra notes 561–63 and accompanying text (discussing 
another limit on a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers that is contained in a statute not part of the Bankruptcy 
Code). 
 124 2 COLLIER ¶ 105.01[2], at 105–7. 
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Relying upon the Supreme Court’s statement in Norwest Bank Worthington 
v. Ahlers that “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts 
must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy 
Code,”125 a number of courts have strictly construed § 105(a).  According to 
this “narrow view,” § 105(a) “does not authorize bankruptcy courts to create 
substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or 
constitute a roving commission to do equity.”126  Instead, the statute may only 
be used to enforce other, specific provisions in the Code127—it merely “confers 
 
 125 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
 126 United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted); accord New England 
Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 
92 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting the passage from Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1308, set forth in the text); Smith v. Omni 
Mfg., Inc. (In re Smith), 21 F.3d 660, 666 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Bankruptcy courts cannot use their equity power 
under Section 105(a) to fashion substantive rights and remedies not contained in the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”); 
In re Morristown & Erie R.R. Co., 885 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Nor does section 105(a) give the court 
the power to create substantive rights that would otherwise be unavailable under the Code.”); 2 COLLIER ¶ 
105.01[2], at 105-8 (quoting the passage from Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1308, set forth in the text). 
 127 See, e.g., New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart 
Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that § 105(a) only grants bankruptcy 
courts the power to enforce the specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code) (citing Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)); Jamo v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 
392, 403–04 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The authority bestowed [under § 105] may be invoked only if, and to the extent 
that the equitable remedy dispensed by the court is necessary to preserve an identifiable right preserved 
elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code.”) (citing Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206); In re Myrvang, 232 F.2d 1116, 1125 
(9th Cir. 2000) (“Exercise of § 105 powers must be linked to another specific Bankruptcy Code provision.”); 
Noonan v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(“But since section 105 itself is not a source of new substantive rights, the bankruptcy court may invoke 
section 105(a) only if the equitable remedy utilized is demonstrably necessary to preserve a right elsewhere 
provided in the Code.”) (citing Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206); In re Fesco Plastics, Inc., 996 F.2d 152, 154, 156 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (citing Ahlers for the proposition that “[u]nder [§ 105(a)], a court may exercise its equitable power 
only as a means to fulfill some specific Code provision,” and concluding that therefore a bankruptcy court may 
not use § 105(a) to create a new exception to the Code’s prohibition on the recovery of post-petition interest by 
unsecured creditors); In re Morristown & Erie R.R. Co., 885 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Section 105(a) 
authorizes the bankruptcy court, or the district court sitting in bankruptcy, to fashion such orders as are 
required to further the substantive provisions of the Code.”); see also Meltzer, supra note 27, at 18 (arguing 
that § 105(a) must be used in conjunction with another, specific provision of the Code); Boyle, supra note 27, 
at 438 (same). 
It should be noted that while a majority of courts appear to have equated the “no substantive rights” 
language from Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1308, with the “tethering” requirement, other courts have used the “no 
substantive rights” locution in different ways.  For example, in Sutton itself, the Fifth Circuit appeared to use 
the “no substantive rights” language to indicate that § 105(a) may not be used to contradict the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Id. at 1308; accord Chiasson v. J. Louis Matherne and Assoc. (In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329, 
1334 (5th Cir. 1993).  And the expression is used in other ways as well.  See infra notes 550, 657, and 
accompanying text; see also Bogart, supra note 86, at 803 (observing that courts use a “confused discourse” in 
applying § 105(a)). 
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power to issue procedural orders.”128  Orders implementing general bankruptcy 
policies are impermissible.129  To illustrate, when a court enjoins a third party 
from prosecuting a derivative claim that was settled as part of the debtor’s plan 
of reorganization,130 the court is using § 105(a) to enforce § 1123(b)(3)(A), 
which declares that a plan of reorganization may provide for “the settlement or 
adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or the estate.”131  
Similarly, when a court issues an injunction barring a creditor from attempting 
to enforce its prior lien on property that was disposed of free and clear in a 
bankruptcy sale,132 § 105(a) is employed as an adjunct to § 363(f).133  Indeed, 
courts adopting the “narrow view” consider a non-debtor stay to be a § 105(a)-
created extension of the general stay imposed by § 362(a).134 
In defense of the limited approach, Collier observes that § 105(a) uses the 
term “provisions” rather than “purposes” in describing a bankruptcy court’s 
authority “to effect the mandate of the Bankruptcy Code.”135  This suggests 
that § 105(a) may only be used in conjunction with another Code section “and 
not merely to [promote] a general bankruptcy concept or objective.”136 
 
 128 Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd., Inc.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1987); accord 
Alisa Loretta Pittman and Erin Hawkins, Survey, The Controversy Surrounding the Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy 
Courts, 5 J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 387, 419 (1996) (“Section 105(a) . . . is merely a procedural rather than a 
substantive rule . . . .”); see also Bird v. Carl’s Grocery Co. (In re NWFX, Inc.), 864 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 
1989) (“Nevertheless, Chapter 1 of the Bankruptcy Code is essentially procedural. It does not set out 
substantive rights of the parties.”). 
 129 See 641 Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re 641 Assocs., Ltd.), Bankr. No. 91-11234S, 
Adv. Nos. 93-0363S, 93-0456S, 1993 WL 332646, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1993) (“The Debtor’s 
contention that the relief sought would be extremely significant to, if not essential to, its successful 
reorganization is, in itself, not a sufficient basis for allowing invocation of § 105(a) to provide the relief sought 
here for several reasons. . . .  Secondly, we believe that a debtor, under the Code, must achieve confirmation of 
a Plan within the confines of the Code.”). 
 130 See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
 131 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (2000). 
 132 See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-0056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820325, at *8 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Mar. 27, 2001) (holding that a § 105(a) injunction does not “create substantive rights” when used “to 
carry out the effect and purpose of § 363(f)”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1996) (holding that bankruptcy courts may use § 105(a) to issue an injunction baring a creditor from seeking to 
enforce an interest in property purchased from the debtor under § 363(f) where the injunction is “necessary and 
appropriate to give the ‘free and clear’ aspect of § 363(f) meaning”). 
 133 § 363(f). 
 134 See, e.g., Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 979 (1st Cir. 1995) (observing that 
non-debtor stays “serve simply as adjuncts to the automatic stay” of § 362(a)); see also Bill Roderick Distrib., 
Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 762 (D. Utah. 1985) (indicating that non-debtor 
stays are only “procedural” because they expire upon confirmation of the reorganization plan). 
 135 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[1] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004). 
 136 Id.; accord New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart 
Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 2 COLLIER ¶ 105.01[1]); Bogart, supra note 
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There is another school of thought, however, that endorses an expansive 
interpretation of the equitable powers available under § 105(a).137  According 
to this “broad view,” “certain goals of the Bankruptcy Code are implied but not 
stated in the statutory language,” and § 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts the 
authority to “fill the gaps left by the statutory language” in effectuating the 
Code’s overarching purposes.138  As a result, courts in this camp believe that it 
is permissible to issue orders under § 105(a) without tying the order to a 
specific Code provision.  The order may be linked, instead, to a general 
bankruptcy policy,139 most typically, the paramount policy favoring successful 
reorganizations.140  To illustrate, courts have relied upon § 105(a) to marshal 
assets,141 issue provisional injunctions,142 allow early payment of prepetition 
claims to creditor-vendors who threaten to withhold goods and services 
essential to the debtor’s business operations,143 and partially discharge student 
debts,144 even though nothing in the Code expressly authorizes these orders.145 
 
86, at 803–04 (“Viewed technically, section 105 permits the courts to issue orders that are necessary to carry 
out provisions of the Code.  This is a more specific word than objectives, goals or purposes.  It would seem 
that this word choice marks a clear, unalterable outer limit of power.”). 
 137 2 COLLIER ¶ 105.01[2], at 105-7. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See, e.g., Bird v. Carl’s Grocery Co. (In re NWFX, Inc.), 864 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that the bankruptcy court’s “broad equitable powers may only be used to further the policies and 
provisions of the Code”) (emphasis added); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Allied Stores Corp. (In re Federated 
Dept. Stores, Inc.), 133 B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (“[T]his Court cannot agree with Appellants 
that the lack of a specific reference in the Bankruptcy Code must preclude equitable authority in the 
Bankruptcy Court, providing, of course, that the action does not fly in the face of unambiguous language in 
Title 11.”). 
 140 See, e.g., In re Commc’n Options, Inc., 299 B.R. 481, 482 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003) (“[T]his Court 
believes it has inherent and express equity powers to take appropriate action necessary to protect a 
reorganizing debtor’s potential for reorganization and the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”) (ordering the 
appointment of a “responsible party to act for the debtor” because the debtor was using “non-productive delay 
tactics . . . to avoid paying its creditors” and consistently taking action “solely to protect its insiders”). 
 141 See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 142 See, e.g., In re Seatco, Inc., 257 B.R. 469, 474–78 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that § 105(a) 
permitted the court to approve of a provisional injunction contained in the debtor’s plan because, inter alia, the 
debtor’s “opportunity to successfully reorganize [would be] substantially threatened” without the injunction); 
In re Mac Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *9-*10 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000) 
(concluding that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) confer upon bankruptcy courts sufficient authority to issue 
provisional injunctions and approving of the one set forth in the debtor’s plan because the injunction was 
“‘essential’” to the debtor’s reorganization). 
 143 See, e.g., In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824–25 (D. Del. 1999) (“[C]ourts have used their 
equitable power under section 105(a) of the Code to authorize the payment of pre-petition claims when such 
payment is deemed necessary to the survival of a debtor in a chapter 11 reorganization . . . .”); In re 
Wehnrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468, 469 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001) (“Payment of the prepetition claims of these 
vendors . . . is necessary to realize the possibility of a successful reorganization.  Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105(a) the Court may authorize the payment of prepetition claims when such payments are necessary to the 
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Collier ultimately favors the broad view: “Given the broad mandate to 
bankruptcy courts generally to reorganize debtors, to afford a fresh start to 
debtors and to distribute funds equitably to creditors, an expansive construction 
[of § 105(a)] is justified.”146 
As will be demonstrated below, the disagreement over the scope of a 
bankruptcy court’s equitable powers is central to the debate concerning the 
propriety of third-party releases.147 
B. Section 524 and the Bankruptcy Discharge 
Upon emerging from bankruptcy, a debtor is generally entitled to a 
“discharge” of all of its liabilities, other than certain specified claims.148  
 
continued operation of the debtor.”); see generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.04[5][a] (Lawrence P. 
King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (discussing the split in the courts over the “doctrine of necessity” or “necessity of 
payment doctrine” and concluding that the doctrine’s continued viability is questionable). 
 144 See, e.g., Kapinos v. Graduate Loan Ctr. (In re Kapinos), 243 B.R. 271, 275–77 (W.D. Va. 2000) 
(concurring with the authorities holding that courts may use § 105(a) to partially discharge student debts that 
are non-dischargeable in full in the absence of undue hardship under § 523(a)(8)). 
 145 Kapinos, 243 B.R. at 275 (“The language of § 523(a)(8) does not explicitly authorize partial 
discharge.”) (emphasis added); In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824–25 (D. Del. 1999) (noting that the 
doctrine of necessity or necessity of payment doctrine “was not codified in the Bankruptcy Code”); Century 
Brass Prod., Inc. v. Colonial Bank (In re Century Brass Prod., Inc.), 95 B.R. 277, 279 (D. Conn. 1989) (“A 
right in bankruptcy to obtain the marshalling of assets is not expressly provided in the Bankruptcy Code.  
Nonetheless we will assume, for purposes of argument only, that in an appropriate case the Bankruptcy Court, 
as a court of equity, could order the marshalling of assets for the benefit of a creditor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105(a).”) (emphasis added); cf. In re Mac Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *9-*10 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000) (relying upon §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), alone, to issue a provisional 
injunction). 
 146 2 COLLIER ¶ 105.01[2], at 105–8; accord id. at 105–9 (“The equitable origins of the bankruptcy power 
suggest substantial leeway to tailor solutions to meet the diverse problems facing bankruptcy courts.  Section 
105 gives the bankruptcy court the power to fill in gaps [in the Code] and further the statutory mandates of 
Congress in an efficient manner.”); see also Bogart, supra note 86, at 803 (“It is unclear which reading is the 
dominant view.”); id. at 803 n.38 (“In truth, although one approach to section 105 powers of bankruptcy courts 
may gain strength at different points over time, both expansive and restrictive applications of the provision 
have existed from the Code’s inception.”). 
As the material in the text should make clear, the debate over the scope of a bankruptcy court’s 
equitable powers has focused almost exclusively on § 105(a).  Section 1123(b)(6) is seldom mentioned.  This 
is not terribly surprising.  Section 105(a) is generally considered to be the primary equitable statute in the 
Code.  See supra note 8.  For purposes of this Article, I shall treat § 1123(b)(6) as conferring powers no 
broader than § 105(a). 
 147 See infra Part III. 
 148 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 524, 727, 944, 1141(d) (2000).  Individual debtors reorganizing under chapter 
13 are generally not entitled to a discharge until they complete all payments under their plan of reorganization.  
See § 1328(a)-(b).  And the same is now true for individuals filing under chapter 11.  See Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 321(d)(2), 119 Stat. 95 (adding 11 
U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A)-(B)); id. § 330(b), 119 Stat. 101 (adding 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(C)). 
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Section 524 of the Code sets forth the precise impact of a discharge.149  
Pursuant to that statute, the discharge of a debt “voids any judgment” based on 
the claim150 and “operates as an injunction” against any attempt to collect upon 
the claim from the debtor personally.151 
Section 524(e) contains an important limitation on the scope of the 
discharge.  It provides that, aside from a minor exception, the “discharge of a 
debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the 
property of any other entity for, such debt.”152  Courts have universally 
interpreted this language to mean that the discharge of a debtor does not, by 
itself, affect the liability of a codebtor on a discharged obligation.153  In 
essence, then, a bankruptcy discharge “does not extinguish the debt itself, but 
merely releases the debtor from personal liability for the debt.”154  This leaves 
creditors free to obtain any deficiency from a co-obligor.155  Without § 524(e), 
 
 149 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.01, at 524-14.5 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2005); see 
generally § 524.  Section 524 applies to all cases under chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13.  § 103. 
 150 § 524(a)(1). 
 151 § 524(a)(2). 
 152 § 524(e).  Section 524(e)’s legislative history “does little more than restate the section.”  Lewis, supra 
note 27, at 164; see S. REP. No. 95-989, at 81, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867 (“Subsection [(e)] 
provides the discharge of the debtor does not affect co-debtors or guarantors.”).  The legislative history thus 
“offers little interpretive insight.”  Boyle, supra note 27, at 424. 
 153 See e.g., Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) 
(“[D]ischarge operates as an injunction, but only against suing the debtor; the statute is explicit on this point, 
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) . . . .”); First Fidelity Bank v. McAteer, 985 F.2d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[Section 524(e)] 
assures creditors that the discharge of a debtor will not preclude them from collecting the full amount of a debt 
from co-debtors or other liable parties.”); FDIC v. Municipality of Ponce, 904 F.2d 740, 747–49 (1st Cir. 
1990) (holding that § 524(e) preserves the liability “of a guarantor on the obligations of a debtor whose debts 
have been discharged in bankruptcy”); Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. La. Nat’l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev. 
Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1351 (5th Cir. 1989) (“A discharge in bankruptcy will simply not affect the liability of 
a guarantor.”); Spiers Graff Spiers v. Menarko (In re Spiers Graff Spiers), 190 B.R. 1001, 1011 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1996) (“[Section 524(e)] at least stands for the proposition that, unless rights of creditors against third 
parties are expressly addressed in the plan, a plan of reorganization and the resulting discharge of a debtor does 
not affect rights that creditors may have against third party non-debtors.”); In re Dollar Assoc., 172 B.R. 945, 
951 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that under § 524(e) “[c]onfirmation of a plan cannot discharge a non-
debtor co-obligor”); see also Boyle, supra note 27, at 421–22 (“[C]ourts have unanimously held that where a 
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization is silent on a non-debtor’s liability, § 524(e) applies to bar the discharge of 
the non-debtor.”); Han, supra note 27, at 565 & n.114 (“Where a plan does not expressly purport to release the 
liability of a nondebtor, courts have consistently interpreted section 524(e) as preserving the liability of that 
nondebtor on the debtor’s obligations.”) (collecting authorities). 
 154 Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1993); see also § 524(a)(1), (2), 
discussed supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 155 Landsing Div. Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 
922 F.2d 592, 600–01 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that numerous courts have confirmed that “creditors whose 
claims have been discharged vis-à-vis the bankrupt [may] recover on the same claims from third parties”), 
modified, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991); Han, supra note 27, at 565 (“Consequently, the creditor may proceed 
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the discharge of the debtor might automatically extinguish claims against 
guarantors and other codebtors under the common law of suretyship, which 
provides that the release of a primary obligor discharges any party that is 
secondarily liable.156 
Section 524(e) had several precursors in the Bankruptcy Act.157  The 
primary statute was section 16 which stated: “[T]he liability of a person who is 
a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt shall 
not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt.”158  Similarly, section 4(b) of 
the Act provided: “[T]he bankruptcy of a corporation shall not release its 
officers, the members of its board of directors or trustees or of similar 
controlling bodies, or its stockholders or members, as such, from any liability 
under the laws of a State or of the United States.”159  Finally, section 5(j) 
stated: “[T]he discharge of a partnership shall not discharge the individual 
general partners thereof from the partnership debts.”160 
Some courts interpreted section 16 to bar non-debtor releases.161  However, 
under the Bankruptcy Act, courts generally held that third-party releases were 
invalid on jurisdictional grounds,162 and thus few courts had occasion to apply 
sections 16, 4(b), and 5(j) to such releases.163 
 
against the debtor’s co-debtor or guarantors to collect an unpaid portion of the original debt, to the extent a 
creditor has not received full payment of its original debt from a distribution in bankruptcy.”). 
 156 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 971–72 & n.46 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND 
GUARANTY §§ 39-44 & intro. note, at 167 (1996)); see also In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 10 (N.D. 
Okla. 1998) (“[S]ection 524(e) was intended to insure that co-debtors or guarantors . . . are not automatically 
released from the debtor or guaranty upon the discharge of a debtor . . . .”) (emphasis removed). 
 157 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 158 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 16, 30 Stat. 550 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1976)). 
 159 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 4(b), 52 Stat. 845 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1976)). 
 160 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 5(j), 52 Stat. 845 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 23(j) (1976)).  It 
should be noted that at least one commentator has suggested that § 524(e) was meant to reenact only section 16 
and not sections 4(b) and 5(j).  See Feldstein, supra note 27, at 32.  Other commentators disagree.  See Lewis, 
supra note 27, at 164 (concluding that § 524(e) is based upon both section 16 and section 4(b) of the Act); see 
also Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that § 524(e) is “a reenactment of 
Section 16 of the 1898 Act,” but also citing section 4(b) in construing § 524(e)). 
 161 See, e.g., Union Carbide v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that under section 16 
creditor approval cannot effectuate a non-debtor release); R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Synder, 539 F.2d. 487, 
490 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (invalidating a non-debtor release in the debtor’s plan because “[t]he bankruptcy court 
can affect only the relationships of debtors and creditor.  It has no power to affect the obligations of 
guarantors.”) 
 162 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1053 (“Because courts under the 1898 Act, as a rule, refused to enjoin 
suits between non-debtors, even temporarily, it is not at all surprising that these courts also rejected occasional 
efforts to obtain permanent non-debtor releases through a plan of reorganization . . . .”); id. at 1053 n.353 
(collecting authorities holding that bankruptcy courts did not have jurisdiction to grant non-debtor releases); id. 
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III. THE SPLIT IN THE COURTS OVER THE PROPRIETY OF NON-DEBTOR 
RELEASES 
This Part summarizes the judicial debate over the validity of non-debtor 
releases.  It also discusses some arguments raised by commentators.  Subpart A 
addresses the primary anti-release authorities.  Subpart B discusses the pro-
release case law.164  Subpart C revisits the anti-release position to present a 
final argument best considered after the discussion of the pro-release decisions.  
Finally, Subpart D considers, and rejects, attempts by judges and scholars to 
reconcile the two lines of authority. 
A. The Anti-Release Cases 
Courts holding that non-debtor releases are impermissible under the 
Bankruptcy Code focus primarily on § 524(e).  They maintain that the statute’s 
express language bars such releases and that the policies underlying § 524(e) 
bolster this interpretation. 
The Ninth Circuit is the leading proponent of the view that third-party 
releases are invalid under § 524(e).  The court first articulated this position in 
Underhill v. Royal.165  There, the debtor’s plan of reorganization contained a 
provision that purportedly released the debtor’s founder (Royal) and other 
related parties from all claims arising from certain notes executed by the 
debtor.166  The persons that had invested in the notes were classified as 
unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy.167  A majority of them voted in favor of 
the plan.168  However, the Underhills dissented, specifically objecting to the 
 
at 1051–52 & n.352 (observing that under the Bankruptcy Act courts generally held that they did not have 
jurisdiction to grant non-debtor stays and collecting authorities). 
 163 And some of the courts that relied upon § 16 did so only in support of a jurisdictional argument.  See 
Weber v. Diversey Bldg. Corp. (In re Diversey Bldg. Corp.), 86 F.2d 456, 456–58 (7th Cir. 1936) (holding that 
the bankruptcy judge did not have jurisdiction to confirm a plan releasing a guarantor of the debtor or to issue 
a permanent injunction enforcing the plan and concluding that its jurisdictional argument was “supported by 
Section 16 of the Bankruptcy Act”); In re Nine N. Church St., Inc., 82 F.3d 186, 188–89 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 164 Some courts categorize the decisions regarding non-debtor releases into three camps—pro-release, 
anti-release, and pro-voluntary release.  See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 476–78 (E.D. Mich. 
2000) (adopting this classification system), rev’d on other grounds, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); see also 
Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1 (same).  As noted in the taxonomy section above, this Article’s focus is on 
involuntary third-party releases.  See supra Part I.A.  Accordingly, this Article classifies as “anti-release” any 
court holding that only voluntary non-debtor releases are permissible under the Code. 
 165 769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 166 Id. at 1429–30. 
 167 Id. at 1429. 
 168 Id. at 1430. 
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release.169  The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, but only pursuant to a 
stipulation that the validity of the release would be determined by the district 
court.170  That court ruled that the release was unenforceable and ultimately 
entered judgment against Royal on the Underhills’ cause of action for 
securities law violations relating to the notes.171 
Royal appealed to the Ninth Circuit where he contended that the release 
barred the Underhills’ claims against him.172  He also argued that the provision 
was valid because the investors approved it when they voted in favor of the 
plan.173  The Ninth Circuit disagreed. 
The court explained that under § 524(e) the discharge of a debtor generally 
“will not discharge the liabilities of co-debtors or guarantors.”174  That statute, 
and its precursors in the Bankruptcy Act, “underscore the limitations on the 
Bankruptcy Court.”175  Moreover, a debtor is discharged by “operation of the 
bankruptcy laws, not by consent of the creditors.”176  From this, the court 
summarily concluded that 
the bankruptcy court has no power to discharge the liabilities of a 
nondebtor pursuant to the consent of the creditors as part of a 
reorganization plan.  The broad language of § 524(e), limiting the 
scope of a discharge so that it “does not affect the liability of any 
other entity,” encompasses this result.177 
The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of non-debtor releases in In re American 
Hardwoods, Inc.178  The debtor in that case, American Hardwoods, requested 
that the bankruptcy court issue a permanent injunction under § 105(a) barring 
Deutsche Credit Corporation from enforcing a state court judgment against the 
 
 169 Id.  The Ninth Circuit’s opinion does not explicitly address whether the Underhills would have 
received full compensation for their securities law claims against Royal under the debtor’s chapter 11 plan.  Id. 
at 1429–30. 
 170 Id. at 1430. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 1431–32. 
 173 Id. at 1432. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 177 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2000)). 
 178 Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
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Keelers, shareholders of the debtor and guarantors of its debt to Deutsche.179  
The bankruptcy court found that if Deutsche pursued its judgment, the 
company would execute on the Keelers’ stock in American Hardwoods, 
destroying the Keelers’ incentive to operate the debtor.180  Under this scenario, 
the reorganization would likely fail.181  Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court 
denied the motion for a permanent injunction,182 and the district court 
affirmed.183 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed “whether section 105 invests the 
court with power to order the permanent relief requested by American 
[Hardwoods].”184  The court acknowledged that § 105(a) endows bankruptcy 
courts “with general equitable powers,” but ruled that the statute “does not 
authorize relief inconsistent with more specific law.”185  Then, after quoting 
the holding in Underhill,186 the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[s]ection    
524(e) . . . limits the court’s equitable powers under section 105 to order the 
discharge of the liabilities of nondebtors, such as the Keelers.”187 
The Tenth Circuit followed American Hardwoods in In re Western Real 
Estate Fund, Inc., holding that § 524(e) prohibits any permanent injunction 
“extended post-confirmation that effectively relieves the non-debtor from its 
own liability to the creditor.”188  In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit 
explained that § 524(e) evinces a Congressional policy not to extend the 
benefits of a discharge to non-debtors because these parties have not “invoked 
 
 179 Id. at 622.  American Hardwood’s plan clearly did not provide payment in full to Deutsche on the 
claims guaranteed by the Keelers.  If it had, Deutsche would not have needed to file a separate lawsuit against 
the Keelers seeking to enforce the guaranty. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 623. 
 184 Id. at 624. 
 185 Id. at 625. 
 186 Id. (quoting Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a bankruptcy court 
has no power to discharge the liabilities of non-debtors)). 
 187 Id. at 626.  It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit found additional support for its conclusions in 
§ 524(a).  11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000).  This argument will be addressed in Part V, see infra notes 633–49 and 
accompanying text, because nearly all subsequent anti-release authorities ignored § 524(a), focusing solely on 
§ 524(e), see infra notes 188–204 and accompanying text. 
 188 Landsing Div. Props. v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 
F.2d 592, 601–02 (10th Cir. 1990) (expressly following Am. Hardwoods, 885 F.2d 621).  The party that the 
debtor sought to enjoin was not scheduled to receive payment in full on its claim under the debtor’s plan.  W. 
Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 598 (“The bankruptcy court permanently enjoined Abel from further 
prosecution of his state action against PSO, conditioned only on timely payment of the diminished fee claim 
allowed against [the debtor].”) (emphasis added). 
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and submitted to the bankruptcy process.”189  This policy is further reflected in 
the fact that a bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish debts; it “merely 
releases the debtor from personal liability,” leaving co-obligors responsible for 
any deficiencies.190  But a non-debtor release effectively discharges the debt of 
a third party,191 contrary to Congressional intent.  Section 524(e) thus bars this 
type of relief.192  And since the equitable powers granted by § 105(a) “may not 
be exercised in a manner that is inconsistent with other, more specific 
provisions of the Code,” that statute does not provide authority for non-debtor 
releases.193 
Numerous decisions have either adopted the holdings of Underhill, 
American Hardwoods, and Western Real Estate Fund or reached the same 
conclusion regarding the scope of § 524(e).194  Some of these cases, as well as 
 
 189 Id. at 600. 
 190 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Boyle, supra note 27, at 437 (“Section 524(a) restricts 
a discharge to debts that are [a] ‘personal liabilit[y] of the debtor.’”) (quoting § 524(a)(1)-(2)). 
 191 W. Real Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 600.  The plan did not pay the creditor’s claim in full, id. at 598, so 
the permanent injunction was an actual release. 
 192 Id. at 602. 
 193 Id. at 601. 
 194 For the decision in the First Circuit, see In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 729–31 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (§ 524(e) bars non-debtor releases; invalidating an actual release). 
For the decision in the Second Circuit, see In re Texaco, Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(stating in dicta that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases), appeal dismissed by 92 B.R. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see 
also Keene Corp. v. Acstar Ins. Co. (In re Keene Corp.), 162 B.R. 935, 946–47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (ruling 
that § 524(e) prohibits bankruptcy court orders that prevent creditors from enforcing disallowed and 
subordinated claims against guarantors, sureties and escrows).  But see infra note 275 for authorities 
establishing that non-debtor releases are permissible in the Second Circuit. 
For the decisions in the Third Circuit, see In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 500, 504–06 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (§ 524(e) expressly prohibits non-debtor releases, displacing any authority in § 105(a) to 
grant such relief; striking a non-debtor discharge); In re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 66–67 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1994) (§ 524(e) bars non-debtor releases, preventing the use of § 105(a) to issue such relief; 
invalidating an actual release); In re W. Coast Video Enters., Inc., 174 B.R. 906, 911 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(§ 524(e) only permits consensual non-debtor releases); In re Swedeland Rd. Corp., No. 91-11851S, 1992 WL 
111112, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 19, 1992) (§ 524(e) bars non-debtor releases; striking a release of a 
creditor’s claim against a guarantor); Mellon Bank v. M.K. Siegel, 96 B.R. 505, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (§ 524(e) 
prohibits non-debtor releases; invalidating an actual release); In re Elsinore Shore Assoc., 91 B.R. 238, 246–52 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (§ 524(e) bars non-debtor releases; invalidating three non-debtor discharges); see also In 
re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating in dicta that involuntary non-
debtor releases violate § 524(e)).  In Gillman v. Continental, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals conducted a 
sustained analysis of the judicial debate over the propriety of non-debtor releases.  See Gillman v. Cont’l 
Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 211–13 (3d Cir. 2000).  The court’s ultimate conclusion is 
somewhat confusing.  It explained that “we need not establish our own rule regarding the conditions under 
which non-debtor releases and permanent injunctions are appropriate or permissible” because the non-debtor 
release there did “not pass muster under even the most flexible tests for the validity of non-debtor releases.”  
Id. at 214.  Thus, the court continued, the third-party release fell “squarely into the section 524(e) prohibition.”  
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Id. at 217.  It appears the Third Circuit was taking the view that § 524(e) generally bars non-debtor releases, 
but that the court is open to the possibility that there are exceptions to this prohibition where the factors set 
forth in the main pro-release cases are met.  See In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 247 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“In [Continental], we held that a plan that enjoined plaintiffs’ actions against Continental’s directors and 
officers violated § 524(e) . . . .  We did not treat § 524(e) as a per se rule barring any provision in a 
reorganization plan limiting the liability of third parties.”); see also infra note 277 and accompanying text. 
For the decisions in the Fifth Circuit, see Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale), 62 F.3d 746, 760 (5th Cir. 
1995) (“Section 524[(e)] prohibits the discharge of debts of non-debtors,” and thus § 105(a) may not be used to 
grant non-debtor releases); Simmons v. 22 Acquisition Corp., No. Civ.A. 2:05-CV-169, 2005 WL 3018726, at 
*2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10 2005) (same) (quoting Zale, 62 F.3d at 760); see also In re General Homes Corp., 134 
B.R. 853, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (stating, in dicta, that a chapter 11 plan may not release any claims 
against non-debtors that are not property of the estate); In re B.W. Alpha, Inc., 89 B.R. 592, 595–96 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating, in dicta, that § 524(e) would have barred confirmation of the plan if the non-debtor 
release had not been removed), aff’d, 100 B.R. 831 (N.D. Tex. 1988); In re U.S. Brass Corp., 194 B.R. 420, 
422–23 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996) (summarizing a previous ruling that courts may not enjoin direct claims 
against non-debtors). 
For the decisions in the Sixth Circuit, see In re Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 485–86 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1988) (§ 524(e) bars even consensual non-debtor releases; invalidating a non-debtor discharge); In re 
Scranes, Inc., 67 B.R. 985, 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (same); In re Eller Bros., Inc., 53 B.R. 10, 11–12 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (§ 524(e) prohibits non-debtor releases; striking a release of a guarantor even 
though the plan provided for payment in full on the creditor’s claim).  But see infra note 275 for authorities 
establishing that non-debtor releases are permissible in the Sixth Circuit. 
For the decisions in the Seventh Circuit, see In re Original IFPC Shareholders, Inc., 317 B.R. 738, 
746–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that § 524(e) bars third-party releases and nullifying both channeling 
and actual releases in the debtor’s plan); In re Spiers Graff Spiers v. Menarko (In re Spiers Graff Spiers), 190 
B.R. 1001, 1012 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing the leading § 524(e) cases in support of its conclusion that the 
“authority to enjoin post-confirmation actions against non-debtors under § 105 must . . . be limited to the 
period in which the Plan is consummated . . . [because] injunctions should not be used to give permanent relief 
to non-debtors from their possible liability to creditors”) (denying a post-confirmation request for a permanent 
injunction that would have enjoined a creditor of the debtor from prosecuting an action against two non-
debtors); In re Envirodyne, Indus., Inc., 174 B.R. 955, 962 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (non-debtor releases are 
proper only “if they are consensual and non-coercive”); United Model Distrib., Inc. v. Ry. Express Agency, 
Inc. (In re United Model Distrib., Inc.), No. 90 B 24281, No. 91 A 1120, 1992 WL 503595, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. May. 1, 1992) (“The authority to enjoin post-confirmation actions against non-debtors under § 105 must 
also be limited to the period in which the Plan is consummated. . . .  Indeed, an injunction that extended 
beyond this time would merely serve to insulate the non-debtor from his liability to the creditors, and courts 
may not issue permanent injunctions which effectively relieve non-debtors from their possible liability to 
creditors.”) (citing Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 
621 (9th Cir. 1989) and Landsing Div. Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real 
Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601–02 (10th Cir. 1990), modified, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
For the decision in the Eighth Circuit, see In re Bennett Paper Corp., 68 B.R. 518, 519–20 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 1986) (§ 524(e) bars a chapter 11 plan from containing a non-debtor release). 
For the decisions in the Ninth Circuit, see Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 
F.3d 1394, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1995) (§ 524(e) prohibits non-debtor releases; invalidating a non-debtor 
discharge); Sun Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Sun World Corp. (In re Sun Valley Newspapers, Inc.), 171 B.R. 
71, 76 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (§ 524(e) bars non-debtor releases; invalidating a hybrid provision that 
extinguished prepetition claims of creditors against non-debtors without providing for payment in full under 
the plan); Seaport Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert Park Auto 
Parts, Inc.), 113 B.R. 610, 614–16 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (§ 524(e) prohibits any plan provision that “affects 
the liability of . . . co-debtors”) (striking a provisional injunction that merely stayed collection efforts against 
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several scholarly articles, have elaborated as follows on the policy arguments 
proffered by the Tenth Circuit. 
The Bankruptcy Code limits creditors to a proportionate distribution from 
the estate and prohibits, through the discharge, any further attempt to collect 
from the debtor.195  To obtain this draconian relief, the debtor must grant the 
bankruptcy court control over all of its assets.196  Acceptance of this burden, 
combined with the debtor’s inability to satisfy its liabilities in full, provides the 
justification for a bankruptcy court’s extraordinary power to force creditors to 
accept partial payment.197  In other words, because extinguishing any portion 
of a claim is an extreme remedy, it is properly granted only to those who 
submit fully to the bankruptcy process.198  Interpreting § 524(e) to bar non-
 
non-debtors for five years after confirmation of the plan and did not release the codebtors from liability); In re 
Keller, 157 B.R. 680, 682, 686 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993) (§ 524(e) bars non-debtor releases; invalidating a 
channeling release); see also Billington v. Winograde (In re Hotel Mt. Lassen, Inc.), 207 B.R. 935, 940–41 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (stating the general rule that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases, but noting that there 
was no such provision at issue in the case). 
For the decisions in the Eleventh Circuit, see In re Davis Broad., Inc., 176 B.R. 290, 291–92 (M.D. Ga. 
1994) (§ 524(e) bars a bankruptcy court from “affecting” the liability of a guarantor in any way, including 
through a provisional injunction staying creditors’ legal actions against certain third parties pending execution 
of the plan) (“It is thus clear that this is a post-confirmation injunction and violates 11 U.S.C. Section 524(e) 
and accordingly exceeds the power and authority of the Bankruptcy Court because the section referred to 
prohibits release or a post-confirmation stay of the obligations of non-party guarantors. . . .  Of course, the 
liability of a guarantor is ‘affected’ regardless of whether it is released or, as in this case, stayed for a long 
period of time.”); In re L.B.G. Props., Inc., 72 B.R. 65, 66 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (§ 524(e) bars non-debtor 
releases; invalidating a provision that appears to only release those claims paid in full under the plan); Hat-
Hanseatische Anlage v. Sago Palms Joint Venture (In re Sago Palms Joint Venture), 39 B.R. 9, 9 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1984) (§ 524(e) prohibited the non-debtor release contained in the plan to the extent the provision 
extinguished “the personal liability of either [non-debtor] for any debt beyond the amounts actually paid by the 
debtor upon such liability . . . .”); see also PNC Bank, NA v. Park Forest Dev. Corp. (In re Park Forest Dev. 
Corp.), 197 B.R. 388, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining in dicta that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases).  
For commentators adopting this view, see Starr, supra note 27, at 487 (concluding that § 524(e) 
prohibits non-debtor releases); Boyle, supra note 27, at 422, 436 (same). 
 195 In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Starr, supra note 27, at 
498). 
 196 Id. (quoting Starr, supra note 27, at 498); accord Brubaker, supra note 27, at 997. 
 197 Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. at 506 (quoting Starr, supra note 27, at 498). 
 198 Id. at 503 (“Since a discharge is an extreme remedy . . . it is a privilege reserved for those entities 
which file a petition under the bankruptcy code and abide by its rules.”); see also Seaport Automotive 
Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts), 113 B.R. 610, 614 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the provisional injunction in the plan “challenges a basic tenet of the Code that 
Chapter 11 cases generally are for the protection of the debtor only and not to protect the debtor’s principals or 
co-debtors”); In re Keller, 157 B.R. 680, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993) (quoting the language from Rohnert in 
the last parenthetical in support of its holding that a channeling release was invalid); cf. Feld v. Zale Corp. (In 
re Zale), 62 F.3d 746, 757 n.28 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that one policy of the Code is that “bankruptcy 
should benefit only the debtor” in justifying its conclusion that jurisdiction did not extend to certain non-debtor 
claims). 
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debtor releases is consistent with this general policy that a party wishing to 
obtain the privileges of bankruptcy must accept its obligations.199 
An alternative construction permits third parties to obtain one of the key 
benefits offered by the Code—a release of liability—without having to comply 
with the Code’s accompanying duties.200  Non-debtors are able to “savor the 
sweet without having to taste the sour.”201 And since third-party releases 
extinguish claims without providing the non-debtor’s obligees the full 
protection the Code grants to creditors of the debtor, they upset “the careful 
balance between . . . debtor’s rights and . . . creditor’s rights that Congress 
struck in creating the bankruptcy system.”202 
In sum, § 524(e) embodies a critical policy of the Code—“the protection of 
rights of creditors to pursue persons and entities who are jointly liable with a 
debtor [and] who have not assumed the burdens of a debtor under the 
Bankruptcy Code.”203  The statute therefore prohibits non-debtor releases.204 
 
 199 Starr, supra note 27, at 487; see also Boyle, supra note 27, at 422–23 (“Moreover, precluding non-
debtor discharges ensures that only parties that have submitted to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court will 
receive the benefits intended under the Code.”) 
 200 Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 761–62 (D. 
Utah. 1985) (holding that only non-debtor stays are valid under the Bankruptcy Code—a court may not enjoin 
a creditor from pursuing a non-debtor after confirmation of the debtor’s plan of reorganization). 
 201 Id. at 761; see also Brubaker, supra note 27, at 998 (“Through non-debtor releases, however, many 
non-debtors are released without making any contribution whatsoever toward satisfaction of the released 
claims.”). 
 202 A.J. Mackay, 50 B.R. at 761; accord Boyle, supra note 27, at 439 (“Congress . . . could not have 
contemplated that the bankruptcy code would have a significant impact upon the relationship between 
creditors and non-debtors.”); see also Brubaker, supra note 27 at 987 (concluding that non-debtor releases can 
corrupt the integrity of the class voting process) 
 203 In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 10 (N.D. Okla. 1998); see also Mellon Bank v. M.K. Siegel, 96 
B.R. 505, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“While the bankruptcy Code expressly alters the contractual obligations of the 
bankrupt, it does not contemplate the same effect on the obligations and liabilities of third parties . . . .”); Starr, 
supra note 27, at 487 (“Section 524(e) clearly embodies the policy of the Bankruptcy Code to discharge the 
debtor but not to release from liability third parties which are liable with the debtor.”). 
 204 In 1994, Congress added a new paragraph to § 524 that expressly allows for non-debtor releases in 
asbestos cases when a series of complicated requirements are satisfied.  11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000); Resorts 
Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995).  Some courts and at 
least one commentator have argued that this amendment lends support to the view that § 524(e) prohibits non-
debtor releases.  Id. at 1402 n.6 (“A recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Code buttresses our conclusion that 
§ 524(e) does not permit bankruptcy courts to release claims against non-debtors.”); In re Salem Suede, Inc., 
219 B.R. 922, 937 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (§ 524(g) “suggests that 524(e) precludes issuance” of channeling 
non-debtor releases); Meltzer, supra note 27, at 31–33.  According to this view, § 524(g) demonstrates that 
Congress believes that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases.  Meltzer, supra note 27, at 32–33.  If Congress 
thought otherwise, there would have been no need to add paragraph (g).  Id.  In addition, since Congress has 
explicitly approved of non-debtor releases in only the asbestos context, it is reasonable to conclude that 
bankruptcy courts lacks the power to grant such releases in other circumstances.  Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 
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Some courts have relied upon an alternative ground in ruling that non-
debtor releases are invalid.  Instead of finding that § 524(e) is a bar, these 
courts hold that third-party releases are simply beyond the equitable powers 
granted by § 105(a).  In re Digital Impact, Inc. is illustrative.205  There, the 
court embraced the narrow view of § 105(a), concluding that the statute may 
 
1402 n.6 (“That Congress provided explicit authority to bankruptcy courts to issue injunctions in favor of the 
third parties in an extremely limited class of cases reinforces the conclusion that § 524(e) denies such authority 
in other, non-asbestos cases.”); Meltzer, supra note 27, at 32 (“[H]ad Congress intended bankruptcy court to 
have greater leeway to effect releases of nondebtor parties, particularly in cases not involving asbestos, it could 
have said so.”).  Finally, because § 524 now expressly addresses non-debtor releases, courts should not look to 
other portions of the Code to find the authority to grant such relief.  The specific subparagraphs of 524(g) 
displace any general provisions contained elsewhere in the Code. 
This argument contains fatal weaknesses.  Most significantly, when Congress amended § 524, it 
included a special “Rule of Construction,” which provides that “[n]othing in [524(g)] . . . shall be construed to 
modify, impair, or supercede any other authority the court has to issue injunctions in connection with an order 
confirming a plan of reorganization.”  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, § 111(b), 108 Stat. 
4106, 4117 (uncodified).  As the legislative history explains, § 111(b) 
make[s] clear that the special rule being devised for the asbestos claim/trust injunction 
mechanism is not intended to alter any authority bankruptcy courts may already have to issue 
injunctions in connection with a plan [of] reorganization. . . .  The Committee expresses no 
opinion as to how much authority a bankruptcy court may generally have under its traditional 
equitable powers to issue an enforceable injunction [outside the asbestos context].  The 
Committee has decided to provide explicit authority in the asbestos area because of the singular 
cumulative magnitude of the claims involved. 
See 140 CONG. REC. H10 766 (Daily ed. Oct 4 1994) (Remarks of Rep. Brooks).  Several courts and 
commentators have cited the Rule of Construction in concluding that § 524(g) does not bolster the anti-release 
position.  See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 739 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that 
§ 524(g) does not support the conclusion that non-debtor releases are invalid under the Code because of the 
Rule of Construction), rev’d on other grounds, 255 B.R. 445 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, 280 F.3d 648 
(6th Cir. 2002); Greenblatt v. Richard Potasky Jeweler, Inc. (In re Richard Potasky Jeweler, Inc.), 222 B.R. 
816, 827 n.19 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (same); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.07[2], at 524–52 (Lawrence P. 
King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2005) (same); Jason J. Jardine, Note, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court to Enjoin 
Creditor Claims Against Nondebtor Parties in Light of 11 U.S.C. § 524(e): In re Dow Corning Corp., 2004 
BYU L. REV. 283, 306–08 (2004) (same); see also In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 299 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2002) (holding that because § 524(g) only applies in asbestos cases, it has no bearing on whether 
bankruptcy courts may issue non-debtor releases in other contexts). 
Section 111(b), standing alone, casts serious doubt on the relevancy of § 524(g) to non-asbestos, third-
party releases.  But there are other problems with any reliance on § 524(g).  First, § 524(h) sets forth rules 
regarding § 524(g)’s application to “existing injunctions.”  11 U.S.C. § 524(h) (2000).  This demonstrates 
Congressional acknowledgement and approval of injunctions issued before § 524(g) came into effect.  Second, 
it is axiomatic that “the interpretation given by one Congress . . . to an earlier statute is of little assistance in 
discerning the meaning of that statute.”  Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994); accord 
United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980).  Congress’s understanding of § 524(e) when it enacted 
524(g) thus has little, if any, interpretive value. 
Accordingly, § 524(g) lends no support to the anti-release interpretation of § 524(e). 
 205 223 B.R. 1, 14 (N.D. Okla. 1998). 
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only be used to implement or enforce other Code provisions.206  Quoting 
Ahlers, the court explained that the “[e]quitable powers conferred under 
Section 105 ‘must and can only be exercised within the confines of the 
Bankruptcy Code.’”207  The statute is not a source of “substantive rights, such 
as a non-debtor discharge, otherwise unavailable under the Bankruptcy 
Code.”208  Thus, the court ruled, since no Code provision explicitly grants the 
power to extinguish non-debtor liabilities, § 105(a) may not be employed for 
that purpose.209 
The clear implication of this reasoning, which has been adopted by several 
other courts,210 is that § 105(a) does not permit the issuance of non-debtor 
releases unless the broad construction of that statute is correct.211  Under the 
narrow reading, any exercise of § 105(a) power must be tethered to a specific 
provision in the Bankruptcy Code.212  But, as one commentator explains, there 
is simply no Code “section that can serve as a pathway . . . to grant third-party” 
releases.213 
 
 206 Id.  For a discussion of the “narrow view” of § 105(a), see supra notes 125–36 and accompanying text. 
 207 Id. (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 207 (1988)). 
 208 Id. (citing United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
 209 Id. at 4–5, 14 (ruling that the actual releases contained in the debtor’s plan were invalid). 
 210 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 742 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that because 
§ 105(a) must be used in conjunction with other Code provisions—i.e., it does not permit the creation of new 
substantive rights—the statute does not give bankruptcy courts the power to issue non-debtor releases) (citing 
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988), and United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 
1308 (5th Cir. 1986)), rev’d, 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, aff’d in pertinent part, 280 
F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Sybaris Clubs, Int’l, Inc., 189 B.R. 151, 155–56, 159 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1995) (holding that § 105(a) can only be used to carry out other provisions of the code—i.e., bankruptcy courts 
may not create new rights outside the Code—and thus that the non-debtor releases contained in the debtor’s 
plan were invalid despite the fact that the sole objector would receive payment in full under the plan); see also 
Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 758, 762 (D. Utah. 1985) 
(holding that courts may use § 105(a) to grant non-debtor stays because they are “procedural,” by which the 
court meant that they terminate upon confirmation of the plan of reorganization; further holding that courts 
may not employ § 105(a) to provide a non-debtor with “substantive” relief, by which the court meant relief 
that extends past confirmation); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 133 B.R. 973, 976–79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(holding that the court did not have sufficient power under § 105(a) to grant a non-debtor release, as part of a 
settlement between the debtor and its insurance company, that extinguished the contractual rights of a co-
insured under the policy), aff’d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 211 See Meltzer, supra note 27, at 23–24 (concluding that since no Code provision expressly permits 
courts to issue non-debtor releases, § 105(a) may only be used to grant a release if the expansive view of the 
statute is adopted). 
 212 Id. at 18; see also Greenblatt v. Richard Potasky Jeweler, Inc. (In re Richard Potasky Jeweler, Inc.), 
222 B.R. 816, 825 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (“Therefore, § 105, standing alone, cannot serve as a source of authority 
for granting a permanent injunction.  Rather, § 105 must be tethered to another § of the Code in order to 
provide the court with such authority.”) (emphasis added). 
 213 Meltzer, supra note 27, at 23; accord Boyle, supra note 27, at 438.  Elaborating on this point, Meltzer 
argues that, in addition to the absence of any explicit authority for non-debtor releases, “there are no general or 
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Finally, even if the expansive interpretation of § 105(a)—or a similar 
reading of § 1123(b)(6)—is controlling, and courts thus possess substantial 
latitude in effectuating the Code’s general policies,214 one important argument 
remains that non-debtor releases are beyond the equitable authority of 
bankruptcy courts.  That argument is presented in Part III.C.215 
B. The Pro-Release Cases 
1. MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. 
Any discussion of pro-release case law must begin with MacArthur Co. v. 
Johns-Manville Corp.216  While that case concerned the release of claims to 
 
specific licenses in the Code allowing judges to take such actions as they deem necessary to confirm plans of 
reorganization.”  Meltzer, supra note 27, at 23; see also id. at 18 (“[T]here is no mandate in the Code telling 
bankruptcy judges to do whatever is necessary to confirm plans, or giving them freewheeling authority to try 
to maximize the number of Chapter 11 cases that result in confirmed plans.”).  But § 1123(b)(6) arguably 
constitutes such a “general license.”  That statute provides that a plan of confirmation may “include any other 
appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”  11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) 
(2000).  And two courts that have embraced the narrow view of § 105(a) ruled that the statute may be used in 
conjunction with § 1123(b)(6) to grant a third-party release.  See In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 478 
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (“The plain meaning of § 105(a) authorizes the bankruptcy court to enter only orders that 
are necessary to carry out the other provisions of the Code. . . .  A third source of authority for a bankruptcy 
court to exercise [its § 105(a)] equitable power is found in 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) . . . .”), rev’d in part, aff’d 
in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648, 656–58 (6th Cir. 2002).  However, as Boyle persuasively explains, such a use 
of these statutes constitutes “bootstrapping;” it amounts to employing “one catch-all provision to implement 
another catch-all provision,” and that is inappropriate.  Boyle, supra note 27, at 438. 
The district court in the Dow Corning reorganization also held that a bankruptcy court may grant a non-
debtor release by using § 105(a) to implement § 1141(a) (chapter 11 discharge provision) and § 1123(b)(3)(A) 
(stating that a plan may provide for “the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the 
debtor.”).  Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. at 478.  The district court was mistaken.  First, as the express 
language of the statute makes clear, § 1123(b)(3)(A) governs resolution of the debtor’s claims, not the direct 
claims of creditors.  Accordingly, a release of the latter could not implement § 1123(b)(3)(A).  Second, as 
carefully articulated by Professor Brubaker, a third-party release is not necessary to protect the debtor’s 
discharge.  See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1002–09 (explaining that the Bankruptcy Code contains provisions 
that prevent claims against non-debtors from interfering with the debtor’s discharge in the absence of a third-
party release).  Thus, such an order may not be understood as serving to enforce § 1141(a). 
 214 For a discussion of the “broad view,” see supra notes 137–46 and accompanying text. 
 215 At least one court invalidated a non-debtor release on grounds independent of §§ 524(e) and 105(a).  
See In re Salem Suede, Inc., 219 B.R. 922, 927–28, 931–37 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (holding that a non-debtor 
release unfairly discriminated under § 1129(b)(1) against the creditors affected by the release because other 
creditors did not need to give up rights against third parties to receive distributions under the plan); see also In 
re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 740–42 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (concluding that (1) § 524(e) does not 
prohibit non-debtor releases, (2) § 105(a) provides insufficient power to grant such releases, and (3) releases 
are not permissible under § 1123(b)(6) when applied to dissenting creditors because they employ an 
inappropriate legal fiction), rev’d, 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, aff’d in pertinent part, 
280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 216 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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insurance proceeds, it “pave[d] the way” for non-debtor releases beyond the 
insurance context.217 
When Johns-Manville declared bankruptcy, it was facing tens of thousands 
of asbestos exposure claims and liability exceeding $2 billion.218  During the 
company’s reorganization, the bankruptcy court approved a settlement between 
the debtor and its insurers.219  Under the agreement, the insurance companies 
paid Johns-Manville $770 million and were “relieved of all obligations related 
to the disputed policies.”220  To effectuate the settlement, the court “enjoined 
all suits against the insurers” concerning the policies.221  It also ordered that 
any lawsuits subject to the injunction would attach only to the proceeds of the 
settlement.222 
A distributor of Johns-Manville’s products, MacArthur, claimed that it was 
a co-insured under the settled policies pursuant to a vendor endorsement that 
entitled the debtor’s distributors “to insurance coverage resulting from their 
sale of Manville’s products.”223  MacArthur argued on appeal that the 
injunction was an illegal discharge that improperly extinguished its rights 
under the insurance contract.224  The Second Circuit disagreed. 
The court explained that the injunction “did not offer the umbrella 
protection of a discharge in bankruptcy.”225  Instead, it precluded “only those 
suits against the settling insurers that arise out of or relate to Manville’s 
insurance policies.”226  Moreover, MacArthur’s claims were not extinguished; 
“they [were] simply channeled away from the insurers and redirected at the 
proceeds of the settlement.”227 
As authority for this type of injunction, the Second Circuit pointed to 
§ 363(f).228  That statute permits, in some circumstances, the sale of estate 
property “free and clear” of any third-party interest such as a lien.229  The non-
 
 217 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 962 n.3. 
 218 Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 90. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 91. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 90. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 93. 
 229 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000). 
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debtor’s rights are typically transferred to the proceeds of the sale.230  The 
court reasoned that since Manville’s policies belonged to the estate,231 § 363(f) 
allowed the bankruptcy court to dispose of the insurance through the 
compromise and channel MacArthur’s claims to the settlement payments.232  
The injunction expressly barring MacArthur and others from suing the 
insurance companies was “necessary to effectuate the Court’s channeling 
authority. . . .  The authority to issue the injunction is thus a corollary to the 
power to dispose of assets free and clear and to channel claims to the 
proceeds.”233 
The Second Circuit found additional authority for the injunction in 
§ 105(a).234  It observed that this statute “has been construed liberally to enjoin 
suits that might impede the reorganization process.”235  And the bankruptcy 
court found that direct actions against Johns-Manville’s insurers “would 
adversely affect property of the estate and would interfere with 
reorganization.”236 
The Second Circuit admitted that the insurance settlement and the 
accompanying injunction “are not precisely the same as the traditional sale of 
real property free and clear of liens followed by a channeling of the liens to the 
proceeds of the sale.”237  The insurance polices were not actually sold and 
MacArthur’s claim was distinct from a lien on property.238  But “the 
 
 230 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[3] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2005). 
 231 Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93 (citing, inter alia, § 541(a)(1)).  Section 541(a)(1) provides that 
a debtor’s estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of 
the case,” with only minor exceptions.  § 541(a)(1). 
 232 Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 94.  When a debtor actually sells an asset under § 363(f), the bankruptcy court may issue an 
injunction barring a creditor from attempting to enforce a preexisting lien on the property.  Fogel v. Zell, 221 
F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 238 Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 94.  In its discussion of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to issue 
the injunction, the Second Circuit stated that MacArthur did not have a direct claim under the policies; rather, 
its rights were “completely derivative of Manville’s rights as the primary insured.”  Id. at 92.  This language 
has caused some confusion regarding whether MacArthur’s claims were derivative, and thus property of the 
estate, or direct, and thus rights belonging entirely to MacArthur.  Compare In re Elsinore Shore Assoc., 91 
B.R. 238, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (holding that Johns-Manville could not be extended to apply to the non-
debtor releases of direct creditor claims contained in Elsinore’s plan because the release in Johns-Manville was 
of claims that were property of the estate), with In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 133 B.R. 973, 976–79 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1991) (arguing that MacArthur’s claims in Johns-Manville were not derivative), aff’d, 149 B.R. 860 
(N.D. Ill. 1992).  I side with the court in Forty-Eight Insulations.  I do not think the Second Circuit was using 
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underlying principle of preserving the debtor’s estate for the creditors and 
funneling claims to one proceeding in the bankruptcy court remains the 
same.”239  Since the settlement was “essential . . . to a workable reorganization, 
it falls well within the bankruptcy court’s equitable powers.”240 
2. In re A.H. Robins Co. 
The Fourth Circuit extended Johns-Manville’s holding to third-party 
releases of direct claims against non-debtors in In re A.H. Robins Co.,241 the 
seminal pro-release decision.242  Like Johns-Manville, A.H. Robins was driven 
into bankruptcy by a mass tort—product liability claims surrounding the 
Dalkon Shield, its notorious contraceptive device.243  Indeed, there were over 
195,000 Dalkon Shield claimants in the bankruptcy.244 
The plan of reorganization in A.H. Robins contained a non-debtor release 
that permanently enjoined the Dalkon Shield claimants from suing any party 
 
the term “derivative” in its technical legal sense.  That is why I classified Johns-Manville as an “insurance” 
case rather than a “derivative” case in the taxonomy section above.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
If MacArthur’s claims were merely property of the Johns-Manville estate, citation to § 363(f) would have been 
unnecessary.  The court could have relied upon § 1123(b)(3)(A).  11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (2000) (“[A] plan 
may . . . provide for . . . the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the 
estate . . . .”) (emphasis added).  Nonetheless, whether MacArthur’s claim was derivative—i.e., property of the 
estate—or merely a claim against property of the estate, it was certainly not a direct claim against non-estate 
property or an independent third party, the type of claim extinguished by the non-debtor releases that are the 
focus of this Article. 
 239 Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 94. 
 240 Id.; see also In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding, for 
purposes of § 363(f), that “[e]quating compromises/settlements of lawsuits to sales of a debtor’s property is 
appropriate because there is so little to distinguish them”); id. at 244–47 (further holding that the debtor’s 
settlement with its liability insurers could be conducted free and clear of any rights in the insurance policies 
held by parties harmed by the debtor’s products and that, under §§ 105(a) and 363(f), the court could enjoin 
the injured parties from suing the insurers).  But see In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 133 B.R. 973, 976–79 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that the court did not have sufficient power under § 105(a) to grant a non-
debtor release, as part of a settlement between the debtor and its insurance company, that extinguished the 
contractual rights of a co-insured under the policy because, inter alia, the co-insured’s rights were not part of 
the debtor’s estate), aff’d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 241 Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 242 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1024 (observing that Robins is “the watershed case paving the way for 
growing judicial acceptance of non-debtor releases”). 
 243 In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743–44 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989); see 
generally RONALD J. BACIGAL, LIMITS OF LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY (1990); MARY F. 
HAWKINS, UNSHIELDED: THE HUMAN COST OF THE DALKON SHIELD (1997); MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: 
CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); SUSAN PERRY AND JIM DAWSON, 
NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY 
OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1993). 
 244 A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. at 747. 
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for their injuries.245  A.H. Robins’s directors and attorneys, Aetna (the debtor’s 
insurer), and Aetna’s attorneys were among those that benefited from the 
release.246  The plan also created several claims resolution trusts intended to 
provide compensation to the injured women.247  The district court found that 
the tort creditors would be able to recover in full for their injuries from the 
trusts,248 which were funded by, inter alia, the debtor, members of the Robins 
family and Aetna.249 
Because most of the Dalkon Shield claims were unliquidated,250 the district 
court conducted an “estimation” hearing to determine how much money was 
needed to fully compensate the tort claimants.251  The court ultimately found 
“that the sum of $2.475 billion . . . is sufficient to pay in full all Dalkon Shield 
personal injury claims as well as expenses of the Trusts established to 
administer the claims.”252  The plan provided that this amount would be placed 
in the trusts.253 
Dalkon Shield claimants that filed their claims on time (class A) were 
allowed to liquidate their rights via a jury trial.254  Those that did not file by the 
deadline (class B) could not litigate their claims before a jury.255  However, 
members of class B were given a limited right to opt out of the plan and the 
non-debtor release.  By exercising this opportunity, they could sue Aetna and 
their medical providers in tort, but they waived their right to compensation 
 
 245 In re A.H. Robins Co., 131 B.R. 292, 294–96 (E.D. Va. 1991), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Dalkon 
Shield Claimants Trust v. Reiser (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 972 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 246 Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 700–01 (4th Cir. 1989).  Despite the 
inclusion of Aetna in the release, Robins is not an insurance-release case.  The women sought to pursue Aetna 
directly in tort, not as joint-claimants under A.H. Robins’s insurance polices.  Id. (“The suits in question which 
some of the appellants wish to bring are against Robins’s directors, Robins’s and Aetna’s attorneys, and Aetna, 
seeking to hold them as joint tortfeasors with Robins for Dalkon Shield injuries.”). 
 247 A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. at 750–51. 
 248 Id. at 751.  The district court withdrew the reference and presided over A.H. Robins’s bankruptcy with 
the assistance of the bankruptcy judge.  Id. at 743. 
 249 Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 700–02; A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. at 751. 
 250 Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 697. 
 251 Id. at 697–700; see also 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2000) (“There shall be estimated for purposes of 
allowance . . . any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as they case may be, 
would unduly delay the administration of the case . . . .”). 
 252 A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. at 747. 
 253 In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 720–21 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 254 Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 255 Id. 
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from the trusts under the plan.256  Moreover, the opt-outs could not sue anyone 
other than Aetna and their medical providers.257 
The vast majority of Dalkon Shield claimants voting (131,761 of 139,605) 
did so in favor of confirmation.258  After the plan was confirmed by the district 
court, several objectors appealed to the Fourth Circuit, challenging the 
propriety of the non-debtor release.259 
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court possessed sufficient equitable 
power under § 105(a) to grant the release.260  It offered two reasons.  First, the 
court of appeals explained that the release was essential to the 
reorganization.261  Any lawsuits by Dalkon Shield claimants against the 
released parties “would affect the bankruptcy reorganization in one way or 
another such as by way of indemnity or contribution,”262 and “the entire 
reorganization hinge[d] on the debtor being free from indirect claims such as 
suits against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims against 
the debtor.”263  Second, the court found that the plan provided the Dalkon 
Shield claimants with payment in full,264 affirming the district court’s 
estimation of the value of their claims.265  The Fourth Circuit reached this 
conclusion even though the funding for the claims resolution trust was capped 
by the plan at $2.475 billion, and thus, if the estimation were inaccurate, there 
might not be enough money to pay all injured women in full.266 
The Robins court found additional support for the non-debtor release in 
“the ancient but very much alive doctrine of marshalling of assets.”267  
Pursuant to that doctrine, a “creditor has no right to choose which of two funds 
will pay his claim.”268  A bankruptcy court may “order a creditor who has two 
funds to satisfy his debt to resort to the fund that will not defeat other 
 
 256 Id. at 701. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 698. 
 259 Id. at 696. 
 260 Id. at 701. 
 261 Id. at 701–02. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. at 702.  If a creditor successfully recovers from a co-obligor of the debtor, the co-obligor may in 
turn have a contribution or indemnity claim against the debtor.  Brubaker, supra note 27, at 973–74. 
 264 Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 700–02. 
 265 Id. at 700. 
 266 Id. at 697.  Because it contained a non-debtor release, the plan placed the risk that there would be 
insufficient funds on the Dalkon Shield claimants rather than on the released third parties. 
 267 Id. at 701.  See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text (discussing marshaling of assets). 
 268 Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 701. 
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creditors.”269  The Fourth Circuit’s point appeared to be that if a bankruptcy 
court may force a creditor to recover from a particular source, then the Dalkon 
Shield claimants could be compelled to recover solely from A.H. Robins. 
The court admitted that class B opt-outs were not entitled to recover under 
the plan.270  But, the Fourth Circuit responded, “Since they have chosen opt-
out rather than payment in full, they may have no complaint about a restriction 
placed on their ability to sue others[,]” particularly since the bankruptcy 
courts’ equitable powers may be invoked “‘to the end that . . . substance will 
not give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent substantial 
justice.’”271 
At last, the Fourth Circuit addressed § 524(e).  While it acknowledged the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding in Underhill, the court of appeals was persuaded by 
language from a Fifth Circuit opinion explaining that § 524(e) “‘does not by its 
specific words preclude the discharge of a guaranty when it has been accepted 
and confirmed as an integral part of reorganization.’”272  Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit continued, “Whatever the result might be as to the application of 
§ 524(e) in other cases, we do not think that section must be literally applied in 
every case as a prohibition on the power of the bankruptcy courts.”273  The 
court concluded that § 524(e) did not bar the non-debtor release in A.H. 
Robins’s plan because the release was essential to the reorganization, the 
creditors overwhelmingly approved the plan, the plan provided the Dalkon 
Shield claimants with the opportunity to receive payment in full, and Aetna 
contributed to the Plan.274 
3. Robins’s Progeny and the Power to Grant Non-Debtor Releases 
A substantial number of cases have followed Robins and ruled that non-
debtor releases are permissible under the Bankruptcy Code.  Most of these 
decisions found that the authority to extinguish claims against third parties 
emanates from § 105(a).  Implicitly adopting the broad view of that provision, 
 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. at 702. 
 271 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MacArthur v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 272 Id. (quoting Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1987)).  Shoaf did not 
ultimately address whether § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases because it found that res judicata prohibited any 
claim to that effect.  Shoaf, 815 F.2d at 1050–54. 
 273 Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 702. 
 274 Id. 
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the courts decided that § 105(a), standing alone, grants sufficient power to 
issue non-debtor releases.275  And at least one court has suggested that both 
 
 275 For the decisions in the First Circuit, see Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 985 
(1st Cir. 1995) (the bankruptcy court, whose opinion is attached as an appendix to the First Circuit decision, 
held that § 105(a) provides sufficient authority to issue non-debtor releases); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes 
& Gray (In re Monarch Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 31, 42 (D. Mass. 1994) (courts may grant non-debtor releases 
pursuant to § 105(a)), aff’d, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 300 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (holding that bankruptcy courts may grant non-debtor releases under § 105(a)). 
For decisions in the Second Circuit, see SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Robins for the proposition that 
bankruptcy courts may enjoin litigation against a non-debtor); Greer v. Gaston & Snow (In re Gaston & 
Snow), Nos. 93 Civ. 8517 (JGK), 93 Civ. 8628 (JGK), 1996 WL 694421, at *2-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1996) 
(holding that § 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts substantial authority over creditor-debtor relationships and 
citing Drexel for the proposition that non-debtor releases are permissible); Abel v. Shugrue (In re Ionosphere 
Clubs, Inc.), 184 B.R. 648, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Drexel and Robins for the proposition that bankruptcy 
courts may grant non-debtor releases); LTV Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 167 
B.R. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that bankruptcy courts may issue non-debtor releases under § 105(a)); 
Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 150, 154–57 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Section 105 grants bankruptcy courts ample power to enjoin actions excepted from the 
automatic stay which might interfere in the rehabilitative process, whether in a liquidation or in a 
reorganization case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (suggesting that the debtor’s plan could include a 
non-debtor release).  But see Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber 
Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2005) (endorsing the narrow view of § 105(a) during its discussion 
of a third-party release by stating that “[a]ny power that a judge enjoys under § 105 must derive ultimately 
from some other provision of the Bankruptcy Code”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Deutsche Bank 
court never explained, however, where the power to grant a non-debtor release actually comes from if 
§ 105(a), by itself, is not sufficient. 
For the decisions in the Third Circuit, see In re Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. 377, 408 (D.N.J. 2000) 
(holding that § 105(a) permitted the court to grant non-debtor releases); Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors v. Bechtle (In re Labrum & Doak), 237 B.R. 275, 305 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Section 105(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code grants the Court broad equitable power[s] . . . .”) (holding that non-debtor releases are 
permissible under § 105(a)). 
For the decision in the Eighth Circuit, see In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 
934–37 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (concluding that bankruptcy courts may issue non-debtor releases pursuant to 
§ 105(a)). 
For the decisions in the Eleventh Circuit, see In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 815–18 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2002) (observing that § 105(a) confers “broad equitable authority” on bankruptcy courts and holding 
that the statute grants such courts the power to issue non-debtor releases); In re Optical Tech., Inc., 216 B.R. 
989, 994 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (“Section 105 . . . is broadly written and allows all orders necessary to 
effectuate a reorganization, including permanently enjoining actions of third parties which . . . would interfere 
with reorganization.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For the decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit, see In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 
148 B.R. 660, 685 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (“Under section 105(a) a bankruptcy court may enter a permanent 
injunction enjoining suits against non-debtor parties funding a plan of reorganization if the court finds that 
such an injunction is essential to effectuate the plan of reorganization.”); In re McCall, No. 93-00632, 1997 
WL 428580, at *16 (Bankr. D.D.C. May 27, 1997) (same). 
The analysis offered on this point in each of the cases cited in this footnote was extremely perfunctory, 
generally consisting of one or two sentences.  See also Buschman, supra note 27, at 942–43 (concluding that 
SILVERSTEIN GALLEYSFINAL 2/19/2007  2:08:42 PM 
2006] HIDING IN PLAIN VIEW 61 
§§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) allow bankruptcy courts to release non-debtor 
claims.276 
As for § 524(e), Robins’s progeny have endorsed a different view of that 
statute.  The Fourth Circuit intimated that § 524(e) generally bars non-debtor 
releases, but that this prohibition may be overcome in rare circumstances, such 
as those present in the A.H. Robins reorganization.277  Most other pro-release 
courts, in contrast, have found that § 524(e) is irrelevant to the validity of non-
debtor releases.  They reason as follows. 
Section 524(e) does not expressly prohibit releases; it merely provides that 
the discharge of a debtor does not, “by itself, affect the liability of other 
parties.”278  Thus, when a plan of reorganization contains no explicit third-
 
§ 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts sufficient power to issue non-debtor releases); Han, supra note 27, at 554, 
579 (same); Inman, supra note 27, at 649 (same); Jardine, supra note 204, at 309–10 (same). 
 276 In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 185 B.R. 302, 313, 321–22 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995) (indicating that 
bankruptcy courts may issue non-debtor releases pursuant to §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6)); see also Feldstein, 
supra note 27, at 39–40, 45 (appearing to conclude that the power to issue non-debtor releases exists under 
§§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), but referring primarily to the release of derivative claims); Swallow, supra note 27, 
at 723, 726 (arguing that non-debtor releases are permissible under § 1123(b)(6) (located at § 1123(b)(5) when 
the Article was written)); cf. In re Mac Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *9 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000) (concluding that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) confer upon bankruptcy courts sufficient 
authority to issue provisional injunctions). 
At least two cases have held that non-debtor releases are permissible even if the narrow view of 
§ 105(a) is correct.  For a discussion of why these decisions are mistaken, see supra note 213. 
 277 Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 702; see also In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 730 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (holding that § 524(e) barred the non-debtor release in the debtor’s plan, but noting, in 
dicta, that the statute may not apply in certain circumstances, including mass tort cases where the third-party’s 
creditors are paid in full on their claims); Buschman, supra note 27, at 942, 946 (arguing that non-debtor 
releases are prohibited by § 524(e) unless they are (1) necessary to the debtor’s reorganization, and (2) the 
third party contributes to the estate an amount that reflects its net worth or potential liability); Swallow, supra 
note 27, at 709 (concluding that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases unless there is (1) payment in full on the 
released claims, (2) the release is necessary, and (3) an overwhelming majority of creditors support the plan); 
Lewis, supra note 27, at 176 (maintaining that non-debtor releases run afoul of § 524(e) unless the 
extinguished claims are paid in full). 
 278 In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002); accord Class Five Nev. 
Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 657 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[Section 
524(e)] explains the effect of a debtor’s discharge.  It does not prohibit the release of a non-debtor.”); Monarch 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 985 (1st Cir. 1995) (the bankruptcy court, whose confirmation 
opinion is attached as an appendix to the First Circuit decision, held that “section 524(e) . . . does not by its 
terms preclude the entry of injunctive relief in favor of nondebtors making plan contributions, particularly 
where as here, creditors have overwhelmingly consented to it”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 477–
78 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“On its face, § 524(e) does not set forth a per se rule prohibiting permanent injunctions 
as to non-debtors. . . .  [The statute] does not expressly prohibit third-party injunctions . . . .”), rev’d in part, 
aff’d in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 
936 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (“To the extent that § 524(e) does not explicitly prohibit the court from issuing a 
permanent injunction, the language is clear . . .”); LTV Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Chateaugay 
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party release, § 524(e) ensures that non-debtor liabilities are unchanged.279  But 
that is the limit of the statute’s impact.280  Reading § 524(e) to also prohibit 
non-debtor releases contravenes the Supreme Court’s admonishment that 
statutes should be given a plain-meaning construction and creates a conflict 
 
Corp.), 167 B.R. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“§ 524(e) does not address whether a bankruptcy court can 
expressly discharge or otherwise affect the liability of a non-debtor.  This section provides . . . [that] a 
bankruptcy court’s discharge of a debtor does not by itself relieve a co-debtor or non-debtor of liability.”); 
Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray (In re Monarch Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 31, 43 (D. Mass. 1994) 
(“Section 524(e) contains no language of prohibition and should not be interpreted to limit the court’s power 
under § 105(a).”) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Mahoney 
Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 299 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (“11 U.S.C. § 524(e) does not specifically prohibit 
the [permanent] injunctions which the Debtor is seeking in this case.  That section only describes the 
parameters of a discharge order.”); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 687 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. 1992) (“[Section 524(e)] is merely declarative of the effect of a discharge under § 524.  It does not 
affect the ability of the court to issue a permanent injunction under § 105(a) that affects the liability of a non-
debtor on the debtor’s debts. . . .  Section 524(e) contains no language of prohibition and should not be 
interpreted to limit the court’s power under § 105(a).”); see also Feldstein, supra note 27, at 29 (“[S]ection 
524(e) simply describes the effect of a naked discharge under section 524(a) and imposes no restriction upon 
the terms of a plan of reorganization. . . .  Section 524(e), by its terms, is not a limitation upon the validity of 
third-party releases pursuant to a plan of reorganization that otherwise satisfies the standards for confirmation 
under sections 1129 and 1141.”); Inman, supra note 27, at 649 (“Section 524(e) merely provides that the 
discharge of the debtor’s debts under a reorganization does not, by itself, discharge the liabilities of any other 
parties.”); Jardine, supra note 204, at 306 (“The Sixth Circuit correctly recognized that nothing in the language 
of § 524(e) prohibits the release of a nondebtor.”); Swallow, supra note 27, at 711 (“[A] careful reading of 
[§ 524(e)] reveals only that a discharge of the debtor has no automatic effect on third parties.  In other words, 
section 524(e) does not expressly prohibit a court . . . from limiting the liability of a third-party debtor.”). 
A number of anti-release authorities agree with this more narrow construction of § 524(e).  See, e.g., In 
re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 10 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (“This Court does not believe that Section 524(e) 
was intended to prohibit [non-debtor] releases.  Rather, Section 524(e) was intended to insure that co-debtors 
or guarantors (who are not debtors in the bankruptcy case), and their property, are not automatically released 
from the debt or guaranty upon the discharge of a debtor, and that rights of creditors are not impaired by the 
debtor’s discharge.”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (“[Section 
524(e)] simply provides in effect that a third party’s liability is not discharged by virtue of a discharge of the 
debtor’s liability.  It does not by its terms preclude a court from discharging the liability of a third party.  The 
better view, then, is that entry of a non-debtor [release] . . . is not incompatible with § 524(e).”), rev’d on other 
grounds, 255 B.R. 445 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, aff’d in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Brubaker, supra note 27, at 972 (“[T]he literal terms of section 524(e) say only that the debtor’s discharge 
does not, by its own force, affect the liability of others.  Nothing in section 524(e) can be read to affirmatively 
prohibit a bankruptcy court from using its equitable injunctive powers in furtherance of a successful 
reorganization . . . .”); see also In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1046–47 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[S]ection 
524(e) provides only that a discharge does not affect the liability of third parties.  This language does not 
purport to limit or restrain the power of the bankruptcy court to otherwise grant a release to a third party.”) 
(holding that § 524(e) did not bar the consensual non-debtor release at issue and noting that there was no need 
to address whether § 524(e) prohibits involuntary releases). 
 279 In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 816 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“Section 524(e) does not overtly 
bar a plan from providing non-debtor releases, but simply provides that, if the plan does not otherwise specify 
such releases, the discharge arising under section 1141 does not affect a creditor’s claim against a non-
debtor.”).  For additional authorities supporting this understanding of § 524(e), see supra notes 153 & 156. 
 280 See authorities cited supra note 278. 
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with § 105(a) and the bankruptcy court’s broad equitable powers where there 
need not be one.281  Finally, since § 524(e)’s language is clear, there is no 
reason to consider its antecedents in the Bankruptcy Act, as some anti-release 
courts did in analyzing the statute.282  Section 524(e) thus does not bar third-
party releases.283 
 
 281 In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 478 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“When the plain meaning of a statute 
is clear, the court’s inquiry is at an end. . . .  A court should interpret the Code in a manner that avoids a 
conflict between its various sections.”) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 
2002); In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 936 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (“First, the clear pattern 
that has emerged from recent Supreme Court rulings is that an analysis of the plain meaning of the statute is to 
be used in construing the Bankruptcy Code. . . .  To interpret [§ 524(e)] as prohibiting all permanent 
injunctions would create a conflict with § 105 where there need be none.”); In re Optical Tech., Inc., 216 B.R. 
989, 994 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (adopting a narrow construction of § 524(e) under which the statute does not 
prohibit non-debtor releases because that interpretation is consistent with § 105(a)’s broad grant of equitable 
power); Swallow, supra note 27, at 721 (arguing that because the Supreme Court has ruled that the plain 
meaning of a statute is conclusive in construing the statute, “it is evident” that § 524(e) does not prohibit non-
debtor releases). 
 282 In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 936 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (concluding that 
because the Supreme Court requires a plain-meaning approach to interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits should not have looked at the statute’s predecessors in construing it); Swallow, supra 
note 27, at 721 (given the Supreme Court’s precedents on statutory construction, “If section 524(e) does not 
provide an express basis for denying confirmation of the injunction, and no other express provision is 
contained in the Code, there is no ground for precluding” a third-party release). 
 283 Some pro-release authorities have suggested that channeling releases do not violate § 524(e) because, 
in their view, the release does not actually “impair” or “discharge” the creditor’s claims.  See, e.g., In re 
Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 687 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (concluding that because the 
partners shielded by the non-debtor release were obligated to provide “the entire funding of the debtor’s plan” 
(instead of paying creditors directly), the partners were “not receiving a discharge of their obligations to 
creditors; they are merely exchanging one obligation for another”); Lewis, supra note 27, at 176 (concluding 
that non-debtor releases do not violate § 524(e) when the extinguished claims are paid in full because such 
claims are not “impaired” by the release); Inman, supra note 27, at 649–50 (arguing that third parties “are not 
truly released from liability” by non-debtor releases when the third parties contribute money to the estate that 
provides “a mechanism for payment of creditor claims. . . .  To suggest that . . . creditor claims were 
prejudiced in [the pro-release cases affirming channeling releases] is incorrect.”).  A number of anti-release 
courts implied the same point when they distinguished opinions approving of channeling releases.  See infra 
note 392 and accompanying text.  Thus, it could be asserted that even if § 524(e) generally bars third-party 
releases, the prohibition is inoperative where the “extinguished” claims are paid in full. 
This argument is unpersuasive.  Section 524(e) provides that the discharge of the debtor may not 
“affect the liability of any other entity.”  11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2000) (emphasis added).  But a non-debtor 
release clearly “affects” the liability of the benefiting party.  The release eliminates the non-debtor’s obligation 
to the creditor.  It does so even if the third party has not contributed any assets to the plan of reorganization.  
Moreover, the creditor is losing an alternative source of recovery.  See In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 9 
(N.D. Okla. 1998) (observing that channeling releases limit the sources of compensation available to the 
creditor).  If the debtor is unable to comply with the terms of its plan, the creditor may not pursue the non-
debtor to recover any deficiency.  Critically, plan failures of this type are not uncommon.  See infra notes 367–
69 and accompanying text (explaining that a large percentage of debtors default on their plan obligations). 
In essence, a non-debtor release “forcibly converts creditors’ in personam claims against a non-debtor 
into [more narrow] in rem claims against the debtor’s property.”  Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1038.  There is 
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4. Circumstances in Which Pro-Release Courts Will Grant a Non-Debtor 
Release 
While pro-release courts generally agree upon the source of their authority 
to issue non-debtor releases, they differ in critical respects over the 
circumstances in which such authority may be exercised.  In Robins, the Fourth 
Circuit approved of the non-debtor release for several reasons: (1) the release 
was essential to A.H. Robins’s plan because the reorganization hinged upon 
the debtor being free from indemnity and contribution lawsuits that third 
parties would have brought had they been sued by the Dalkon Shield 
claimants; (2) the creditors voted overwhelmingly in favor of the plan; (3) the 
plan provided the Dalkon Shield claimants with the opportunity to receive 
payment in full on the released claims; and (4) Aetna contributed substantial 
assets to the Plan.284  These elements have since evolved into a five-factor test 
that a majority of pro-release courts use in assessing whether to grant a non-
debtor release. 
Reviewing Johns-Manville, Robins and some of their early progeny, the 
bankruptcy court in In re Master Mortgage Investment Fund, Inc. set forth 
what is now the most authoritative formulation of the test.285  First, there must 
be “an identity of interest between the debtor and the third party, usually an 
indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a 
suit against the debtor or will deplete assets of the estate.”286  To elaborate, a 
 
no doubt that this constitutes an “affect” on the non-debtor’s liability.  Indeed, a number of courts have found 
that provisional injunctions, which do not even purport to extinguish claims, improperly “affect” a third-
party’s liability and thus violate § 524(e).  See In re Davis Broad., Inc., 176 B.R. 290, 291–92 (M.D. Ga. 1994) 
(§ 524(e) bars a bankruptcy court from “affecting” the liability of a guarantor in any way, including through a 
provisional injunction staying creditors’ legal actions against certain third parties pending execution of the 
plan) (“It is thus clear that this is a post-confirmation injunction and violates 11 U.S.C. Section 524(e) and 
accordingly exceeds the power and authority of the Bankruptcy Court because the section referred to prohibits 
release or a post-confirmation stay of the obligations of non-party guarantors. . . .  Of course, the liability of a 
guarantor is ‘affected’ regardless of whether it is released or, as in this case, stayed for a long period of time.”); 
Seaport Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc.), 
113 B.R. 610, 614–16 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 524(e) prohibited a provisional injunction that 
stayed collection efforts against certain non-debtors for five years after confirmation of the plan); see also Bill 
Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 758, 762 (D. Utah 1985) 
(holding that postconfirmation injunctions staying legal action against a non-debtor are impermissible; 
invalidating a chapter 11 plan provision that appears to be a provisional injunction).  Accordingly, if § 524(e) 
prohibits non-debtor releases, it bars all such releases—both actual releases and channeling releases. 
 284 Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701–02 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 285 In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994). 
 286 Id. at 935 & n.4 (collecting authorities); see also Inman, supra note 27, at 641 (“Generally courts look 
for some sort of indemnity relationship between the debtor and third party such that any suit against the third 
party may deplete the assets of the debtor estate.”). 
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creditor’s action against a co-obligor generally provides the co-obligor with a 
contribution or indemnity claim against the debtor.287  The assertion of such a 
claim can drain property from the estate.  Thus, the co-obligor and the debtor 
have an “identity of interest” because a suit against the co-obligor can impact 
the debtor indirectly.288 
Second, the third party must contribute “substantial” assets to the 
reorganization.289  This typically entails giving large sums of money to the 
estate for distribution to creditors and/or the release of claims the non-debtor 
possesses against the debtor.290 
Third, the release must be “essential to the reorganization.  Without the 
release, there is little likelihood of success.”291  To illustrate, in the absence of 
a release, non-debtors may refuse to contribute assets to the estate that are 
“necessary” for the debtor’s reorganization.  Without the payments, the debtor 
will be forced to liquidate, which means that creditors will likely recover much 
less, if they recover at all, and the debtor will not be able to resume its 
business.292 
Fourth, a “substantial majority of the creditors agree to [the release], 
specifically, the impacted class, or classes has ‘overwhelmingly’ voted to 
accept the proposed plan treatment.”293  In Master Mortgage, for example, 
 
 287 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 973–74. 
 288 See, e.g., In re Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. 377, 391–92 (D.N.J. 2000) (approving of a non-debtor 
release because, among other reasons, the debtor had indemnified the releasees and lawsuits against them 
would have lead to the assertion of indemnity claims against the debtor, which ultimately would have depleted 
assets of the estate); Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 937 (holding that the existence of an indemnity relationship 
between the debtor and the released non-debtor satisfied the first element of the test). 
 289 Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 & n.5 (collecting authorities). 
 290 Id. at 937–38 (non-debtors’ contributions included the release of claims against, or the assignment of 
interests to, the debtor); Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. at 392 (released third parties contributed over $70 
million to the estate for distribution through the reorganization plan). 
 291 Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 & n.6 (collecting authorities). 
 292 Id. at 938 (without a release, the non-debtors would not have made contributions that enabled the 
debtor to formulate a workable plan and allowed creditors to recover in full); Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. at 
391–92 (contributions of third parties that made possible (1) significant distributions to creditors, and (2) the 
continued operation of the debtors, were contingent upon the third parties obtaining releases); see also 
Cartalemi v. Karta Corp. (In re Karta Corp.), 342 B.R. 45, 54–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (approving of a non-debtor 
release because, inter alia, the reorganization plan was made possible by the principals’ substantial financial 
contributions and the principals refused to make the contributions without a release). 
 293 Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 & n.7 (collecting authorities). 
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94.8% and 93.4% of the two classes affected by the release voted for the 
plan.294 
Fifth, the plan provides for “payment of all, or substantially all, of the 
claims of the class or classes affected by the” non-debtor release.295  In Master 
Mortgage, all of the extinguished non-debtor claims were to be paid in full 
under the plan.296  However, smaller distributions have been held to satisfy this 
element.297 
 
 A number of courts have adopted the Master Mortgage test.298  And a 
 
 294 Id. at 938; see also Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. at 392 (100% of two impacted classes and 99.99% of 
the third voted for the plan). 
 295 Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 & n.8 (collecting authorities).  While the Master Mortgage court 
stated that these factors “do not appear to be an exclusive list of considerations,” id. at 935, they have largely 
become so. 
 296 Id. at 938. 
 297 See, e.g., Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. at 392 (holding that a 90% distribution to one class and 100% 
distributions to two other classes impacted by the release met the fifth element of the Master Mortgage test). 
 298 For decisions adopting the test in the First Circuit, see In re M.J.H. Leasing, Inc., 328 B.R. 363, 369–
72 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (applying the test but concluding that the channeling release proposed in the 
debtor’s disclosure statement was improper because it failed to satisfy most of the Master Mortgage factors); 
In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 300–03 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (adopting the test but finding 
invalid both of the proposed non-debtor releases—an insurance company release and an actual release of 
partners in the debtor, which was a limited liability partnership). 
For a decision adopting the test in the Third Circuit, see Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. at 386–87, 390–
92, 405–08 (following Robins and Master Mortgage and approving of several non-debtor releases because the 
five factors were satisfied; notably, the plan did not provide for payment in full—the tort claimants subject to 
the release only received ninety percent of their claims). 
For a decision adopting the test in the Sixth Circuit, see In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 479–
81 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (adopting the test and approving of the channeling releases in the debtor’s plan because 
all five factors were met), rev’d in part, 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002) (endorsing the Master Mortgage 
test, but adding a sixth factor—that “the plan provides an opportunity for those claimants who choose not to 
settle to recover in full”). 
For decisions adopting the test in the Eighth Circuit, see Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935, 937–38 
(adopting the test and approving of a channeling release in the debtor’s plan because the test was satisfied; 
concluding that all five factors were met); In re Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 321 B.R. 498, 513–14 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ark. 2005) (adopting the test, but rejecting the actual release contained in the debtor’s plan because none of 
the five factors were satisfied). 
For decisions adopting the test in the Eleventh Circuit, see In re Optical Tech., Inc., 216 B.R. 989, 
990–94 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (expressly adopting the Master Mortgage test but striking the actual releases 
contained in the plan because the plan provided for the liquidation of the debtors rather than reorganization, 
did not provide payment for substantially all of the released claims, and there was no identity of interest 
between the third parties and the debtors); In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 816–20 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2002) (adopting the test and holding that only one of the non-debtor releases contained in the plan was 
permissible because the third parties shielded by the other releases did not contribute to the plan or did not 
show that their release was necessary). 
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further group has assessed the propriety of non-debtor releases using similar 
factors.299  But the authorities are not uniform in their understanding of the test.  
For example, some cases indicate that the five elements should be balanced.300  
Others suggest that each of the five must be satisfied.301  Still others have 
added to the test.  The Sixth Circuit recently included a sixth factor: all 
dissenting creditors whose claims are extinguished by the release must be paid 
in full under the plan.302  The courts following Master Mortgage do agree on 
 
Some courts have used the test in assessing the validity of a provisional injunction.  See, e.g., In re Mac 
Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *8-*11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000) (applying 
the Master Mortgage test in holding that the provisional injunction contained in the debtor’s plan was 
permissible under the Code because each of the five factors was satisfied); In re Shaw Aero Devices, Inc., 283 
B.R. 349, 350–53 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (applying the Master Mortgage test in holding that a non-debtor 
release, which the court construed to operate as a provisional injunction, was permissible where four of the 
five factors were satisfied). 
 299 See, e.g., Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 975–76, 985 (1st Cir. 1995) (the 
bankruptcy court, whose confirmation opinion is attached as an appendix to the First Circuit decision, 
approved of a broad non-debtor release barring nearly all claims against numerous third parties, including the 
debtor’s attorneys, directors, employees, and agents, that related to the debtor’s operations where the third 
parties contributed substantial funds to the plan, the creditors “overwhelmingly consented,” and the non-debtor 
release was “the only basis on which to build, confirm and effectuate the Plan”); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. 
Ropes & Gray (In re Monarch Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 31, 41–43 (D. Mass. 1994) (affirming the Monarch 
Life Ins. bankruptcy court’s granting of the non-debtor releases), aff’d, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 185 B.R. 302, 313, 321–22 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that the non-debtor releases 
in the plan of reorganization were permissible under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) and other “applicable law,” 
where there was an “absence of objections” to the releases, all impaired classes supported the plan, the 
released parties gave up valuable rights against the debtor, the debtor had indemnified the third parties from 
the released claims, and there was no evidence that the non-debtors faced any liability on the released claims);  
see also Buschman, supra note 27, at 942, 946 (approving of non-debtor releases where (1) the injunction is 
indispensable to the reorganization because it facilitates an increase in estate assets earmarked for distribution 
to creditors, (2) does not bar claims against non-contributing third parties, and (3) the non-debtor’s 
contributions “bear a reasonable relation to their potential liability (in the case of insurers) or their net worth 
(in the case of general partners)”); Swallow, supra note 27, at 709, 726 (arguing that non-debtor releases are 
permissible under § 1123(b)(6) where (1) the plan provides payment in full on all extinguished claims, (2) the 
non-debtor release is essential to the plan—i.e., without the release the creditors will recover substantially less 
and a confirmable plan cannot be formulated, and (3) a substantial majority of creditors support the plan); cf. 
Lewis, supra note 27, at 176 (maintaining that third-party releases are allowable where creditors receive full 
payment on all claims eliminated by the release). 
 300 See, e.g., Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 (“The courts seem to have balanced the five listed factors 
most often.”); In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 817–18 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (suggesting that not all 
factors need be present to justify a non-debtor release). 
 301 See, e.g., Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 
658 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a non-debtor release is “appropriate” under § 1123(b)(6) only where all five 
Master Mortgage factors are satisfied and where every dissenting creditor with claims affected by the release 
is paid in full); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(implying that all of the factors the court considered in upholding the non-debtor release were necessary to 
avoid the impact of § 524(e)). 
 302 Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (adopting the test but remanding because the factual findings of 
the bankruptcy court did not support a finding that unusual circumstances existed justifying the non-debtor 
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one thing, however: non-debtor releases should only be granted in 
“exceptional” or “unusual” circumstances because they are a “drastic” form of 
relief.303  Indeed, the Master Mortgage approach has been called the “unusual 
circumstances test.”304 
Although many pro-release courts have adopted some version of the Master 
Mortgage test, others apply a less stringent standard when addressing the 
propriety of non-debtor releases.  The leading case in this line of authority is In 
re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.305  Drexel and eighteen of its 
subsidiaries were driven into bankruptcy, in large part, by class action and 
derivative lawsuits for securities violations brought on behalf of “tens of 
thousands” of persons.306  Prior to confirmation of the plan, the district and 
bankruptcy courts certified a mandatory non-opt-out class under Rule 
23(b)(1)(B)307 that consisted of all securities claimants.308  The judges also 
granted approval to a settlement between the class and the debtors that 
provided for payments to the securities claimants through the debtors’ plan of 
 
releases).  The Sixth Circuit articulated a seventh factor as well—that the bankruptcy court make specific 
factual findings that support its conclusion as to the other six elements.  Id.  But this is technically not an 
additional factor.  It simply mandates that the bankruptcy court make a record in its assessment of the six 
elements. 
 303 See, e.g., In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 937 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (“The Court 
cautions the Gentle Reader that a permanent injunction is a rare thing, indeed, and only upon a showing of 
exceptional circumstances in which the factors outlined above are present will this Court even entertain the 
possibility of a permanent injunction.”); Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning 
Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Because such an injunction is a dramatic measure to be used 
cautiously, we follow those circuits that have held that enjoining a non-consenting creditor’s claim is only 
appropriate in ‘unusual circumstances.’”); In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 818 (Bankr. M.D. FL. 
2002) (“Moreover, allowing non-debtor releases is the exception, not the norm.  Debtors should not 
automatically expect to release officers, directors, insurers, or creditors from future liability, unless some 
extraordinary reason is proven.”); id. at 820 (“Non-debtor releases are extraordinary and should be reserved for 
unusual circumstances.”); id. at 817 (“[T]he courts allowing non-debtor releases hold that the granting of such 
releases is justified only in unusual circumstances.”); In re Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. 377, 406 (D.N.J. 
2000) (interpreting Robins and its progeny as allowing for non-debtor releases only in “exceptional or 
extraordinary circumstances”); see also Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re 
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A nondebtor release in a plan of 
reorganization should not be approved absent the finding that truly unusual circumstances render the release 
terms important to success of the plan . . . .”). 
 304 See Greenblatt v. Richard Potasky Jeweler, Inc. (In re Richard Potasky Jeweler, Inc.), 222 B.R. 816, 
826 (S.D. Ohio 1998). 
 305 SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 
285 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 306 See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 130 B.R. 
910, 913–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 307 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 308 Drexel Burnham Lambert, 130 B.R. at 914, 918, 923–24. 
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reorganization and released most of the class’s securities claims against the 
debtors’ directors and officers.309  In support of this ruling, the lower courts 
explained that the settlement and non-debtor release were essential to the 
reorganization because, without them, “there could be no Plan and indeed, no 
successful and prompt resolution of these chapter 11 cases.”310  More 
specifically, the judges found that the non-debtor release would (1) facilitate 
cooperation between the debtors and their employees, (2) induce the debtors’ 
directors and officers to settle certain claims with the debtors, which would 
provide more funds for the reorganization, (3) eliminate competition over 
particular assets, and (4) protect the debtors’ estate by preventing indemnity 
claims that insiders would assert if they were sued by the securities 
claimants.311 
On appeal, the Second Circuit overruled the objections challenging the 
non-debtor releases.312  Citing Robins, the court of appeals stated, with no 
additional analysis, that “[i]n bankruptcy cases, a court may enjoin a creditor 
from suing a third party, provided the injunction plays an important part in the 
debtor’s reorganization plan.”313  The court continued by determining that the 
settlement “is unquestionably an essential element of Drexel’s ultimate 
reorganization[,]” and that the non-debtor release “is a key component of” that 
agreement.314  Without it, the directors and officers would be less likely to 
settle.315 
Drexel is a substantial extension of Robins.  The standard it proposes—
whether a non-debtor release “plays an important part in the debtor’s 
reorganization plan”316—is not nearly as rigorous as the Master Mortgage 
test.317  And while there is evidence that four of the Master Mortgage elements 
 
 309 Id. at 924–28; Drexel Burnham Lambert, 960 F.2d at 288–89. 
 310 Drexel Burnham Lambert, 130 B.R. at 926–27. 
 311 Id. at 928. 
 312 Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 960 F.2d at 293. 
 313 Id. (citing Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
 314 Drexel Burnham Lambert, 960 F.2d at 293. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
 317 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1022 (noting that the Drexel court’s standard for acceptance of non-
debtor releases is less strict than the test adopted by most pro-release courts).  But cf. Deutsche Bank AG v. 
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“A nondebtor release in a plan of reorganization should not be approved absent the finding that truly unusual 
circumstances render the release terms important to success of the plan . . . .”). 
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were satisfied in Drexel,318 there clearly was no payment in full.319  
Nonetheless, the Drexel test is now controlling in the Second Circuit,320 and in 
at least one other jurisdiction.321 
 
 318 The securities claimants overwhelmingly supported the settlement. Drexel Burnham Lambert, 130 
B.R. at 923.  Furthermore, the courts concluded that the non-debtor release was essential to the reorganization., 
id. at 926–28; Drexel Burnham Lambert, 960 F.2d at 293, and that there was a threat of indemnity actions, 130 
B.R. at 928; 960 F.2d at 293.  Finally, the settlement of the lawsuits between the debtors and the directors and 
officers provided additional funds for the plan, 130 B.R. at 928, 960 F.2d at 293, and one could construe the 
settlement payments to be contributions by the non-debtors.  But see In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 
285, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (ruling that an insurance company’s payment to the estate under the debtor’s 
policy did not satisfy the “substantial contribution” element of the Master Mortgage test because the insurance 
company was “only fulfilling its contractual obligation”). 
 319 Drexel Burnham Lambert, 130 B.R. at 913–14, 920 (indicating that the value of the securities 
claimants’ claims exceeded the assets of the debtors by roughly a multiple of ten); id. at 925 (stating that the 
debtors did not have sufficient funds to pay more than the amount put forth in the settlement).  Indeed, Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) mandatory non-opt-out classes are intended for use where the assets available for the class 
members constitute a limited fund, insufficient to pay all claimants in full.  See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 
680 F.2d 1175, 1187 (8th Cir. 1982) (“A class action may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) when a number 
of individuals claim rights to a share of a fund that is too small to satisfy in full every individual’s claim.”).  
Thus, the “nature of [the Drexel class action] settlement implicitly recognized the fact that [the securities 
claimants] were not being fully compensated.”  Brubaker, supra note 27, at 989.  Professor Brubaker provides 
devastating criticism of Drexel in his article.  He illustrates how the use of the mandatory non-opt-out class 
wholly subverted critical protections contained in the Bankruptcy Code.  See id. at 988–89. 
 320 See, e.g., Cartalemi v. Karta Corp. (In re Karta Corp.), 342 B.R. 45, 54–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (following 
Drexel and largely approving of a non-debtor release extinguishing claims against principals of the debtors and 
several related entities because the reorganization plan preserved the debtors’ business operations, the plan was 
made possible by the principals’ substantial financial contributions, and the principals refused to make the 
contributions without the release); Abel v. Shugrue (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 184 B.R. 648, 655 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that non-debtor releases are permissible “to resolve finally all claims in connection 
with the estate and to give finality to a reorganization plan”) (approving of several non-debtor releases where 
they were integral to a final resolution of claims in connection with the estate and to give finality to the 
reorganization plan); LTV Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 167 B.R. 776, 780 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that bankruptcy courts may issue non-debtor releases under § 105(a) if they are 
“essential” to the plan of reorganization, but remanding and directing the bankruptcy court to more carefully 
consider whether the non-debtor release in the plan satisfied this standard); Greer v. Gaston & Snow (In re 
Gaston & Snow), Nos. 93 Civ. 8517 (JGK), 93 Civ. 8628 (JGK), 1996 WL 694421, at *2-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 
1996) (following Drexel in holding that non-debtor releases are permissible where they play “an important part 
in the debtor’s reorganization plan”) (concluding that third-party releases that extinguished all partner 
contribution and indemnity claims against partners that contributed to the estate of the debtor-partnership 
“clearly played an important part in the plan” because no partner would have contributed without the 
protection of the release); In re Spiegel, Inc., No. 03-11540 (BRL), 2005 WL 1278094, at *11, *15-*17 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2005) (following Drexel); see also Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. 
P’ship (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 150, 154–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (suggesting that the debtor-
partnership’s plan could include a non-debtor release barring the debtor’s creditors and partners from suing 
partners that contributed to the debtor’s estate as part of the plan because the release was necessary to the 
formulation of a workable plan; further noting that the release may be permissible even though the creditors 
would not be paid in full if the contributing partners only paid on the basis of their net worth and the 
substantive validity of any claims against them). 
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While pro-release courts have used various standards to assess the 
legitimacy of non-debtor releases, this Article maintains that releases must 
satisfy a modified version of the Master Mortgage “unusual circumstances” 
test.  In my view, a bankruptcy court may grant a third-party release only if the 
first (“identity of interest”) and third (“essential to the reorganization”) Master 
Mortgage factors are met, the impacted class of creditors “accepts” the plan as 
that concept is defined by § 1126(c) of the Code,322 and all dissenting creditors 
affected by the release are to be paid in full on their extinguished claims.  
Unless each of these four elements is fulfilled, the non-debtor release is invalid 
and the issues that are the primary focus of this Article—(1) the scope of 
 
 321 See In re McCall, No. 93-00632, 1997 WL 428580, at *16 (Bankr. D.D.C. May 27, 1997) (“Estate 
creditors may be permanently enjoined from instituting collection actions against non-debtors who are jointly 
liable with the debtor on estate debts when the non-debtor co-obligors make financial contributions to the 
estate that are an essential source of funding for a reorganization plan.”) (upholding a channeling release); In 
re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 666–67, 685–87 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (“Under 
section 105(a) a bankruptcy court may enter a permanent injunction enjoining suits against non-debtor parties 
funding a plan of reorganization if the court finds that such an injunction is essential to effectuate the plan of 
reorganization.”) (confirming a plan containing a non-debtor release that extinguished the contribution and 
indemnity claims that partners, who did not contribute assets to the estate, could assert against contributing 
partners, where the release was the “sin qua non of the plan”). 
As a final note, a few courts have approved of non-debtor releases using tests wholly distinct from 
those in the Master Mortgage and Drexel lines.  See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Bechtle (In re 
Labrum & Doak), 237 B.R. 275, 305–08 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (using the test for non-debtor stays set forth in 
In re Monroe Well Serv. Inc., 67 B.R. 746, 750–57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986), in issuing a postconfirmation non-
debtor release of partners who had provided assets to the debtor-partnership’s estate pursuant to a settlement 
with the debtor); Munford v. Munford, Inc. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 449, 452, 455 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that where the debtor settled with a defendant in an adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court could 
issue a permanent injunction under § 105(a) and FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9) that barred the non-settling 
defendants from asserting contributing and indemnity claims against the settling defendant because the 
injunction was necessary to effectuate the settlement).  While some courts have included Munford in the pro-
release camp, see, e.g., In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 816 n.2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002), the case 
involved relatively unique circumstances.  Most non-debtor releases bar a creditor of the debtor from pursuing 
a co-obligor of the debtor.  But the release in Munford prohibited parties liable to the debtor from suing other 
such parties, where the injunction was necessary to induce the settling defendant to compromise and the 
settlement saved estate assets.  Munford, 97 F.3d at 452, 454–55.  Critically, the court of appeals did not cite 
any pro- or anti-release cases; and it focused heavily on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(9) (providing 
that a court may use “special procedures to assist in” promoting settlement) in analyzing the propriety of the 
release.  Munford, 97 F.3d at 454–55.  Accordingly, it is not clear whether the Eleventh Circuit would extend 
its reasoning in Munford to the more typical non-debtor release context.  Cf. In re Optical Tech., Inc., 216 B.R. 
989, 990–94 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (failing to discuss or cite Munford in analyzing whether to adopt the Master 
Mortgage test). 
 322 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000) (“A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by 
creditors . . . that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of 
such class held by creditors . . . that have accepted or rejected such plan.”). 
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authority conferred by §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), and (2) whether § 524(e) bars 
releases—do not even arise.323 
Element One—“Identity of Interest.”  First, an “identity of interest” is 
required to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the claims that are 
eliminated by the release.  If the debtor and the third party do not have such a 
relationship, any lawsuit against the third party will have no impact on the 
estate, placing the underlying claim beyond the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court.324  And a bankruptcy court may not extinguish a claim over which it 
lacks jurisdiction.325 
Element Two—“Essential to the Reorganization.”  Second, §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) mandate that non-debtor releases be “essential to the 
reorganization.”  The former law only permits a court to issue orders 
“necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Code.326  And the 
latter allows a plan of reorganization to include “any other appropriate 
provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”327  
Because non-debtor releases are a drastic form of relief,328 it is difficult to 
imagine why a release would be “necessary” or “appropriate” if it is not 
essential to the reorganization.329 
Under the test proposed here, the primary method of demonstrating that a 
non-debtor release is essential is by showing that contributions from third 
parties are necessary to the formulation of a workable plan and are contingent 
 
 323 In addition, nothing beyond these four elements is necessary. 
 324 See Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that bankruptcy courts have 
jurisdiction over claims that “could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in 
bankruptcy”) (italics removed); see also supra note 38 and infra note 357 for brief discussions of the 
jurisdictional issues relating to non-debtor releases. 
 325 See Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624 
(9th Cir. 1989) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a bankruptcy court’s capacity to act); 
see also Wasserman v. Immormino (In re Granger Garage, Inc.), 921 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir. 1990) (§ 105(a) is 
not a jurisdictional provision). 
 326 § 105(a). 
 327 § 1123(b)(6). 
 328 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 329 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1022 (concluding that “nothing short” of a showing of necessity could 
justify a non-debtor release); see also United States v. Energy Res. Co. 495 U.S. 545, 548–50 (1990) (holding 
that bankruptcy courts may issue tax designation orders under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) “if the bankruptcy 
court determines that this designation is necessary to the success of a reorganization plan”) (emphasis added).  
For additional discussion of the similarities between the modified Master Mortgage test proposed in the text 
and the standard used by the Supreme Court in Energy Resources, see infra note 533. 
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upon the third parties receiving a release.330  But this is not the only way to 
establish that a release is essential.  The reorganization may hinge upon the 
debtor being free from indemnity and contribution claims,331 which can 
consume precious estate resources, inhibiting the debtor’s rehabilitation.  
Alternatively, critical employees of the debtor might refuse to continue 
working in the absence of a release, making it impossible for the debtor to 
emerge from bankruptcy and resume its operations.332 Accordingly, 
contributions from the released parties are not necessary in all cases, and thus 
the second Master Mortgage factor (a “substantial” contribution to the estate 
by released third parties) is not mandatory. 
Additionally, the second element cannot be satisfied unless the debtor is 
actually reorganizing.  Debtors liquidating under chapter 11 do not receive a 
discharge.333  Neither do corporations and other artificial persons disposing of 
their property in a chapter 7 proceeding.334  Bankruptcy courts should not be 
permitted to extinguish non-debtor liabilities in a case where the Code denies 
any such relief to the debtor itself.335  That is because a non-debtor release that 
 
 330 See, e.g., In re Am. Family Enter., 256 B.R. 377, 391–92 (D.N.J. 2000) (contributions of third parties 
that made possible (1) significant distributions to creditors, and (2) the continued operation of the debtors, 
were contingent upon the third parties obtaining releases); In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 
930, 938 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (without a release, the non-debtors would not have made contributions that 
enabled the debtor to formulate a workable plan and allowed creditors to recover in full). 
 331 See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989).  But 
see Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1002–09 (asserting that contribution and indemnity claims do not threaten the 
estate in the manner that pro-release courts and commentators suggest). 
 332 See, e.g., In re Shaw Aero Devices, Inc., 283 B.R. 349, 352–53 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (upholding a 
non-debtor release, which the court construed to operate as a provisional injunction, because, inter alia, while 
the beneficiary of the release was not contributing money to the plan, the beneficiary’s participation in the 
future operations of the debtor was “necessary . . . to consummate the Plan of Reorganization”); see also 
United States v. A&B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. (In re A&B Heating & Air Conditioning), 823 F.2d 
462, 465 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Frequently, the efforts put forth by [the] officers during the reorganization is the 
corporation’s only hope for future viability.”), vacated, 486 U.S. 1002 (1988). 
 333 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)(A) (2000) (“The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if . . . the 
plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the estate.”).  As § 1141(d)(3) 
makes clear, chapter 11 expressly contemplates liquidating plans of “reorganization.”  § 1141(d)(3). 
 334 § 727(a)(1) (“The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless . . . the debtor is not an        
individual . . . .”); Wetherbee v. Willow Lane, Inc. (In re Bestway Products, Inc.), 151 B.R. 530, 537 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. 1993) (“It is a crystalline rule that a discharge cannot be entered in a Chapter 7 case in which the 
debtor is not an individual.”), aff’d, 165 B.R. 339 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994). 
 335 See In re Optical Tech., Inc., 216 B.R. 989, 990–94 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (adopting Master Mortgage but 
striking the actual releases contained in the debtors’ liquidating plan because “where . . . a plan of 
reorganization provides for the total liquidation of the debtor, the factors of Master Mortgage cannot be met”); 
In re Mrs. Weinberg’s Kosher Foods, 278 B.R. 358, 365–66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding in this chapter 7 
case that bankruptcy courts may not use a channeling injunction to enjoin a creditor from prosecuting direct 
claims against a non-debtor); In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 302 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) 
SILVERSTEIN GALLEYSFINAL 2/19/2007  2:08:42 PM 
74 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23 
is part of a liquidation does not serve the “conventional purposes of the 
reorganization policy,” such as preserving jobs and protecting broader 
community interests.336  Rather, it simply promotes the more narrow 
bankruptcy policy of maximizing the debtor’s estate for distribution to 
creditors.337  Therefore, non-debtor releases are inappropriate in chapter 7 and 
chapter 11 liquidations.  In short, “essential to the reorganization” means 
essential to the reorganization.338 
Element Three—“Consent by Impacted Creditors.”  Third, when the class 
of creditors affected by a non-debtor release has “accepted” the plan under 
§ 1126(c), the debtor need not satisfy the requirements of the Code’s 
“cramdown” provision.  Section 1129(a) states that a plan may be confirmed 
only if each “impaired” class of creditors has accepted the plan.339  However, 
 
(concluding that a proposed actual release did not satisfy the Master Mortgage test because, inter alia, the 
debtor intended to file a liquidating chapter 11 plan); In re Swallen’s, Inc., 210 B.R. 123, 127 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1997) (concluding that even if the court adopted the Master Mortgage test, the proposed non-debtor 
release was impermissible because, inter alia, the debtor was liquidating under chapter 11 and thus the release 
could not be essential to a reorganization); cf. In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 133 B.R. 973, 976–79 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that the court did not have sufficient power under § 105(a) to grant a non-debtor 
release that extinguished the contractual rights of a non-debtor shareholder that was co-insured with the debtor 
and distinguishing Johns-Manville, in part, because the debtor here proposed a liquidating plan rather than a 
reorganization), aff’d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 336 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1014–16, 1019; see also Boyle, supra note 27, at 439 (“Indeed, Congress 
has indicated in the Code’s legislative history that the purpose of a reorganization is to rehabilitate the debtor 
so that it may continue to provide its employees with jobs, satisfy its debts to its creditors, and yield a return to 
its shareholders.”). 
 337 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1019. 
 338 Admittedly, a significant number of cases have approved of non-debtor releases contained in chapter 
11 liquidating plans.  See, e.g., Greer v. Gaston & Snow (In re Gaston & Snow), Nos. 93 Civ. 8517 (JGK), 93 
Civ. 8628 (JGK), 1996 WL 694421, at *2-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1996) (holding that the non-debtor releases in 
the debtor-partnership’s liquidating chapter 11 plan were valid); Abel v. Shugrue (In re Ionosphere Clubs, 
Inc.), 184 B.R. 648, 654–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding a non-debtor release contained in the corporate 
debtors’ chapter 11 liquidating plan); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Bechtle (In re Labrum & 
Doak), 237 B.R. 275, 283, 305 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (approving of a postconfirmation permanent injunction 
even though the debtor-partnership filed a chapter 11 liquidating plan); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & 
Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 666–68, 685–87 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (same). 
 339 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2000).  A class of claims is “impaired under § 1124 if the plan alters the legal, 
equitable or contractual rights to which holders of such claims are otherwise entitled.”  7 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1124.01, at 1124–3 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2003); see also § 1124(1).  “Any 
alternation of these rights constitutes impairment, even if the value of the rights is enhanced.”  7 COLLIER ¶ 
1124.02, at 1124–5 (emphasis added) (collecting authorities).  In other words, even if a claim is paid in full 
under the plan, if the claim is changed in any way—e.g., the plan provides that a contractual claim will be paid 
more slowly than originally agreed—the claim is impaired.  See Oxford Life Ins. Co. v. Tucson Self-Storage, 
Inc. (In re Tucson Self-Storage, Inc.), 166 B.R. 892, 895 n.5 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994) (holding that a class’ 
claims were impaired because they were to be paid in full sixty days after the effective date of the plan rather 
than immediately upon the effective date as was their right under nonbankruptcy law). 
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§ 1129(b) creates an exception: a plan may be confirmed over the objection of 
an impaired class (i.e., “crammed down”)340 if the plan “does not discriminate 
unfairly” against the class and treats the class in a “fair and equitable” 
manner.341  These standards are exceptionally demanding,342 and a plan 
containing a non-debtor release probably could not satisfy them.343  In fact, 
several years after confirmation, a bankruptcy court in Robins noted that the 
debtor’s plan would have been “unconfirmable” under § 1129(b) if the Dalkon 
Shield claimants had voted against the plan and there was any chance that they 
would not receive payment in full.344  Thus, a third-party release will not pass 
muster if the impacted class objects.345 
Critically, this proposed requirement of class consent is distinct from the 
fourth Master Mortgage factor—that the class affected by the release has 
“‘overwhelmingly’ voted to accept the proposed plan treatment.”346  This 
Article contends that if the impacted class has “accepted” the plan pursuant to 
 
 340 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.04, at 1129–75 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004). 
 341 § 1129(b)(1). 
 342 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.04, at 1129–75 (“The requirements of section 1129(b) . . . are both numerous and 
exacting.”). 
 343 See Feldstein, supra note 27, at 43 (“It should never be fair or equitable to confirm a plan requiring a 
dissenting class to release a nondebtor from a claim not held by other classes.”); see also In re Salem Suede, 
Inc., 219 B.R. 922, 927–28, 931–37 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (holding under § 1129(b)(1) that a non-debtor 
release unfairly discriminated against the class of creditors affected by the release because other creditors did 
not need to give up rights against third parties to receive distributions under the plan).  The main problem is 
that, in relation to provisional injunctions, non-debtor releases shift the risk of plan failure from the benefited 
third party to the impacted creditor.  See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.  This feature of non-
debtor releases is particularly likely to run afoul of the fair and equitable standard.  Cf. 7 COLLIER ¶ 
1129.04[4][b][ii], at 1129-107 (observing that courts have concluded that the fair and equitable requirement 
prohibits the “unfair and unreasonable shifting of risk” of plan failure from junior classes to senior classes).  
But see In re McCall, No. 93-00632, 1997 WL 428580, at *16 (Bankr. D.D.C. May 27, 1997) (approving of a 
channeling release over the objection of several impaired classes and expressly finding that the provision was 
fair and equitable under § 1129(b)). 
 344 In re A.H. Robins Co., 129 B.R. 457, 460 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991); see generally Aetna Realty 
Investors, Inc. v. Monarch Beach Venture, Ltd. (In re Monarch Beach Venture, Ltd.), 166 B.R. 428, 436 (C.D. 
Cal. 1993) (“This Court holds that, to be fair and equitable, a plan of reorganization cannot unfairly shift the 
risk of a plan’s failure to the creditor.”) (collecting authorities); accord In re Prussia Assoc., 322 B.R. 572, 595 
(Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2005). 
 345 Creditors impacted by a non-debtor release must be placed in a distinct class (or classes, if the release 
extinguishes different types of claims).  Including them in a class with other creditors “undermines the 
Bankruptcy Code’s classification and treatment scheme” set forth in §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(4).  Brubaker, supra 
note 27, at 983; see also id. at 981–86 (arguing that third-party releases frequently corrupt the integrity of class 
formation and treatment because courts do not take the extinguished non-debtor claims into account in 
analyzing whether the plan of reorganization satisfies §§ 1122(a) and 1123(a)(4)); id. at 990–91 (third-party 
releases weaken the “cramdown” protections set forth in § 1129(b) by “infect[ing] the soundness of the 
classification system”). 
 346 In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994). 
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§ 1126(c) of the Code, no additional creditor consent, overwhelming or 
otherwise, is necessary.  And under § 1126(c) “[a] class of creditors has 
accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by creditors . . . that hold at 
least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed 
claims of such class held by creditors . . . that have accepted or rejected such 
plan.”347 
Element Four—“Payment in Full to Dissenting Creditors.”  Fourth and 
last, payment-in-full for dissenting creditors whose claims are extinguished by 
the non-debtor release is required by the “best-interests-of-creditors test.”348  
Under that test, a chapter 11 plan of reorganization may only be confirmed if it 
provides each dissenting creditor at least as much as the claimant would 
receive if the debtor liquidated under chapter 7.349  In a chapter 7 proceeding, a 
creditor may recover any deficiency from a solvent co-obligor if the liquidation 
distribution does not completely satisfy the creditor’s claim.350  Therefore, 
 
 347 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000). 
 348 It has been suggested that payment in full for dissenting creditors on any extinguished claims is the 
most important factor when considering the validity of a non-debtor release.  See In re Mac Panel Co., No. 98-
10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673784, at *8 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2000) (“A careful reading of [Robins] 
reflects that perhaps the most important consideration prompting the decision was that the nondebtors who 
were being enjoined could obtain full payment of their claims under the plan of reorganization.”); Meltzer, 
supra note 27, at 26 (“After all, the only reason to be concerned about the issue in the first place is presumably 
if the debtor’s plan does not make provisions for full payment of the creditor’s claim and that creditor wants to 
obtain its deficiency or its damages from third parties.”); see also Lewis, supra note 27, at 170, 176 
(concluding that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases unless the creditors receive payment in full on any 
discharged debts); Han, supra note 27, at 554, 579 (arguing that non-debtor releases are permissible under 
§ 105(a) only where holders of any released claims are paid in full under the plan); Swallow, supra note 27, at 
709 (concluding that non-debtor releases are permissible where the plan provides for payment in full on all 
extinguished claims).  But see In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 938 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1994) (“The Court considers this [creditor approval] the single most important factor.”).  It should be noted 
that Meltzer adds a corollary, arguing that non-debtor releases are permissible only where the creditor is paid 
in full on its claim at the time the plan is confirmed.  Id. at 26 n.83, 41. 
 349 § 1129(a)(7); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7][e], at 1129–56 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 
rev. 2004).  Unlike the cramdown provisions in § 1129(b), which protect classes of creditors, see In re Sentry 
Operating Co. of Texas, Inc., 264 B.R. 850, 865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001), the best-interests test protects 
individual creditors, see In re Cajun Elec. Power Cooperative, Inc., 230 B.R. 715, 741 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999) 
(the best-interests test “is designed to protect those individual creditors who voted against a particular plan, but 
who, nonetheless, are being bound to such plan”). 
 350 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 992 (“In a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, creditors retain their 
rights to pursue non-debtors for full payment, because there is no reorganization to protect by providing non-
debtor releases.”); Feldstein, supra note 27, at 43 (“Where a creditor holds, or creditors generally hold, claims 
against a nondebtor, § 524(e) . . . would preserve those claims and they would survive a chapter 7 discharge of 
the debtor pursuant to § 524(a).”); see also § 723(a) (providing that if the estate of a bankrupt partnership can 
not pay all claims in full, the trustee may pursue general partners for any deficiency to the extent permitted 
under nonbankruptcy law).  The assumption here is that non-debtor releases are impermissible in chapter 7 
bankruptcies, a correct assumption in my view.  See supra notes 333–38 and accompanying text. 
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since the dissenting creditor would receive payment in full on its claim in a 
chapter 7 bankruptcy from either the debtor, the co-obligor, or a combination 
of the two, the dissenting creditor must receive full payment under the debtor’s 
chapter 11 plan of reorganization if the codebtor receives a release.  Otherwise, 
the plan violates the best-interests test.351  As a result, only channeling releases 
are permissible; actual releases are forbidden. 
Professor Brubaker, in his immensely thorough article on non-debtor 
releases, is particularly critical of actual releases.  His fundamental objection is 
that actual releases extract value from a creditor of the non-debtor against the 
creditor’s will, and then redistribute that value to other parties, such as the 
releasee, the debtor, and the debtor’s other creditors and shareholders.352  In 
 
 351 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 991–94 (arguing that non-debtor releases violate the best-interests-of-
creditors test); id. at 992 (“[G]iving at least liquidation value to each creditor requires protection of the Chapter 
7 right to pursue non-debtor actions.”); Lewis, supra note 27, at 174–75 (arguing that a plan containing a non-
debtor release does not satisfy the best-interests test if the co-obligors have sufficient assets to satisfy any 
deficiencies on the discharged claims); see also In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 732 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1993) (“Indeed, because a chapter 7 trustee of [a] partnership may proceed against the partners 
individually, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1988), the best-interest-of-creditors test . . . requires the court to find that 
creditors will receive at least as much from the partners’ contributions to the [partnership’s] plan as they would 
from the assertion of a chapter 7 trustee’s rights against the partners,” if the plan releases the partners.); 
Feldstein, supra note 27, at 43 (“Accordingly, if the claims released have any real value, then the best interest 
test requires realization of that value for the plan to be confirmed.”); cf. Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow 
Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that non-debtor releases 
are permissible only when all dissenting creditors whose claims are extinguished by the release are paid in full 
under the debtor’s plan).  The same analysis applies if the debtor and the third party are not co-debtors—i.e., 
where the debtor has no personal liability for the claim against the third party.  Clearly the creditor would 
receive compensation in full on such a claim from the non-debtor if the debtor liquidated.  Thus, when a 
debtor’s chapter 11 plan purports to extinguish an independent claim against a third party, the best-interests 
test mandates payment in full for the claimholder. 
 352 Professor Brubaker articulates this point numerous times throughout his article.  See, e.g., Brubaker, 
supra note 27, at 989 (“The ultimate injury non-debtor releases visit upon creditors is distributional.  Creditors 
without valuable non-debtor rights can take value away from creditors whose valuable non-debtor rights are 
extinguished through non-debtor releases.”); id. at 1001 (“What non-debtor releases take from creditors 
holding valuable non-debtor claims, they give to (1) the released non-debtors and their other creditors, and/or 
(2) creditors and shareholders of the Chapter 11 debtor without valuable non-debtor rights.”); id. at 1008 
(noting that particular arguments purportedly in favor of non-debtor releases cannot justify the “categorical 
elimination of certain types of disputed claims” because that requires “an additional policy judgment that 
certain creditors are more worthy of payment than others—a choice that violates basic creditor equality 
principles and that should be reserved for Congress”); id. at 1009 (explaining that choosing between a third 
party’s contribution or indemnity claim against the debtor and the creditor’s claim against the third party, a 
choice inherent in non-debtor releases, “punctuates the essential distributional policy judgments implicit in 
judges’ approval of non-debtor releases”); id. at 1013 (arguing that “the redistribution of value inherent in non-
debtor releases” undermines Code policies of creditor equality); id. at 1021 (“Thus, the reorganization policy 
often adds very little to the debate concerning non-debtor releases and, at its worst, seems to be a vacuous and 
pretextual cover for the redistributional effects of non-debtor releases.”); id. at 1038 (maintaining that a release 
that “channels” a creditor’s claims against a non-debtor to the debtor’s estate does so “without any assurance 
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addition to violating the Code, this undermines the policies of some 
nonbankruptcy laws, such as joint and several liability and guarantee law.353 
But if the debtor’s plan provides the dissenting creditor with payment in 
full, the redistributional consequences of any non-debtor release largely 
evaporate.  Unlike actual releases, channeling releases neither strip creditors of 
their claims, nor force them to impart value to other parties over their 
objection. 
As with the creditor consent element, the suggested payment-in-full 
requirement deviates from Master Mortgage.  If a creditor votes in favor of a 
plan containing a release, it is not given the protection of the best-interests 
test.354  More importantly, any such release is consensual and thus legitimate, 
whether the creditor receives full satisfaction on its claim or not.355  That is 
why a plan need not provide payment in full to “all, or substantially all” 
creditors impacted by a non-debtor release, as mandated by the Master 
Mortgage test.356  Instead, only dissenting creditors must be paid in full.  As a 
practical matter, however, it is likely that creditors subject to a third-party 
release would demand equal treatment and object to any plan of reorganization 
that paid only some of them in full, dooming the release under Element 
Three—creditor consent.  Therefore, plans with non-debtor releases satisfying 
Element Four will generally provide payment in full on all extinguished 
claims.357 
 
that the substituted in rem rights against the debtor’s property are the equivalent of the extinguished in 
personam rights.”).  While Professor Brubaker is addressing non-debtor releases generally in each of these 
quotes, only actual releases have the redistributional effects that he finds objectionable.  See also Boyle, supra 
note 27, at 446 (“Courts that place the debtor’s survival above that of the creditor’s right to full payment [by 
granting an actual release] ignore the implicit mandate of the Code’s absolute priority rule that the creditor’s 
right to full payment is superior to creating value for shareholders.”). 
 353 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1029 (asserting that the policies underlying nonbankruptcy law are 
undermined by non-debtor releases that extract value “involuntarily from those creditors with valuable non-
debtor claims”); see also Boyle, supra note 27, at 440–44 (concluding that non-debtor releases subvert the 
policies protected by joint and several liability and guaranty law). 
 354 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2000). 
 355 This assumes that the release meets the requirements for consensual releases.  For a fuller discussion 
of such releases, see supra Part I.B. 
 356 See In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994). 
 357 While jurisdictional issues are generally beyond the scope of this Article, see supra note 38, one 
important question regarding the procedure for granting a third-party release deserves brief attention.  To the 
extent bankruptcy courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over actions between non-debtors, they do so 
pursuant to their “related to” jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000) (providing that federal district 
courts have jurisdiction “of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under 
title 11”) (emphasis added); § 157(a) (permitting “any or all” bankruptcy matters to be referred to bankruptcy 
courts); Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.5 (1995) (“Proceedings ‘related to’ the bankruptcy 
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Releases are Not Mandatory.  Finally, while the pro-release courts have 
adopted multiple standards for assessing the validity of non-debtor releases, 
they generally agree that a release is not mandatory simply because the 
accepted test is satisfied.  Third parties are not automatically entitled to a 
release.  Instead, when the relevant standard is met, bankruptcy courts may, in 
the exercise of their discretion, extinguish claims against third parties.358  I 
 
include . . . suits between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate.”); 1 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01[4][c][ii], at 3–24 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (“[C]ivil proceedings 
encompassed by § 1334(b)’s ‘related proceedings’ are those whose outcome could conceivably have an effect 
on the bankruptcy estate and that . . .  are suits between third parties . . . .”).  For a discussion of the types of 
third-party actions that satisfy the “related to” standard, see generally id. ¶ 3.01[4][c][ii][B]. 
However, absent consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2000), bankruptcy courts may not issue 
final judgments in related proceedings, id. at § 157(c)(1).  Instead, “[i]n such proceedings the bankruptcy judge 
shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or 
judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and 
conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically 
objected.”  Id.  A non-debtor release is effectively a final judgment.  In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 12 
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998) (holding that a non-debtor release “is equivalent to issuing a final adjudication of the 
merits” of the released claims); Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1070 (“A non-debtor release is not a mere status 
quo injunction; a non-debtor release effectively adjudicates the released non-debtor action.  The release 
operates as an adjudication on the merits, fully binding for res judicata/preclusion purposes.”).  Accordingly, 
any such release issued by the bankruptcy court—whether set forth in a confirmed plan of reorganization or 
contained in proposed findings and conclusions in a related proceeding—is subject to de novo review by the 
district court if a party impacted by the release objects on appeal.  See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1070 (“The 
non-debtor actions that are ‘adjudicated’ through non-debtor releases are, at best, non-core, ‘related to’ actions, 
beyond the power of a bankruptcy judge to determine by final order without consent of the litigants.”). 
Alternatively, to avoid the waste of judicial resources resulting from duplicative assessment of a third-
party release, the district court can withdraw the reference under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and grant the release 
itself, in the first instance.  See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1070 n.432 (“Limitations on a bankruptcy court’s 
core jurisdiction are not implicated where the district court enters the final order approving non-debtor release 
and injunction provisions.”).  Indeed, that is precisely what happened in Drexel and Robins.  See SEC v. 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 915, 924–28 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the reference was withdrawn in a prior order and granting a non-debtor release to 
the debtor’s directors and officers), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); Beard v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re A.H. 
Robins Co.), 59 B.R. 99, 105–07 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (setting forth, in an appendix, a copy of the district 
court’s prior order withdrawing the reference), aff’d, 828 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1987); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 
B.R. 742, 751–55 (E.D. Va. 1988) (confirming the debtor’s plan and expressly approving of the third-party 
release contained therein), aff’d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 358 See, e.g., Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 
658 (6th Cir. 2002) (“We hold that when the following seven factors are present, the bankruptcy court may 
enjoin a non-consenting creditor’s claims against a non-debtor.”) (emphasis added); SEC v. Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (“In bankruptcy 
cases, a court may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party, provided the injunction plays an important part in 
the debtor’s reorganization plan.”) (emphasis added); In re Optical Tech., Inc., 216 B.R. 989, 994 (M.D. Fla. 
1997) (“Under appropriate circumstances, this Court may use its power under Section 105 to issue a third-party 
injunction and release in order to effectuate a reorganization plan.”) (emphasis added); In re Master Mortgage 
Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 937 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (“[T]he Court believes that the exercise of [the] power 
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agree with the pro-release authorities on this point.  Once the four elements of 
my amended Master Mortgage test are complied with, a release is permissible, 
but not required.359 
C. The Anti-Release Position Revisited: Channeling Releases and the Risk of 
Plan Failure 
As noted in the previous Subpart, this Article contends that bankruptcy 
courts only possess the authority to grant channeling, involuntary, non-debtor 
releases—releases contained in plans that pay dissenting creditors in full on 
any extinguished third-party claims.  Actual releases are prohibited because 
they violate the best-interests test.360  As a result, from this point forward, I 
shall use the terms “non-debtor release,” “third-party release,” and “channeling 
release” synonymously. 
Channeling releases are not immune from the anti-release arguments 
discussed in Subpart A.  In fact, courts have held that such releases violate 
§ 524(e)361 and that they are beyond the powers conferred by § 105(a) under 
the narrow construction of that statute.362 
 
[to grant third-party releases] is discretionary.”); In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 300 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2002) (“I conclude that injunctive relief protecting non-debtor third parties may be appropriate 
depending upon the circumstances of the case.”) (emphasis added); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & 
Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 685 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (“Under section 105(a) a bankruptcy court may enter a 
permanent injunction enjoining suits against non-debtor parties funding a plan of reorganization if the court 
find that such an injunction is essential to effectuate the plan of reorganization.”) (emphasis added). 
 359 For an example of a countervailing factor beyond the four elements of the test, see infra notes 670–78 
and accompanying text. 
 360 See supra notes 348–51 and accompanying text. 
 361 See In re Keller, 157 B.R. 680, 682, 686 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (ruling that § 524(e) barred a channeling 
release); see also Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases and expressly rejecting Robins); Landsing Div. Props.-II v. 
First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601–02 (10th Cir. 
1990) (holding that § 524(e) prohibits any permanent injunction “extended post-confirmation . . . that 
effectively relieves the nondebtor from its own liability to the creditor”), modified, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 
1991); In re B.W. Alpha, Inc., 89 B.R. 592, 595–96 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating, in dicta, that § 524(e) 
would have barred confirmation of the plan if the non-debtor release had not been removed even though the 
objecting creditor was receiving payment in full under the plan), aff’d, 100 B.R. 831 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Starr, 
supra note 27, at 487, 491–92 (arguing that § 524(e) prohibits all non-debtor releases); Boyle, supra note 27, 
at 422, 436 (same). 
 362 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 742–43 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that 
because § 105(a) must be used in conjunction with other Code provisions and does not permit the creation of 
new substantive rights, the statute does not give bankruptcy courts the power to issue non-debtor releases 
(citing Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988), and United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 
1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)) (ruling that the channeling releases contained in the plan could not extinguish the 
claims of dissenting creditors), rev’d, 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, aff’d in pertinent 
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Even if § 524(e) does not bar third-party releases and the broad view of 
§ 105(a) (or a similar construction of § 1123(b)(6)) is correct, there is a final 
anti-release argument that deserves attention.  According to this objection, 
channeling releases are not an appropriate use of the bankruptcy court’s 
equitable powers because they place the risk of plan failure on the releasing 
creditor rather than the benefiting non-debtor. 
To elaborate, plans of reorganization that contain a channeling release 
typically provide payment in full on a deferred basis to those with claims 
extinguished by the release.  For example, in In re McCall, the creditors 
impacted by the release were to receive their distributions over eight or ten 
year periods.363  In Master Mortgage, the plan provided that the creditors 
would be paid over twenty years.364 
Critically, there is no guarantee that a debtor will comply with its duties 
under a plan of this type.  Instead, a bankruptcy court must find only by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a plan is “feasible”365—that confirmation 
“is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial 
reorganization, of the debtor.”366  What if the reorganized entity encounters 
financial difficulties before fulfilling its obligation to the creditors whose non-
 
part, 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Sybaris Clubs, Int’l, Inc., 189 B.R. 151, 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1995) (holding that § 105(a) can only be used to carry out other provisions of the Code and thus that the non-
debtor releases contained in the debtor’s plan were invalid, despite the fact that the sole dissenter would 
receive payment in full under the plan); see also In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 133 B.R. 973, 976–79 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1991) (deciding that the court did not have sufficient power under § 105(a) to grant a non-debtor 
release that extinguished the contractual rights of a shareholder that was co-insured with the debtor as part of a 
settlement between the debtor and the insurance company, even if the settlement provided the shareholder with 
payment in full; the benefits provided by the settlement “would not be the same thing” as the shareholder’s 
contractual rights under the insurance policy), aff’d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Meltzer, supra note 27, at 
26 & n.83 (concluding that a bankruptcy court may not issue a non-debtor release under § 105(a) unless the 
extinguished claims are paid in full contemporaneously with confirmation of the plan). 
 363 In re McCall, No. 93-00632, 1997 WL 428580, at *3, *16 (Bankr. D.D.C. May 27, 1997). 
 364 In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 932 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).  For anti-
release decisions that fit this pattern, see Sybaris Clubs, 189 B.R. at 153 (creditors impacted by the channeling 
release were scheduled to be paid over “twenty-seven quarters” under the debtor’s plan); Keller, 157 B.R. at 
682, 686 (the debtor’s plan of reorganization contained a channeling release and provided that the only creditor 
affected by the release would receive payment through an annuity); In re L.B.G. Props., Inc., 72 B.R. 65, 66–
67 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (plan provided that a creditor impacted by a provision that appears to be a 
channeling release would be paid over several years). 
 365 Danny Thomas Props. II Ltd. P’ship v. Beal Bank, S.S.B. (In re Danny Thomas Props. II Ltd. P’ship), 
241 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The debtors bear the burden of establishing the feasibility of their plans by 
a preponderance of the evidence.”); Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New 
Orleans Ltd. P’ship), 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). 
 366 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2000).  This subparagraph of § 1129(a) is known as the “feasibility 
requirement.”  T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship, 116 F.3d at 801. 
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debtor claims were extinguished, and ultimately fails to pay these creditors in 
full?  In such circumstances, the third-party release forces the creditors to bear 
the loss.  The release shields the previously liable non-debtors, eliminating the 
creditors’ alternative source of recovery. 
This possibility of default under a plan of reorganization is not 
insignificant.  Several studies indicate that a high percentage of debtors do not 
fully consummate their chapter 11 plans.367  Indeed, one authoritative source 
concluded that “only a fraction of confirmed plans are fully performed.”368  In 
other words, the promise of payment in full over time contained in any plan “is 
just that—a promise—that may or may not come to pass.”369 
A further element of risk is present in mass tort cases where the injured 
creditors’ rights are not liquidated prior to confirmation.  In addition to the 
danger that the debtor will face unforeseen financial problems after emerging 
from bankruptcy, the value of the tort claims is unknown, making it more 
difficult to determine whether the reorganized debtor will be able to meet its 
plan commitments.  For example, substantially more individuals filed personal 
injury claims in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy than had been anticipated, and 
their claims were much larger than expected.370  The litigation trust set up to 
 
 367 See, e.g., Nancy Rhein Baldiga, Is This Plan Feasible? An Empirical Legal Analysis of Plan 
Feasibility, 101 COM. L.J. 115, 128 (1996) (concluding that even in cases in which the chapter 11 
reorganization plan has undergone an extensive feasibility challenge, half of the confirmed, nonliquidating 
plans failed to fully consummate); Edith S. Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy Performance and Management 
Turnover, 50 J. FIN. 3, 10, 15 (1995) (empirical study of 197 public companies emerging from chapter 11 as 
operating entities, finding that over 40% continued to experience operating losses in the following three years, 
and 32% required further restructuring through a second bankruptcy filing, a private workout or an out-of-
court liquidation); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 608 (1993) (empirical study of large, chapter 11 
cases finding that in 32% of those where the entity reached confirmation of a plan, the emerging company 
subsequently refiled under chapter 11); Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? 
The Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 324–25 (1992) (empirical study of forty-
five confirmed chapter 11 plans finding that only 58% completed all payments to creditors under the plan; 
concluding that only 10% of the chapter 11 cases in the study area resulted in a consummated plan); Edward 
M. Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, Administrative Office of the United States Courts—Statistical 
Analysis & Reports Division—Bankruptcy Division 13 (Oct. 1989) (unpublished report) (concluding that 
between 10 and 12% of chapter 11 cases filed result in a successful reorganization).  The language for these 
parentheticals is borrowed largely from Brubaker, supra note 27, 987 n.102, and NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW 
COMM’N, supra note 32, at 610 n.1550. 
 368 NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 32, at 610. 
 369 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 987 n.102. 
 370 Findley v. Falise (In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Lit.), 78 F.3d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Findley 
I”); Findley v. Trustees of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust (In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos 
Lit.), 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 303 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Findley II”). 
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resolve the personal injury claims thus was forced to reduce payments to 10% 
of a claim’s value,371 and subsequently dropped awards to 5%.372 
The risk of plan failure took a slightly different form in the bankruptcy of 
A.H. Robins.  There, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
estimated that $2.475 billion would be sufficient to pay all Dalkon Shield 
Claimants in full.373  Pursuant to the plan, roughly this amount was placed in 
several claims resolution trusts designed to compensate the tort creditors.374  
However, while the money available for the claimants was not contingent on 
the future financial performance of the reorganized debtor, it was capped at 
$2.475 billion.375  Thus, if the estimation had turned out to be inaccurate, the 
trusts could have been exhausted before all Dalkon Shield claims were 
satisfied.376  Nonetheless, the A.H. Robins plan was approved by the Fourth 
Circuit.377 
Faced with a plan strikingly similar to that of A.H. Robins, the Dow 
Corning bankruptcy court sharply criticized the risk-allocating impact of 
channeling releases.378  Directing its attention to the Fourth Circuit’s reliance 
upon marshaling of assets as a justification for the Robins release, the 
bankruptcy judge explained that, under marshaling, the party enjoined cannot 
be prejudiced.379  But since Dow Corning’s plan places a cap on tort liability, 
there is a possibility that creditors will be harmed by the channeling release—
 
 371 Findley I, 78 F.3d at 770 
 372 Findley II, 237 F. Supp. at 314. 
 373 Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 697–700 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 374 Id. at 720–21; Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (Or Found)?, 
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 627 (1992). 
 375 Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 697. 
 376 Id. 
 377 Id. at 700–02. 
 378 Under Dow Corning’s plan, several third parties, including the debtor’s shareholders, are released from 
all liability relating to Dow Corning’s silicone breast implants.  In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 475 
(E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002).  The plan provides a capped fund of $2.35 
billion net present value for tort claimants, including a $400 million litigation facility intended to liquidate 
contested claims.  In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 727–28 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999), rev’d, 255 B.R. 
445 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002).  A group of tort claimants challenged the 
adequacy of the litigation facility, but the bankruptcy court concluded that it was more than sufficient to pay in 
full the claims of all plaintiffs that did not settle.  Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. at 729–32.  Upon remand 
from the Sixth Circuit, the District Court agreed, issuing detailed findings on the matter.  287 B.R. 396, 415–
16 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 379 Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. at 743 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (citing In re Atlas Commercial Floors, 
Inc., 125 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991)); see also 53 AM. JUR. 2d Marshaling Assets § 14 (1996) 
(“If a paramount creditor or third party holding a superior lien will be delayed or inconvenienced in the 
collection of its debt or prejudiced or injured in any manner, the doctrine of marshaling cannot be applied.”). 
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that some will not be paid in full.380  Even if the risk is low, the court 
continued, “the equitable solution (and marshaling, of course, is grounded in 
equity) would be to grant only a provisional injunction—one which terminates 
if and when the ‘primary’ fund [i.e., the reorganized debtor] is exhausted.”381 
Moreover, a marshaling injunction merely compels a senior claimant to 
exhaust one fund before proceeding against the second; it does not terminate 
the claimant’s right to collect from the second source until it is paid in full.382  
Thus, a channeling release “which permanently bars creditors from seeking 
compensation from the ‘secondary’ payment source [i.e., the non-debtor] is 
neither equitable nor consistent with the objectives of a marshaling 
injunction.”383 
While the Dow Corning bankruptcy court focused on discrediting the 
Fourth Circuit’s use of marshaling, its analysis applies more broadly.  In 
essence, the Dow Corning bankruptcy court argued that channeling releases are 
inequitable because they place the risk of plan failure on the creditors rather 
than on the non-debtors that receive the release.  As one commentator 
succinctly argued, it “hardly comports with equity” to release tort claims 
 
 380 Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. at 743. 
 381 Id. 
 382 Id. (citing C.T. Dev. Corp. v. Barnes (In re Oxford Dev. Ltd.), 67 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 383 Id.  Admittedly, the bankruptcy court was reversed on appeal by the district court, which found that 
bankruptcy courts have sufficient equitable authority to issue non-debtor releases.  In re Dow Corning Corp., 
255 B.R. 445, 475 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d in part, aff’d in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002).  And 
the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court on this point.  280 F.3d at 656–58.  However, neither the district 
court nor the court of appeals expressly addressed the bankruptcy judge’s marshaling argument.  See 255 B.R. 
at 475–94; 280 F.3d at 656–61.  Moreover, Professor Brubaker was similarly critical of the Robins court’s use 
of marshaling.  Noting that a marshaling injunction must treat all parties equitably, Brubaker explained that the 
doctrine cannot be used to “extinguish a creditor’s rights against either ‘fund’ until the creditor’s claim is fully 
satisfied.”  Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1038–39 n.301.  This makes marshaling of assets an “inapposite 
analogy” to non-debtor releases.  Id. at 1038 n.301. 
Professor Brubaker further attacked the relevancy of marshaling of assets by noting that the doctrine 
only applies to in rem claims and thus does not justify extinguishing the in personam rights generally subject 
to non-debtor releases.  Id. at 1039 n.301.  Boyle agrees.  He observed that marshaling only applies where “one 
debtor has two funds from which a particular creditor may draw.”  Boyle, supra note 27, at 433 n.66 (emphasis 
added).  Marshaling does not apply where the creditor has rights against the assets of the debtor and a third 
party and therefore renders no support for non-debtor releases.  Id.; see also 53 AM. JUR. 2d Marshaling Assets 
§ 28 (1996) (“[T]he principle of marshaling assets is not applicable to a case where one of the funds is the 
property of a surety of the common debtor.”) (emphasis removed).  However, the Fourth Circuit only cited 
marshaling as a useful analogy; it did not contend that a marshaling injunction perfectly parallels a non-debtor 
release.  Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 1989).  Accordingly, 
because it is highly technical, the “in rem” limitation is not a significant objection to the Fourth Circuit’s 
reliance on marshaling.  But the “prejudice” argument raised by the Dow Corning bankruptcy court and 
Brubaker remains important because it relates to marshaling’s equitable nature rather than to a technical aspect 
of the doctrine. 
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against third parties, channel the claims to the estate for payment in full, but 
force the claimholders to “bear the risk that the [estate] . . . is sufficient to 
compensate them.”384  In contrast, under a provisional injunction, the non-
debtors remain liable until the creditors’ claims are fully satisfied.  The risk of 
a default thus falls primarily on the non-debtors rather than the creditors 
because any such default terminates the injunction and permits the creditors to 
pursue the non-debtors for their deficiencies.385 
This reasoning is relevant to both mass tort bankruptcies involving 
unliquidated claims and cases where a plan merely delays payment on 
liquidated claims until well beyond confirmation.  In fact, one court converted 
a channeling release into a provisional injunction because the creditor 
impacted by the release was to be paid over seven years.386  Although the court 
did not explain its rationale, it seems likely that it was motivated by the 
possibility of a default years after confirmation. 
In sum, according to the last anti-release argument, channeling non-debtor 
releases, contained in plans where payment in full is deferred or otherwise not 
guaranteed, unfairly shift the risk of plan failure from the beneficiaries of the 
release to the creditors whose claims are extinguished.  Such releases are 
therefore inequitable.  Pursuant to this objection, bankruptcy courts may, at 
most, employ the equitable power conferred by §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) to 
issue provisional injunctions.387 
 
 384 Starr, supra note 27, at 492; cf. Meltzer, supra note 27, at 26 n.83, 41 (concluding, on slightly different 
grounds, that non-debtor releases are permissible only when the creditors are paid in full for their extinguished 
claims on the effective date of the plan; otherwise, the channeling release improperly prohibits the creditors 
from recovering from a third party “that could afford to pay [them] immediately”). 
 385 As noted in the taxonomy section, see supra note 77, a provisional injunction still places some risk on 
the creditor.  There is no guarantee that the non-debtor will be available to satisfy any deficiency not paid by 
the debtor when the provisional injunction expires.  For example, the non-debtor itself could declare 
bankruptcy.  In the absence of an injunction, the creditor may collect immediately from the non-debtor, 
eliminating any such risk. 
 386 See In re Mac Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *8-*11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 
24, 2000) (applying the Master Mortgage test in holding that the provisional injunction contained in the 
debtor’s plan was permissible under the Code because each of the five factors was satisfied); see id. at *11 
(“Because VPC will receive full payment of its claim over time, however, the court finds that it is appropriate 
to condition the injunction on MAC Panel meeting its obligations to VPC under the Modified Plan.”). 
 387 It should be noted that there is also a split in the authorities over whether bankruptcy courts have 
sufficient power to issue provisional injunctions.  For example, in In re Davis Broad., Inc., the court held that 
§ 524(e) prohibits the “release or a post-confirmation stay” of third-party obligations and invalidated the 
provisional injunction contained in the debtor’s plan.  In re Davis Broad., Inc., 176 B.R. 290, 291–92 (M.D. 
Ga. 1994).  The court explained that a non-debtor’s liability is improperly “‘affected’ regardless of whether it 
is released or, as in this case, stayed for a long period of time.”  Id. at 292; see also Seaport Auto. Warehouse, 
Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc.), 113 B.R. 610, 614–16 (B.A.P. 9th 
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D. Can the Pro- and Anti-Release Decisions Be Reconciled? 
As illustrated in the prior three Subparts, the debate over the validity of 
non-debtor releases appears to be a genuine one.  However, some courts and 
commentators have attempted to harmonize the pro- and anti-release decisions.  
First, they contend that the cases in the two lines of authority are factually 
distinct.388  The pro-release decisions typically involved complex, mass torts 
 
Cir. 1990) (holding that § 524(e) prohibited a provisional injunction that stayed collection efforts against 
certain non-debtors for five years after confirmation of the plan); Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay 
Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 758, 762 (D. Utah 1985) (holding that postconfirmation injunctions 
staying legal action against a non-debtor are impermissible; invalidating a chapter 11 plan provision that 
appears to be a provisional injunction).  But others disagree, including some courts from anti-release 
jurisdictions.  In In re Seatco, Inc. (“Seatco”), the plan contained a provisional injunction stating that all 
creditors of the debtor “shall be temporarily enjoined” under § 105(a) from attempting to collect on their 
allowed claims against certain third parties related to the debtor.  In re Seatco, Inc., 257 B.R. 469, 474 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2007)  The Northern District of Texas bankruptcy judge, who sits within the Fifth Circuit, an anti-
release jurisdiction, held that the provisional injunction did not run afoul of § 524(e).  Id. at 474; In re Seatco, 
Inc. 259 B.R. 279, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) (“Seatco II”).  The court reasoned that while the plan 
temporarily enjoined the objecting secured creditor from foreclosing on its guarantee, the guarantors’ liability 
“is not affected.”  Seatco, 257 B.R. at 475.  If the reorganized debtor defaulted on its obligations under the 
plan, the injunction terminated automatically and the secured creditor would be free to pursue the guarantor for 
any outstanding amounts owed.  Id.  The court also stated that the provisional injunction did not have to satisfy 
the Master Mortgage factors; only non-debtor releases need to meet that standard.  Seatco II, 259 B.R. at 284 
n.6; see also Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale), 62 F.3d 746, 761–62 (5th Cir. 1995) (appearing to hold that a 
bankruptcy court had the power pursuant to § 105(a) to issue a provisional injunction staying a creditor from 
prosecuting a claim against a non-debtor); In re Shaw Aero Devices, Inc., 283 B.R. 349, 351–53 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2002) (citing Master Mortgage as authority for approving of a non-debtor release, which the court 
construed to operate as a provisional injunction); In re Mac Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 
33673757, at *9 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000) (concluding that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) confer upon 
bankruptcy courts sufficient authority to issue provisional injunctions). 
 388 See In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 937 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (distinguishing (1) 
Landsing Div. Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 
592 (10th Cir. 1990), modified, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991), because the non-debtor there made no 
contribution, the release was not essential to the reorganization, and the only effected creditor objected, and (2) 
Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989), 
because the third party in that case made no contribution and the only creditor impacted by the release 
dissented); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 985 (1st Cir. 1995) (the bankruptcy court, 
whose confirmation opinion is attached as an appendix to the First Circuit decision, distinguished Am. 
Hardwoods and W. Real Estate Fund because the non-debtors in those cases made no contribution and thus the 
third-party releases were not essential); In re Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. 377, 407–08 (D.N.J. 2000) 
(distinguishing Am. Hardwoods, W. Real Estate Fund, and Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re 
Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995), because none of the Master Mortgage factors were present 
in those cases); Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 
156–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (distinguish Am. Hardwoods because the non-debtors did not propose that they 
contribute to the debtor’s estate in return for the requested injunction); Inman, supra note 27, at 641–47 
(concluding that “a closer review suggests that the differing outcomes between the [pro-release and anti-
release decisions] may be as much a product of different factual settings as a result of divergent interpretations 
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where all, or most, of the Master Mortgage factors were met.389  The anti-
release opinions generally concerned smaller disputes where the release clearly 
did not satisfy the Master Mortgage test.390  Second, the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished Robins in American Hardwoods, a leading anti-release case, 
explaining that the Fourth Circuit had limited Robins to its “unusual facts.”391  
Finally, some anti-release opinions contain language suggesting that non-
debtor releases are permissible where the extinguished claims are paid in full 
out of the estate—i.e., where channeling releases are involved392—or where 
other Masters Mortgage factors are observed.393 
 
of the law”); Swallow, supra note 27, at 720–23 (arguing that the pro- and anti-release cases are factually 
distinguishable). 
 389 For examples of mass tort, pro-release cases see Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In 
re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2002) (silicon breast implant mass tort); Menard-
Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 697 (4th Cir. 1988) (Dalkon Shield mass tort); In re 
Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. 377, 383, 386–87 (D.N.J. 2000) (mass tort concerning deceptive mailings 
containing magazine subscription offers); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel 
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 913–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (securities violations mass tort), aff’d, 
960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 390 Inman, supra note 27, at 645–46 (“Few if any of the factors that influence the pro-release decisions 
were present in key release cases.”); see also Landsing Div. Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of 
Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 594–95, 598–601 (10th Cir. 1990) (the non-debtors 
made no contribution, there was no payment full of the creditor’s claim against the non-debtor, the only 
creditor affected by the non-debtor release dissented, and the action did not involve a mass tort), modified, 932 
F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 
F.2d 621, 622 (9th Cir. 1989) (the non-debtors did not offer to make any contribution to the debtor’s plan, the 
impacted creditors did not overwhelmingly approve of the release, the injunction was not essential to plan, and 
the case did not involve a mass tort); In re Keller, 157 B.R. 680, 681–82 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (small bankruptcy 
regarding assets and liabilities of less than one million dollars, the non-debtors made no contribution to the 
plan, and the only creditor impacted by the channeling release objected to the plan). 
 391 Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th 
Cir. 1989); see also Inman, supra note 27, at 646–47 (arguing that because Am. Hardwoods distinguished 
Robins, the Ninth Circuit may have “merely concluded that an injunction was unwarranted on those particular 
facts” before it). 
 392 For example, the Fifth Circuit offered the following in Feld v. Zale Corp.: 
In [Drexel and Johns-Manville], the courts upheld permanent injunctions of third-party claims 
because while the injunction permanently enjoined the lawsuits, it also channeled those claims to 
allow recovery from separate assets and thereby avoided discharging the nondebtor. . . .  The 
injunction at issue in this case provided no alternative means for [the creditors] to recover from 
[the non-debtor]. . . .  Accordingly, because the permanent injunction as entered improperly 
discharged a potential debt of . . . a nondebtor, the bankruptcy court exceeded its power under 
§ 105. 
Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale), 62 F.3d 746, 760–61 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also In re 
Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (holding that consensual non-debtor releases 
are permissible because in that context the creditor “has not been forced by virtue of the discharge provisions 
of the code, to accept less than full value for its claim”); In re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 66–67 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (distinguishing Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 
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However, these attempts at reconciliation are unpersuasive.  To begin with, 
the seminal anti-release cases from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits used 
unqualified language in ruling that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases.  In 
American Hardwoods, the court held that “[s]ection 524(e) . . . limits the 
court’s equitable power under section 105 to order the discharge of the 
liabilities of non-debtors.”394  The Tenth Circuit was even clearer in Western 
Real Estate Fund, concluding that § 524(e) prohibits any permanent injunction 
“extended post-confirmation . . . that effectively relieves the non-debtor from 
its own liability to the creditor.”395  Such statements leave little room to argue 
that the anti-release courts would approve of third-party releases in any 
context.  Removing any doubt, the Ninth Circuit reinforced its rejection of 
Robins in a later decision: 
Lowenschuss looks to our discussion, in dictum in American 
Hardwoods of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re A.H. Robins, as 
indicating our approval of the Fourth Circuit’s approach.  
Lowenschuss ignores the clear language of American Hardwoods, 
where we expressly declined to adopt the approach set forth in In re 
A.H. Robins; we stated, in dictum, “[e]ven if we adopted In re A.H. 
Robins Co. . . ., it would not dictate a different result.”396 
 
700–01 (4th Cir. 1989), and MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 
89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 1988), because in those cases objecting creditors received one hundred percent payment on 
their non-debtor claims out of the estate and thus the non-debtor releases “resulted in no detriment to the 
claimant”); In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 730 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (holding that actual 
releases violate § 524(e), but stating in dicta, in reliance upon Johns-Manville and Robins, that channeling 
releases in the mass tort context may be permissible); Lewis, supra note 27, at 170, 176 (arguing that § 524(e) 
bars non-debtor releases unless the creditors receive payment in full on any discharged debts); Han, supra note 
27, at 554, 579 (concluding that non-debtor releases are permissible under § 105(a) only where holders of any 
released claims are paid in full under the plan); Swallow, supra note 27, at 709 (concluding that non-debtor 
releases are permissible where the plan provides for payment in full on all extinguished claims). 
 393 See, e.g., In re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (distinguishing Robins 
and Johns-Manville because without resolution of the mass tort claims in those cases “a reorganization was not 
feasible”). 
 394 Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
 395 Landsing Div. Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 
922 F.2d 592, 601 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 396 Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis removed). 
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Furthermore, several anti-release decisions struck down channeling releases.397  
And some have even invalidated provisional injunctions.398  There also are a 
number of pro-release cases that do not involve mass torts,399 and others where 
there was no payment in full on the extinguished claims under the plan of 
reorganization.400  Finally, none of the anti-release decisions that distinguished 
 
 397 See, e.g., In re Keller, 157 B.R. 680, 682, 686 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (ruling that § 524(e) barred a 
channeling release); In re Sybaris Clubs, Int’l, Inc., 189 B.R. 152, 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that 
§ 105(a) can only be used to carry out other provisions of the Code and thus that the non-debtor releases 
contained in the debtor’s plan were invalid, despite the fact that the sole dissenter would receive payment in 
full under the plan); see also In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 133 B.R. 973, 976–79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(deciding that the court did not have sufficient power under § 105(a) to grant a non-debtor release that 
extinguished the contractual rights of a shareholder that was co-insured with the debtor as part of a settlement 
between the debtor and the insurance company, even if the settlement provided the shareholder with payment 
in full; the benefits provided by the settlement “would not be the same thing” as the shareholder’s contractual 
rights under the insurance policy), aff’d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992); In re B.W. Alpha, Inc., 89 B.R. 592, 
595–96 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating, in dicta, that § 524(e) would have barred confirmation of the plan if 
the non-debtor release had not been removed even though the objecting creditor was receiving payment in full 
under the plan), aff’d, 100 B.R. 831 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Meltzer, supra note 27, at 26 n.83 (concluding that non-
debtor releases are not permissible unless the extinguished claims are paid in full contemporaneously with 
confirmation of the plan); Starr, supra note 27, at 487, 491–92 (arguing that § 524(e) prohibits all non-debtor 
releases); Boyle, supra note 27, at 422, 436 (same). 
 398 See, e.g., Seaport Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert Park 
Auto Parts, Inc.), 113 B.R. 610, 614–16 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 524(e) prohibited a provisional 
injunction that merely stayed collection efforts against non-debtors for five years after confirmation of the plan 
and did not release the co-debtors from liability); In re Davis Broad., Inc., 176 B.R. 290, 291–92 (M.D. Ga. 
1994) (§ 524(e) bars a bankruptcy court from “affecting” the liability of a guarantor in any way, including 
through a provisional injunction staying the creditors’ legal actions against certain third parties pending 
execution of the plan); see also Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 
B.R. 756, 758, 762 (D. Utah 1985) (holding that postconfirmation injunctions staying legal action against a 
non-debtor are impermissible; invalidating a chapter 11 plan provision that appears to be a provisional 
injunction). 
 399 See, e.g., Greer v. Gaston & Snow (In re Gaston & Snow), Nos. 93 Civ. 8517 (JGK), 93 Civ. 8628 
(JGK), 1996 WL 694421, at *2-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1996) (approving of a non-debtor release in the 
bankruptcy of a law firm); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray (In re Monarch Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 
31, 41–43 (D. Mass. 1994) (approving of non-debtor releases in the bankruptcy of an insurance and real estate 
holding company), aff’d, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. 
M.D. FL. 2002) (approving of a non-debtor release in the bankruptcy of a trucking company); see also In re 
Mac Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673784, at *8 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2000) (“The 
recognition of bankruptcy court jurisdiction in the A.H. Robins case is not rendered inapplicable in the present 
case on the grounds that mass tort litigation was involved in the Robins case.”) (provisional injunction case). 
 400 See, e.g., In re Am. Family Enters., 256 B.R. 377, 387, 390–92, 405–08 (D.N.J. 2000) (granting 
several non-debtor releases despite the fact that the creditors impacted by one of the releases were to recover 
only ninety percent of their extinguished claims under the plan); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. 
(In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 130 B.R. 910, 913–14, 920, 925, 927–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(approving of several non-debtor releases even though the plan of reorganization did not provide for payment 
in full on all released claims), aff’d, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. 
Bechtle (In re Labrum & Doak), 237 B.R. 275, 302, 305–08 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that the court had 
authority to grant non-debtor releases on behalf of partners that contributed to the debtor-partnership’s chapter 
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the pro-release authorities expressly held that non-debtor releases are 
permissible where there is payment in full or other Master Mortgage factors 
are satisfied. 
Accordingly, I disagree with those judges and commentators that have 
asserted that the split in the courts is more apparent than real.  Instead, this 
Article argues that, in light of United States v. Energy Resources Co.,401 the 
pro-release courts simply have the better view.  In the next Part, I summarize 
Energy Resources. 
IV.  UNITED STATES V. ENERGY RESOURCES CO. 
A. Internal Revenue Law Background 
A number of Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”)402 sections and Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) rules play an important role in Energy Resources.  
This Subpart sets forth a brief description of these provisions. 
1. Trust Fund Taxes 
The IRC requires employers to withhold money from their employees’ 
paychecks for the purpose of paying the employees’ income and social security 
taxes.403  These funds are held in trust for the United States404 and are referred 
to as “trust fund taxes.”405  Under § 6672 of the IRC, if an employer fails to 
pay any portion of its trust fund taxes, the government may collect the 
deficiency directly from the employees responsible for collecting the taxes.406  
These individuals are known as “responsible persons.”407  Critically, the IRS 
 
11 plan even though the partnership’s creditors “probably will not be” paid in full on their extinguished 
claims); see also Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 
150, 156–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (suggesting that a non-debtor release of partners contributing to the debtor-
partnership’s estate may be permissible even though the creditors would not be paid in full if the contributing 
partners paid on the basis of their net worth and the substantive validity of any claims against them). 
 401 495 U.S. 545 (1990). 
 402 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9833 (2000). 
 403 §§ 3102(a), 3402(a). 
 404 § 7501(a). 
 405 Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1978). 
 406 § 6672. 
 407 Slodov, 436 U.S. at 245.  The liability created by § 6672 is separate and distinct from the employer’s.  
United States v. Prescription Home Health Care, Inc. (In re Prescription Home Health Care, Inc.), 316 F.3d 
542, 544 (5th Cir. 2002).  Nonetheless, it is the IRS’s policy to only seek a single recovery for its losses.  
United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Chene (In re 
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may not seek reimbursement from responsible persons for nontrust fund taxes 
that the employer fails to pay, such as corporate income taxes.408 
2. Voluntary Versus Involuntary Payment of Taxes 
IRS procedures generally permit a taxpayer who “voluntarily” makes a tax 
payment to designate the specific debt to which the funds will be applied.409  If 
a taxpayer turns over money to the agency “involuntarily,” however, it is 
denied this privilege.  Instead, the agency decides how to allocate the funds.410  
And the IRS almost always applies an involuntary payment to nontrust fund 
taxes before trust fund taxes if both types are owed.411  It does so because 
paying the nonguaranteed liabilities first increases the likelihood that the 
government will ultimately collect the full amount of taxes due from the 
taxpayer.412 
B. In re Energy Resources, Co. 
Energy Resources concerned two bankruptcy proceedings that each 
addressed whether a bankruptcy court may order the IRS to allocate payments 
made by a chapter 11 debtor to the debtor’s trust fund tax liabilities before its 
nontrust fund tax liabilities.413  In the first case, the bankruptcy of Energy 
Resources Co., Inc., the bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan 
under which all of the debtor’s assets, except its environmental division, were 
 
Chene), 236 B.R. 69, 73 (M.D. Fla. 1999).  And while the IRS is not bound to exhaust its remedies against the 
employer before seeking to collect under § 6672 from the responsible persons, it is also IRS policy to not 
assess a § 6672 penalty against a responsible person if the employer is in bankruptcy and complying with the 
terms of its payment plan.  Prescription Home Health Care, 316 F.2d at 544–45. 
 408 IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 225 (1st Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 
(1990). 
 409 Rev. Proc. 2002-26, 2002-1 C.B. 746, superseding Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B. 83, modifying Rev. 
Rul. 73-305, 1973 C.B. 43, superseding Rev. Rul 58-239, 1958 C.B. 94.  At the time Energy Resources was 
decided, the controlling authority was Rev. Rul 79-284.  United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 548 
(1990).  Rev. Proc. 2002-26 does not contain any substantive changes relevant to this Article. 
 410 See IRS Policy Statement P-5-60(7) (1993), reprinted in 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL—
ADMINISTRATION § 1.2.1.5.14 (CCH Rev. 2000) (“The taxpayer, of course, has no right of designation 
[between trust fund and non-trust fund taxes] of payments resulting from enforced collection measures.”); 1 
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL—ADMINISTRATION § 5.9.15.2(2) (CCH Rev. 2006) (noting that “[p]ayments 
received through the bankruptcy proceeding are considered involuntary payments” and that such payments are 
allocated to the debtor’s various tax liabilities according to IRS policy). 
 411 Energy Res., 871 F.2d at 227 (collecting authorities). 
 412 Id. at 231. 
 413 United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 547–48 (1990). 
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placed in a liquidating trust for the purpose of paying the company’s debts.414  
Energy Resources owed the IRS about one million dollars in federal taxes, 
most of which constituted trust fund taxes.415  The plan provided that the IRS 
would receive full compensation on its claims, including interest, via a series 
of payments made by the trust.416 
Fourteen months after the plan was confirmed, the trustee of the liquidating 
trust made a payment to the IRS and requested that the agency apply the funds 
to the debtor’s trust fund tax liabilities.417  After the IRS refused, the trustee 
asked the bankruptcy court to order the agency to allocate all plan payments as 
directed by the trustee.418  The trustee contended that it needed this authority to 
maximize the benefit to the estate of any tax payments.419  The trustee further 
argued that designating payments to trust fund taxes before nontrust fund taxes 
(1) would not harm the IRS since the reorganization plan provided that the 
agency would receive payment in full on its claims, and (2) was necessary to 
implement a settlement with Richard Rosen, a former officer of Energy 
Resources.420  Under the terms of the settlement, Rosen agreed to immediately 
pay $14,000 to the trust and, in return, the trustee agreed that the debtor’s 
payments to the IRS would be used to extinguish trust fund tax liabilities 
first.421  The tax allocation was intended to limit the personal liability of 
Energy Resources’s officers, providing them with an additional incentive to 
cooperate with the trustee during the reorganization.422 
Finally, the trustee asserted that payments made to the IRS under a chapter 
11 plan are “voluntary” and therefore a debtor-payee is entitled to designate 
the liabilities to which the funds are applied.423  The IRS focused on this last 
point in its response, maintaining that tax payments made under a plan of 
reorganization are “involuntary.”424  The bankruptcy court thus only 
considered “whether . . . tax payments made pursuant to a confirmed chapter 
 
 414 In re Energy Res. Co., 59 B.R. 702, 703 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986), aff’d, No. 1987 WL 42960 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 5, 1987), aff’d, 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990). 
 415 IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 
(1990). 
 416 Energy Res., 59 B.R. at 703. 
 417 Energy Res., 871 F.2d at 227. 
 418 Energy Res., 59 B.R. at 704. 
 419 Id. 
 420 Id. 
 421 Id. 
 422 Id. 
 423 Id. 
 424 Id. 
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11 plan of reorganization are voluntary or involuntary.”425  The court ruled that 
such payments are voluntary and accordingly the trustee “had every right to 
direct the IRS to allocate the payments to the trust fund portion of the taxes 
owed.”426  The district court affirmed in a short unpublished opinion that also 
simply addressed the voluntary-versus-involuntary issue.427 
C. In re Newport Offshore, Ltd. 
In the second case, the bankruptcy of Newport Offshore, Ltd. (“Newport”), 
Allied Marine Associates agreed to (1) pay all of Newport’s prepetition tax 
debts, which included trust fund tax and nontrust fund tax liabilities, (2) pay 
various other debts, and (3) invest additional money in the company.428  In 
return, Allied Marine would receive an eighty-five percent equity share in the 
reorganized debtor.429  Based upon this agreement, a plan of reorganization 
was formulated under which Newport would pay all of its tax debts over 
approximately six years.430  The plan also provided that payments to the IRS 
would be allocated to extinguish trust fund tax liabilities first.431 
The IRS objected to the designation provision.432  In particular, the agency 
contended that allowing debtors to designate payments to trust fund tax 
liabilities unfairly benefits responsible individuals and shifts the risk of 
nonpayment of taxes to the government.433  The bankruptcy court disagreed, 
explaining that the IRS had no factual support for its assertion that the 
designation was intended to benefit a responsible person.434  The agency also 
maintained that the plan was likely to fail once the trust fund tax liabilities 
 
 425 Id. 
 426 Id. at 706.  The precise reasoning adopted by the court in reaching this conclusion is not relevant for 
purposes of this Article. 
 427 See United States v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), Civ. A. No. 86-1533 Mc., 1987 WL 
42960, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 5, 1987), aff’d, 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990). 
 428 IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 
(1990). 
 429 Id. 
 430 Id.  The Bankruptcy Code previously required that tax debts be paid within six years of the date of 
assessment.  Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (2000) with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988).  That section 
now mandates payment of priority tax claims within five years of the date the debtor files for bankruptcy.  See 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 710, 119 Stat. 127 
(amending § 1129(a)(9)(C)). 
 431 Energy Res., 871 F.2d at 226. 
 432 In re Newport Offshore, Ltd., 75 B.R. 919, 920–23 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987), subsequently aff’d, 871 F.2d 
223 (1st Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990). 
 433 Id. at 923. 
 434 Id. 
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were paid, relieving the responsible individual of any obligations but denying 
the government full compensation on its claims.435  The bankruptcy court again 
thought otherwise, noting that a plan of reorganization likely to fail in the 
manner described by the IRS “would not be confirmable under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(11),” the plan feasibility requirement.436  Therefore, the court 
overruled the IRS’s objection.437 
On appeal, the district court reversed,438 reasoning that Congress “‘did not 
ever intend that a principal stockholder of a corporation in a reorganization 
would have the ability to negotiate in the Bankruptcy Court an exculpatory 
provision with respect to trust fund taxes.’”439 
D. Consolidated Appeals Before the First Circuit 
Energy Resources and Newport Offshore were consolidated before the First 
Circuit.  The court of appeals made two rulings.  First, it decided that the IRS 
may “call tax payments within a chapter 11 reorganization ‘involuntary,’ for 
purposes of applying its own regulations.”440  Second, it held that a bankruptcy 
court may order the IRS to allocate “‘involuntary’ payments to a taxpayer’s 
‘trust fund’ liability first, provided that the court reasonably concludes that this 
allocation will likely increase the reorganization plan’s chances for success.”441  
Only the latter ruling is relevant here. 
 
 435 Id. 
 436 Id.  A plan may be confirmed only if it is “not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or need for 
further financial reorganization, of the debtor . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2000). 
 437 Newport Offshore, 75 B.R. at 922–23. 
 438 IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 
(1990); Brief for the United States (“Petitioner’s Brief”) at 7, 1989 WL 428936, United States v. Energy Res. 
Co, Inc., 495 U.S. 545 (1990) (No. 89-255).  The district court did not issue a written opinion; it ruled from the 
bench.  Petitioner’s Brief at 7. 
 439 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 8 (apparently quoting a transcript of the district court’s ruling 
from the bench). 
 440 Energy Res., 871 F.2d at 227.  The IRS asserted that payments under a chapter 11 plan are 
“involuntary” because they are made pursuant to a court order confirming the plan.  Id. at 228.  The debtors 
countered that payments are “involuntary” only where they are compelled by a levy, execution, or judicial sale 
and the more limited role of the bankruptcy court in confirming a plan of reorganization falls short of this 
standard.  Id. 
 441 Id. at 227.  The First Circuit adopted the following test for bankruptcy court’s to use in making this 
determination: 
[U]pon consideration of the reorganization plan as a whole, in so far as the particular structure or 
allocation of payments increases the risk that the IRS may not collect the total tax debt, is that 
risk nonetheless justified by an offsetting increased likelihood of rehabilitations, i.e., increased 
likelihood of payment to creditors who might otherwise lose their money. 
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Beginning with the source of the authority to issue tax allocation orders, the 
court of appeals explained that “Congress has granted bankruptcy courts broad 
equitable powers, including those powers ‘expressly or by necessary 
implication conferred by Congress.’”442  As support for this proposition, the 
First Circuit cited § 105(a).443 The court then observed that an order 
designating tax payments to trust fund tax debts would satisfy the 
“appropriate” requirement of that statute in at least some circumstances.444  For 
example, responsible persons might agree to contribute funds to their 
employer’s estate in bankruptcy that are necessary for a successful 
reorganization, but only if they receive assurances from the court that the 
reorganized debtor will pay its trust fund taxes first.445 
The court then considered whether any laws prohibit a bankruptcy court 
from using its equitable power to dictate the allocation of tax payments.  It 
found none.446  Specifically, the First Circuit explained that no provision in the 
Bankruptcy Code limits a bankruptcy court’s authority to designate tax 
payments.447 It also concluded that there is no policy “embodied in any specific 
[nonbankruptcy] statute, tax or otherwise, that either directly, or by 
 
Id. at 234.  When this standard is satisfied, bankruptcy courts may order an allocation.  Id. 
 442 Id. at 230 (quoting Johnson v. First Nat’l. Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
 443 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000)). 
 444 Energy Res., 871 F.2d at 230.  In addition to § 105(a), the First Circuit observed that “bankruptcy 
courts have long had the legal power to tell creditors against which of a debtor’s several debts they are to apply 
a particular payment.”  Id. at 231 (citing National Bank of the Commonwealth v. Mechanics’ National Bank, 
94 U.S. 437, 439 (1876)).  But the court’s focus appeared to be on § 105(a).  See id. at 230–32. 
 445 Id.  The First Circuit explained as follows: 
Suppose . . . that certain third parties that included “responsible” individuals were willing to 
advance enough money to rehabilitate the corporation only if the court would assure them that 
the reorganized corporation would pay its “trust fund” tax debts first.  That assurance would 
diminish the likelihood that the third parties would have to pay debts personally; without it they 
might prefer immediate liquidation, which could mean total payment on all tax debt, and a 
“guarantee that no tax penalty will be assessed against them personally.” . . .  Of course, to give 
the “responsible” persons this assurance, and then allow the reorganized corporation to stretch 
out its tax payments over six years, might diminish the chances that the reorganizing firm will 
pay its entire tax debt, for no one can be absolutely certain that the reorganized corporation will 
still have money four or five years in the future.  But, by giving this assurance, and thereby 
keeping the firm alive, the bankruptcy court would also increase the chances that the debtor will 
pay something to its general unsecured creditors. 
Id.  The First Circuit also noted that frequently “‘the efforts put forth by these officers during the 
reorganization is the corporation’s only hope for future viability.’”  Id. at 230–31 (quoting United States v. 
A&B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. (In re A&B Heating & Air Conditioning), 823 F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 
1987)). 
 446 Id. at 231–33. 
 447 Id. at 231. 
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manifesting a congressional intent, circumscribes a bankruptcy court’s general 
powers in the respect at issue here.”448  In reaching this conclusion, the First 
Circuit expressly disagreed with the government’s contention that tax 
allocation orders frustrate the purpose of § 6672, the statute that allows the IRS 
to collect trust fund taxes from responsible individuals.449  The court conceded 
that § 6672 manifests a strong congressional policy in favor of collecting trust 
fund taxes.450  But the IRS’s chapter 11 allocation policy did not assure the 
prompt payment of those taxes; instead, the policy only guaranteed that trust 
fund taxes are paid last, after all nontrust fund tax debts are extinguished.  In 
essence, 
[t]he IRS seeks to use the personal liability of “responsible” persons, 
not to help collect “trust fund” tax debts, but to collect total tax debts.  
And, in order to help maximize that total collection, it is willing, by 
not crediting the “trust fund” debts first, to run a greater risk of not 
collecting the “trust fund” debt at all. . . .  [This] effectively forces 
the ‘responsible’ persons to be liable for the last tax dollars due from 
the debtor, a liability which Congress did not say “responsible” 
persons ought to have.451 
The First Circuit admitted that “because money is fungible, the effect of [an 
allocation order] is to diminish the IRS’s ability . . . to obtain” full recovery on 
all tax liabilities (for both trust fund and nontrust fund taxes),452 and to assist 
the responsible individuals.453  But, it responded, “we can find no policy in any 
statute suggesting that Congress felt that bankruptcy courts must maximize the 
likelihood that the IRS will receive its entire tax debt, irrespective of all other 
goals, particularly the Bankruptcy Court’s preference for rehabilitation over 
liquidation.”454  In sum, there is “no statute that attaches so overriding an 
importance to” total tax collection “as to circumscribe a [bankruptcy] court’s 
 
 448 Id. at 232. 
 449 Id. 
 450 Id. 
 451 Id. 
 452 Id. at 233. 
 453 Id. at 225.  The First Circuit offered the following illustration to demonstrate the point: 
If, for example, the reorganized corporation were to run out of money a few years from now and 
“trust fund” debts were still owed, the government might collect them from “responsible” 
individuals.  But if all “trust fund” debts have been paid, and if the only debts are for, say, 
ordinary corporate income taxes, the government will be out of luck, for there are no personal 
guarantors of payment of a corporation’s tax liabilities. 
Id. 
 454 Id. at 233. 
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statutorily granted powers to the contrary” in § 105(a).455  And the IRS cannot 
otherwise limit a bankruptcy judge’s statutory authority “by using an internal 
rule” like those governing allocation of involuntary tax payments.456 
Turning to the pending cases, the First Circuit held that the allocation 
provision in Newport’s chapter 11 plan was permissible because (1) the 
bankruptcy court found that the designation would do more than merely benefit 
the responsible individuals, and (2) Allied Marine Associates would not have 
made its financial contribution to Newport, an investment necessary for the 
success of the reorganization, without the provision.457  The court reached the 
same conclusion with respect to Energy Resources because the bankruptcy 
court (1) heard argument regarding the trustee’s claims that the designation 
would not damage the IRS and was necessary to the estate, and (2) found that 
the chapter 11 plan was made possible by the infusion of capital from the 
responsible individual.458 
E. Proceedings Before the United States Supreme Court 
1. Briefs of the United States 
The government presented two arguments in its appeal to the Supreme 
Court.  First, it contended that tax payments made pursuant to a chapter 11 
plan of reorganization are involuntary.459  Second, the United States asserted 
that bankruptcy courts may not order the IRS to allocate involuntary payments 
to trust fund tax liabilities.460  Once again, the discussion here will focus only 
on the latter point. 
 
 455 Id. at 232. 
 456 Id.  In addition, the First Circuit offered a policy argument in support of its holding.  It explained that 
“it makes administrative sense for the bankruptcy court to have the power to determine, in some cases, the debt 
allocation of Chapter 11 tax payments.” Id.  at 231.  That is because bankruptcy courts have more expertise 
than the IRS at balancing “the increased ‘tax collection’ risk against the increased likelihood of 
‘rehabilitation’” that results from allocation.  Id. 
Finally, the First Circuit also observed that because of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421, 
nothing, including any allocation order, restrains the IRS from pursuing a responsible person before the trust 
fund tax debt is satisfied by the debtor itself.  Id. at 233 (collecting authorities).  Section 7421 provides, with 
certain exceptions, that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be 
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was 
assessed.”  26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2000). 
 457 Energy Res. Co., 871 F.2d at 234. 
 458 Id. 
 459 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 16–25; Reply Brief for the United States (“Reply Brief”) at 3–6, 
1990 WL 505638, United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990) (No. 89-255). 
 460 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 25–38; Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 10–17. 
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The government began by emphasizing that nothing in the Bankruptcy 
Code explicitly grants bankruptcy courts the authority to apply chapter 11 tax 
payments to trust fund tax debts first.461  The United States then conducted a 
lengthy analysis of § 105(a).  Arguing for the narrow view of that statute, the 
government stated that § 105(a) does not give bankruptcy courts boundless 
authority to enter any order that facilitates a reorganization.462  Instead, the 
statute “speaks to the procedural powers of the bankruptcy court.”463  
Accordingly, § 105(a) only permits bankruptcy courts to enter orders that 
implement specific provisions of the Code.464  Section 105(a) “‘does not 
authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise 
unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do 
equity.’”465  These conclusions, the government asserted, are consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s oft-quoted statement in Norwest Bank Worthington v. 
Ahlers that “‘whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must 
and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.’”466 
Based upon the above, the government asserted that an order is not 
“necessary or appropriate” under § 105(a) simply because it might improve the 
debtor’s chances for a successful reorganization.467  Rehabilitation, while the 
central goal of chapter 11, may be pursued “only within the limitations 
established by the Code that address other, often competing, interests.”468  And 
a critical countervailing value reflected in the Bankruptcy Code is the 
government’s interest in collecting delinquent taxes.469  Congress sought to 
protect this interest through §§ 507(a)(8), 523(a)(1)(A), and 1129(a)(9)(C), 
where it, respectively, granted priority status to specified tax claims, made 
those claims nondischargeable in the bankruptcy of an individual, and required 
that chapter 11 debtors satisfy all such liabilities within six years of the date of 
assessment.470  When a bankruptcy court commands the IRS to designate 
 
 461 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 28. 
 462 Id. at 29. 
 463 Id. 
 464 Id. at 29–30 (citing United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir. 1986), and Bird v. Carl’s 
Grocery Co. (In re NWFX, Inc.), 864 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1989)); Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 12. 
 465 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 30 (quoting Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1308). 
 466 Id. (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)). 
 467 Id. at 31. 
 468 Id. 
 469 Id. 
 470 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 32; Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 14.  Section 507(a)(8) grants 
priority status to certain tax claims.  Section 523(a)(1)(A) makes those debts nondischargeable in the 
bankruptcy of an individual.  And § 1129(a)(9)(C) required that a chapter 11 plan of reorganization provide 
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payments to trust fund tax liabilities first to facilitate a reorganization, the court 
upsets the Code’s careful balancing of the interests in rehabilitation and 
collection of taxes, defeating the congressional policy judgments reflected in 
§§ 507(a)(8), 523(a)(1)(A), and 1129(a)(9)(C).471  Allocation orders have this 
effect because, as the First Circuit explained,472 such orders shift the risk of 
plan failure from the responsible persons, “whose misconduct created the trust 
fund tax delinquency in the first place,” to the IRS.473 
The government acknowledged that numerous provisions in the Code limit 
its right to recover outstanding taxes.474  For example, not all tax claims are 
afforded priority status,475 penalties on federal tax claims are subordinated to 
general unsecured claims,476 and the IRS can be forced to return payments that 
constitute preferential transfers.477  But the United States contended that these 
mandates simply offer further evidence of the deliberate balance struck in the 
Code between tax collection and other competing interests, a balance disrupted 
by the allocation orders at issue.478 
In sum, a § 105(a) designation grants relief to the debtor and responsible 
persons that is beyond the scope of any other Code section.479  Because such an 
order does not implement a specific bankruptcy statute, as required by the 
narrow view of § 105(a), it is invalid.480  Allocation orders are also 
impermissible because they violate §§ 507(a)(8), 523(a)(1)(A), and 
1129(a)(9)(C).481 
The government further contended that allocation orders are not authorized 
by § 105(a) because they “substantially undermine congressional policies 
embodied in” § 6672 of the IRC.482  In essence, the government argued that 
 
for the payment of priority tax claims within six years of the date of assessment.  See supra note 430 for a 
discussion of a recent amendment to this statute. 
 471 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 32–33. 
 472 See supra note 453 and accompanying text. 
 473 Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 14.  The impact on general unsecured creditors of the IRS’s 
designation policy, on the other hand, is, at most, “the indirect and speculative one that it may dampen the 
enthusiasm of the debtor’s officers in assisting the debtor’s rehabilitation.”  Id. at 10–11. 
 474 Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 13. 
 475 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2000). 
 476 § 726(a)(2), (4). 
 477 § 547(b). 
 478 Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 13. 
 479 Id. at 12. 
 480 Id. 
 481 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 32–33; Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 14. 
 482 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438 at 34 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2000)). 
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§ 6672 was designed to protect the IRS’s ability to collect taxes in general by 
creating an additional source from which trust fund taxes could be obtained.483  
The IRS’s method of allocation obviously facilitates this broad policy because 
“it is in the government’s fiscal interests to apply a partial payment to the non-
trust fund liability—thereby preserving the alternate source of collection for 
the trust fund portion of the liability in the event the corporation cannot make 
full payment.”484 
The government admitted that designating chapter 11 payments to trust 
fund tax debts first would actually improve the chances that the IRS would 
collect on those liabilities; it would eliminate trust fund tax delinquencies on 
the IRS’s books more quickly than if the payments were applied to other tax 
debts:485 
But the revenue protection policy of Section 6672 is not designed to 
achieve an accounting goal of assuring that tax dollars collected will 
be placed in the trust fund column, rather than the non-trust fund 
column.  Rather, the statute is intended to protect the Treasury from a 
loss—by providing an alternate source of collection from the persons 
responsible for misusing the funds held in trust for the 
government.486 
An allocation order undermines these goals because it “shift[s] the risk of 
failure of the plan from the responsible officers, whose improper conduct 
created the trust fund delinquency, to the government.”487  If “the 
reorganization is not successful and the corporate tax liability is not paid in 
full, the government could not resort to the responsible persons to make itself 
whole, but would have to bear the loss of the priority taxes that the corporate 
debtor did not pay.”488  Permitting the chapter 11 debtor to designate the tax 
liability extinguished by its payments thus “greatly” diminishes § 6672’s 
deterrent effect on managers.489  Such orders provide an incentive for 
responsible individuals to raid trust funds and escape individual liability for 
unpaid taxes through bankruptcy proceedings.490 
 
 483 Id. at 23, 34. 
 484 Id. at 19. 
 485 Id. at 37. 
 486 Id. 
 487 Id. at 23–24. 
 488 Id. at 24. 
 489 Id. at 34. 
 490 Id. 
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2. Respondents’ Brief 
Most of the arguments offered in response by the Energy Resources trustee 
and Newport (“Respondents”) are unimportant to the validity of non-debtor 
releases.  However, several points raised in their brief are worth noting. 
First, the Respondents argued that allocating tax payments does not require 
“the creation of new substantive rights nor the violation of the provisions and 
polices expressed in the Code.”491  Instead, the authority to allocate is well 
within the scope of a bankruptcy court’s power under § 105(a) because it is 
“but an adjunct to the exercise of power under several provision [sic] of the 
Code which address the treatment of tax claims.”492  “A court order concerning 
the proper allocation of tax payments is a logical carrying out of” § 507(a), 
which provides for the priority payment of tax claims,493 § 1129(a)(9)(C), 
which mandates that tax claims must be paid within six years of assessment,494 
and § 505, which grants bankruptcy courts the power to determine a debtor’s 
tax liability.495  In other words, the Respondents asserted that a tax allocation 
order is permissible even if the narrow view of § 105(a) is controlling. 
Alternatively, the Respondents maintained that bankruptcy courts are not 
limited to issuing orders that are “necessary to implement the clear substantive 
provisions enacted by Congress.”496  Advocating for the broad interpretation of 
§ 105(a), the Respondents explained that bankruptcy courts have traditionally 
exercised various types of equitable powers that are not located within the 
strict four corners of the Code, such as marshaling of assets and voiding state 
court judgments obtained by fraud.497  Designation of tax payments is 
consistent with this authority,498 particularly in light of the Code’s express 
limitations on the recovery of taxes.499 
 
 491 Joint Brief for the Respondents (“Respondents’ Brief”) at 27, 1990 WL 505637, United States v. 
Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990) (No. 89-255). 
 492 Id. 
 493 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000). 
 494 § 1129(a)(9)(C).  See supra note 430 for a discussion of a recent amendment to this statute. 
 495 § 505; Respondents’ Brief, supra note 491, at 27. 
 496 Respondents’ Brief, supra note 491, at 27. 
 497 Id. at 28. 
 498 Id. at 27–30. 
 499 Id. at 31–35 (citing, inter alia, § 507(a)(7) (indicating that not all federal tax claims are given priority 
status), § 726(a)(4) (providing that penalties on federal tax claims are subordinated to general unsecured 
claims), § 547(b) (requiring that the government return preferential transfers)). 
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The Respondents also argued that allocating tax payments does not conflict 
with any congressional policy reflected in the Bankruptcy Code or the IRC.500  
They acknowledged that the IRS has a strong interest in collecting trust fund 
taxes, but countered that “[t]here is nothing in the court of appeals opinion, nor 
anything else in the law, that removes § 6672 as an alternative source of 
collection . . . as long as there are trust fund taxes owed.”501  The Respondents 
explained that “the IRS is not concerned about collection of trust fund taxes, 
but collection of taxes in total.”502  However, the purpose of § 6672 is to 
provide for the collection of trust fund taxes, not all taxes.503  In effect, “[t]he 
IRS is attempting to use § 6672 to render the ‘responsible person’ a guarantor 
of a debtor’s entire tax obligation.”504 
Finally, the Respondents asserted that the government has no basis to 
complain that the recovery of nontrust fund taxes is subjected to the risk of 
plan failure by a designation order.505  Section 1129(a)(9)(C), which allows the 
debtor to pay its federal taxes through a reorganization plan within six years of 
assessment,506 clearly permits the imposition of such risk.507  The only 
protection against plan failure that the IRS is entitled to is that provided by the 
Code’s requirement that reorganization plans be feasible.508 
3. Opinion of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit, holding that “whether or not 
the payments at issue are rightfully considered to be involuntary, a bankruptcy 
court has the authority to order the IRS to apply the payments to trust fund 
liabilities if the bankruptcy court determines that this designation is necessary 
to the success of a reorganization plan.”509  The Court began its analysis by 
acknowledging that “[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the 
bankruptcy courts to approve reorganization plans designating tax payments as 
 
 500 Id. at 37–40. 
 501 Id. at 37–38. 
 502 Id. at 38. 
 503 Id. at 30. 
 504 Id. at 39. 
 505 Id. at 38. 
 506 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (2000).  See supra note 430 for a discussion of a recent amendment to this 
statute. 
 507 Respondents’ Brief, supra note 491, at 38. 
 508 Id. at 38 n.16 (citing § 1129(a)(11)). 
 509 United States v. Energy Res. Co, 495 U.S. 545, 548–49 (1990).  The Court affirmed by a vote of 8-1, 
with Justice White delivering the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 546.  Justice Blackmun dissented, but he did so 
without comment.  Id. at 546, 551.  There were no concurring opinions.  Id. 
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either trust fund or nontrust fund.”510  The Court explained, however, that the 
Code 
grants the bankruptcy courts residual authority to approve 
reorganization plans including “any . . . appropriate provision not 
inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1123(b)(5) [now 1123(b)(6)]; see also § 1129.  The Code also 
states that bankruptcy courts may “issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” 
of the Code.  § 105(a).  These statutory directives are consistent with 
the traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as courts of 
equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor 
relationships.511 
 Having concluded that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) provide bankruptcy courts 
with sufficient power to issue tax allocation orders, the Court proceeded to 
address the IRS’s contention that such orders are inconsistent with 
§§ 507(a)(7), 523(a)(1)(A), and 1129(a)(9)(C) of the Code.512  The Court 
rejected the government’s argument, explaining that “[i]t is evident that these 
[statutes] . . . do not preclude the court from issuing orders of the type at issue 
here” because they “do not address the bankruptcy court’s ability to designate 
whether tax payments are to be applied to trust fund or nontrust fund 
liabilities.”513  The High Court conceded that if the IRS applies payments to 
nontrust fund taxes first, collection of all outstanding taxes is more likely 
because the guaranteed portion would be extinguished last.514  But, the Court 
ruled, such a payment plan constitutes 
an added protection not specified in the Code itself: Whereas the 
Code gives [the Government] the right to be assured that its taxes 
will be paid in six years, the Government wants an assurance that its 
taxes will be paid even if the reorganization fails—i.e., even if the 
bankruptcy court is incorrect in its judgment that the reorganization 
plan will succeed.515 
 Although an allocation order may be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code, 
the Supreme Court continued, “[It] might be inappropriate if it conflicted with 
 
 510 Id. at 549. 
 511 Id.  At the time Energy Resources was decided, § 1123(b)(6) was contained at 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) 
(1988). 
 512 Id. at 549–50. 
 513 Id. at 550. 
 514 Id. 
 515 Id. 
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another law that should have been taken into consideration in the exercise of 
the [bankruptcy] court’s discretion.”516  The Court thus turned to the 
government’s § 6672 argument.  It started by acknowledging that § 6672 
provides the IRS with an alternative source for the collection of trust fund 
taxes.517  But designation orders do not interfere with the government’s rights 
because they do not bar the IRS from pursuing responsible persons for the 
recovery of trust fund tax debts.518 “[T]o the contrary,” the Supreme Court 
explained, “the orders require the Government to collect trust fund payments 
before collecting non-trust-fund payments.”519  As for the United States’ 
contention that “if the IRS cannot designate a debtor corporation’s tax 
payment” the debtor might only pay the guaranteed liability, “leaving the 
Government at risk for non-trust-fund taxes,”520 the Court had a simple 
response: “§ 6672, by its terms, does not protect against this eventuality.  That 
section plainly does not require us to hold that the orders at issue here, 
otherwise wholly consistent with the bankruptcy court’s authority under the 
Bankruptcy Code, were nonetheless improvident.”521 
V. ENERGY RESOURCES AND NON-DEBTOR RELEASES 
Energy Resources is the Supreme Court’s most definitive guidance on the 
scope of the equitable powers conferred by §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) and the 
relationship of these statutes to other sections of the Code.522  Nonetheless, the 
vast majority of pro-release and anti-release authorities have overlooked the 
decision.523  Moreover, those that cited Energy Resources did not conduct a 
 
 516 Id. 
 517 Id. 
 518 Id. 
 519 Id. 
 520 Id. at 551. 
 521 Id. 
 522 The Supreme Court has cited § 105(a) just five times.  And only in Energy Resources did the Court 
offer any analysis regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s powers under the statute.  Compare Energy 
Res., 495 U.S. at 549–51, with Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 301–14 (1995) (considering whether a 
bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue a § 105(a) injunction under § 1334(b), but not 
addressing the scope of a bankruptcy court’s power under § 105(a)); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 
638, 645–46 (1992) (refusing to address a party’s § 105(a) argument because the party raised the issue for the 
first time in its opening brief on the merits, thus waiving the issue); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 
88 (1991) (quoting § 105(a) in passing but conducting no analysis of the statute); Northern Pipeline Constr. 
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55, 85 (1982) (same).  Additionally, the Court has only cited 
§ 1123(b)(6) once—in Energy Resources. 
 523 Only a handful of pro-release and anti-release decisions and articles even cited Energy Resources, and 
most are identified in the next footnote. 
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sustained analysis of the case and failed to comprehend the full impact of its 
holding.524  In this Part, I contend that Energy Resources resolves the split in 
the courts concerning the propriety of non-debtor releases by providing 
compelling support for the pro-release position. 
First, Energy Resources endorsed the broad view of §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6)—the view held by pro-release courts and commentators.  The 
decision illustrates that bankruptcy courts may employ their equitable powers 
for the general purpose of facilitating a reorganization.  In other words, 
bankruptcy courts possess substantive equitable powers; they are not limited to 
issuing orders that are tethered to specific sections of the Code. 
Second, Energy Resources demonstrates that shifting the risk of plan 
failure from non-debtors to creditors—the exact impact of a channeling release 
vis-à-vis a provisional injunction—comports with equity where such action is 
necessary to the success of a reorganization.  This defeats a critical objection to 
channeling non-debtor releases—that such relief is inequitable. 
 
 524 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 478–79 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that bankruptcy 
courts have the authority to issue non-debtor releases under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) because, inter alia, those 
statutes, pursuant to Energy Resources, “provide the bankruptcy courts with broad authority to approve plans 
of reorganization that include provisions affecting creditors’ rights to recover against non-debtors, if the 
provisions are necessary to carry out the plan”) (citing Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 549) (offering no additional 
analysis regarding Energy Resources), rev’d in part, aff’d in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Feldstein, supra note 27, at 39–40 (arguing that Energy Resources provides that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) 
grant substantive powers and thus that these statutes confer the authority to issue third-party releases, but 
merely quoting several sentences from Energy Resources before reaching this conclusion) (citing Energy Res., 
495 U.S. at 549); Buschman, supra note 27, at 942 (concluding that the pro-release decisions are “consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s recent observation regarding the bankruptcy court’s ‘broad authority to modify 
creditor-debtor relationships,’” but providing no further discussion) (quoting Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 549).  
Several other courts cited Energy Resources generally before approving of third-party releases.  See, e.g., 
Greer v. Gaston & Snow (In re Gaston & Snow), Nos. 93 Civ. 8517 (JGK), 93 Civ. 8628 (JGK), 1996 WL 
694421, at *2-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1996) (quoting the statement in Energy Res., 545 U.S. at 549, that 
bankruptcy courts have “broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relationships” in a general discussion of 
§ 105(a) before holding that non-debtor releases are permissible under Drexel); Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors v. Bechtle (In re Labrum & Doak), 237 B.R. 275, 305 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (quoting the same 
excerpt from Energy Resources in discussing § 105(a) prior to ruling that § 105(a) grants courts the power to 
issue non-debtor releases); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 685–87 (Bankr. D.D.C. 
1992) (same); see also Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 
648, 656–57 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing the same quotation from Energy Resources in a general discussion of 
§ 105(a) before concluding that bankruptcy courts may grant non-debtor releases by using § 105(a) in 
conjunction with § 1123(b)(6)).  The only anti-release authority to consider Energy Resources is Professor 
Brubaker.  And his primary discussion of the case is limited to a single footnote where he argues that Energy 
Resources does not support the conclusion that bankruptcy courts may use their equitable powers in a manner 
that directly contravenes nonbankruptcy law.  See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1030 n.255; see also infra Part 
V.C. (addressing whether § 105(a) may be used to issue orders that conflict with nonbankruptcy law). 
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Third, Energy Resources establishes that the Supreme Court’s “plain-
meaning” approach to statutory interpretation applies when considering 
whether a § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) order conflicts with another provision of 
the Code.  Thus, because § 524(e) fails, by its precise terms, to proscribe or 
even address non-debtor releases, the statute places no limit upon a bankruptcy 
court’s equitable power to grant that type of relief. 
In sum, the Energy Resources Court effectively sided with the pro-release 
authorities on each of the critical issues regarding the validity of third-party 
releases.525  These disputes must therefore be resolved in favor of the pro-
release position. 
Energy Resources does suggest a new objection to non-debtor releases 
generally ignored by anti-release courts and commentators—that §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) orders may not contravene nonbankruptcy law.  But the opinion 
also provides the dispositive response to that objection.  And, as a result, this 
Article concludes that non-debtor releases are valid under the Bankruptcy 
Code.526 
A. Energy Resources and §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) 
1. The Substantive Equitable Power of Bankruptcy Courts 
Pro- and anti-release authorities are divided over the scope of a bankruptcy 
court’s equitable powers.  In nearly every pro-release decision, the court 
implicitly adopted the broad view of § 105(a), finding that the statute, standing 
alone, confers sufficient power to issue non-debtor releases.527  Other pro-
release authorities concluded that § 1123(b)(6), by itself, permits bankruptcy 
judges to extinguish claims against non-debtors.528  In contrast, several anti-
release courts and commentators endorsed the narrow view of § 105(a).  
Pursuant to that interpretation, the statute may only be used to implement 
other, specific provisions in the Code; it is not a substantive source of 
power.529  Therefore, according to the anti-release decisions, because no Code 
 
 525 See supra Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C. 
 526 Of course, non-debtor releases are only valid if they satisfy the four elements of the modified Master 
Mortgage test proposed in Part III.B.4.  See supra notes 322–57 and accompanying text. 
 527 See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 528 See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 529 See supra notes 125–34 and accompanying text. 
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provision can serve as a pathway to grant third-party releases, § 105(a) may 
not be used to order that type of relief.530 
Energy Resources ends this debate.  There, the Supreme Court embraced 
the broad view of § 105(a) and an identical construction of § 1123(b)(6).  
Explaining that these statutes “are consistent with the traditional understanding 
that bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify 
creditor-debtor relationships,”531 the Court made it clear that both §§ 105(a) 
and 1123(b)(6) are sources of substantive power: the High Court ruled that 
bankruptcy judges may use these laws to grant relief for the broad aim of 
promoting a reorganization; § 105(a) and § 1123(b)(6) orders need not be 
tethered to more specific Code provisions. 
To elaborate, Energy Resources held that the equitable statutes may be 
employed to command the IRS to apply chapter 11 payments to a debtor’s trust 
fund tax liabilities before its nontrust fund tax debts.532  And the Supreme 
Court ruled that bankruptcy judges may use §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) to grant 
such relief for the general goal of facilitating a reorganization.  The Court 
stated that “a bankruptcy court has the authority to order the IRS to apply . . . 
payments to trust fund liabilities if the bankruptcy court determines that this 
designation is necessary to the success of a reorganization plan.”533  The Court 
 
 530 See supra notes 205–13 and accompanying text.  One would presume that the anti-release authorities 
would reach the same conclusion with respect to § 1123(b)(6). 
 531 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990). 
 532 Id. 
 533 Id. at 549 (emphasis added); accord id. at 546 (“In this case, we decide that a bankruptcy court has the 
authority to order the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to treat tax payments made by Chapter 11 debtor 
corporations as trust fund payments where the bankruptcy court determines that this designation is necessary 
for the success of a reorganization plan.”). 
It should also be noted that the standard adopted by the Supreme Court for determining when 
bankruptcy courts may exercise their equitable powers is identical to the one set forth in the second element of 
the modified Master Mortgage test.  The Energy Resources Court held that bankruptcy courts may employ 
§§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) where “necessary to the success of a reorganization.”  Id. at 549 (emphasis added).  
Similarly, under both the original and modified versions of the Master Mortgage test, a non-debtor release 
must be “essential to the reorganization.”  See supra notes 326–38 and accompanying text (my amended 
version of the test); supra notes 291–92 and accompanying text (the original test). 
Furthermore, while the Supreme Court did not discuss what the term “necessary” means, the First 
Circuit concluded that the tax designations in the Energy Resources and Newport bankruptcies were necessary 
because they induced third parties to make substantial contributions to the debtors’ estates, making the 
reorganization plans workable.  IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 234 (1st Cir. 
1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990); see generally In re Classic Chemical and Supply Co., 198 B.R. 112, 114 
(E.D. Penn. 1996) (using the test proffered by the First Circuit in Energy Resources for determining when a 
court should issue a tax allocation order as “guidance” in construing the Supreme Court’s opinion); Bryan T. 
Camp, Avoiding the Ex Post Facto Slippery Slope of Deer Park, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 329, 336 (1995) 
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gave no indication that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) confer powers that may be 
employed only in conjunction with other, specific provisions of the Code.534  
In fact, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “Bankruptcy Code does not 
explicitly authorize” tax allocation orders.535 
Energy Resources thus demonstrates that bankruptcy courts possess 
substantive equitable powers.  Bankruptcy judges may issue orders that are not 
tethered to any particular provision in the Code.  Orders that merely implement 
general bankruptcy policies, such as the promotion of reorganizations, are 
permissible.  In short, Energy Resources constitutes a full endorsement of the 
broad view of §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), the view defended by pro-release 
authorities. 
Tellingly, the Energy Resources Court adopted the expansive 
understanding of the equitable statutes even though it was presented with an 
opportunity to affirm the First Circuit under the alternative construction.  
Newport and the Energy Resources trustee contended that bankruptcy courts 
have the power to designate tax payments even if the narrow view of § 105(a) 
is correct.  They proposed that an allocation order issued pursuant to that law is 
merely “an adjunct to the exercise of power under several provision [sic] of the 
Code which address the treatment of tax claims,” including §§ 505, 507(a), and 
1129(a)(7).536  But the Supreme Court ignored this suggestion, instead 
focusing solely on § 1123(b)(6), which it cited sua sponte, and § 105(a).537 
Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court rejected the narrow view of 
§§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) even though the government presented the same 
 
(observing that some courts have “imputed” the First Circuit’s test to the Supreme Court).  Once again, the 
parallel to the pro-release position is clear: facilitating critical contributions to the estate from non-debtors is a 
key justification for third-party releases.  See supra notes 291–92, 330, and accompanying text. 
 534 Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 549–51. 
 535 Id. at 549. 
 536 Respondents’ Brief, supra note 491, at 27. 
 537 495 U.S. at 449; see also IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 230 (1st Cir. 
1989) (bankruptcy courts may act pursuant to § 105(a) to “promote the ‘twofold’ (and often conflicting) 
purpose [sic] of the Bankruptcy Code: ensure fair payment to creditors and provide the bankrupt firm with an 
opportunity to make a ‘fresh start’”), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990).  Interestingly, § 1123(b)(6) was not cited in 
any of the briefs or the lower court opinions.  The Supreme Court raised this statute on its own. 
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court’s opinion firmly establishes that § 105(a), by itself, 
permits the issuance of orders necessary to the success of a reorganization: the allocation order in the Energy 
Resources bankruptcy was entered fourteen months after confirmation of the plan.  871 F.2d at 227.  Section 
1123(b)(6) thus could not have provided authority for that order because the statute only governs the contents 
of a plan of reorganization.  11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) (2000) (permitting a plan to “include any other appropriate 
provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title”). 
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rationale for adopting a restrictive interpretation that anti-release authorities 
have proffered—the High Court’s statement in Ahlers that a bankruptcy court 
must exercise its equitable powers “within the confines of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”538  The Energy Resources Court apparently did not consider Ahlers to 
be a serious impediment to its holding; Ahlers is not cited once in the 
opinion.539 
Although the Energy Resources Court ignored Ahlers, it is not difficult to 
harmonize the two decisions.  Ahlers is best understood as reflecting the rule 
that a bankruptcy court may not use §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) to issue orders 
that are inconsistent with the Code.  Courts have, in fact, cited Ahlers for this 
very point,540 including some anti-release authorities.541  Thus, Ahlers and 
Energy Resources should be reconciled in the following manner: Energy 
Resources establishes that bankruptcy courts have substantive equitable power 
under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), while Ahlers confirms that any use of this 
authority must be consistent with the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  
 
 538 Compare Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 30 (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 
U.S. 197, 206 (1988)), with the authorities discussed supra at notes 127, 205–10, and accompanying text. 
 539 Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 546–51. 
 540 See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305, 1311 (1st Cir. 
1993) (explaining that “the bankruptcy court has no equitable power to deprive creditors of rights or remedies 
available to them under the Code” because of the language in Ahlers that a bankruptcy court may only exercise 
its equitable power “‘within the confines of the Code’”) (quoting Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206); United States v. 
Sanford (In re Sanford), 979 F.2d 1511, 1513–14 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a bankruptcy court may not 
use the equitable power under § 105(a) to alter the procedures governing the allowance of claims, see 
§ 502(b)(1), because of the same language at Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone 
III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1283 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that general 
equitable principles may not be used to deviate from the requirements of the absolute priority rule, 
§ 1129(b)(2)(B), because of the same language at Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206); see also 2 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01, at 105-7 & n.7 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (citing Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 
206, for the proposition that “[s]ection 105 does not allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates 
of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code”); In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2002) (“As a general rule, however, the equitable powers of bankruptcy courts must be exercised within the 
confines of the Bankruptcy Code.  Thus, § 105(a) cannot be used to authorize any relief that is prohibited by 
another provision of the Code.”) (no citation to Ahlers). 
 541 See In re Sybaris Clubs, Int’l, Inc., 189 B.R. 152, 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (“More importantly, 
‘section 105 does not authorize relief inconsistent with more specific law.’  This is because ‘whatever 
equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the 
Bankruptcy Code.’”) (citations omitted); In re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 66–67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1994) (quoting Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206, in support of its conclusion that § 105(a) may not be used to trump 
§ 524(e)’s explicit prohibition on non-debtor releases).  Some pro-release courts have cited Ahlers, apparently 
concluding that it presented no bar to third-party releases.  See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In 
re Chateaugay Corp.), 167 B.R. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that bankruptcy courts may issue non-
debtor releases under § 105(a) and citing Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206). 
SILVERSTEIN GALLEYSFINAL 2/19/2007  2:08:42 PM 
110 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23 
Indeed, at least one court has interpreted the two cases in precisely this 
manner.542 
Alternatively, Ahlers might be understood as providing that §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) may be used only to carry out bankruptcy policies—i.e., policies 
falling “within the confines of the Bankruptcy  Code.”543  This interpretation is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous statement that “[t]he Bankruptcy 
Code does not authorize free-wheeling consideration of every conceivable 
equity, but rather only how the equities relate to the success of the 
reorganization.”544  In other words, the Ahlers Court may only have been 
reaffirming the principle that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) do not constitute 
“roving commission[s] to do equity.”545  Once again, this construction of 
Ahlers is wholly consistent with Energy Resources’s endorsement of the broad 
view of §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6). 
Admittedly, some courts have found that Energy Resources does not 
support the broad view of the equitable statutes.  The Third Circuit, for 
example, has argued that “[t]here is nothing in Energy Resources which would 
derogate from our prior observations that § 105 does not give the court the 
power to create substantive rights that would otherwise be unavailable under 
the Code.”546  Therefore, any use of § 105(a) must still be tethered to a more 
 
 542 See Gurney v. Arizona Dept. Rev. (In re Gurney), 192 B.R. 529, 537 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (observing 
that Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 549, explained that bankruptcy courts have broad equitable power under 
§ 105(a), but citing Ahlers, 485 U.S. 199, for the proposition that this authority “may be exercised only in a 
manner not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code”); see also In re ATD Corp., 278 B.R. 758, 764 n.3 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) (citing Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 207 for the proposition that a bankruptcy court “cannot 
use its equity powers to enter an order inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code,” and concluding that Energy 
Res., 495 U.S. at 549, is in agreement with this point), aff’d, 352 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 2003).  For example, 
Energy Resources does not permit a bankruptcy court to “change the classifications of debts from one 
category, where full payment is required, to another category where less than full payment is required.”  Bates 
v. United States (In re Bates), 974 F.2d 1234, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 1992); accord United States v. Haas (In re 
Haas), 162 F.3d 1087, 1089–90 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that Energy Resources does not justify an order 
altering federal tax debts from unsecured priority to secured status, particularly where this has the effect of 
reducing the IRS’s recovery under the plan of reorganization); In re Burgess, 171 B.R. 227, 230 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tex. 1994) (“Energy Resources does not encompass a situation where a debtor wishes to reapportion certain 
tax liability from secured to unsecured in order to discharge a larger portion of the liability.”). 
 543 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
 544 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984). 
 545 United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 546 United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
accord IRS v. Kaplan (In re Kaplan), 104 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting the language in the text from 
Pepperman, 976 F.2d at 131). 
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specific Code provision.547  And the Third Circuit continues to cite Ahlers in 
support of this understanding.548  But tax allocation orders like those approved 
of in Energy Resources do not implement other statutes of the Code; the orders 
flow from §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) standing alone.  Therefore, the Third 
Circuit’s belief—that the narrow view of the bankruptcy court’s equitable 
authority survives Energy Resources—is mistaken.549 
In sum, Energy Resources establishes that the broad view of §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) is the correct interpretation.  Bankruptcy courts may use these 
statutes to issue orders in furtherance of general bankruptcy policies. 
2. The Scope of a Bankruptcy Court’s Substantive Equitable Powers After 
Energy Resources 
Despite Energy Resources’s endorsement of the broad view, one might 
assert that the substantive authority conferred by §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) is 
not wide enough to permit third-party releases. 
Some courts have stated, for example, that bankruptcy judges are 
prohibited from using their equitable power to provide relief that is not 
available under nonbankruptcy law.550  In other words, while bankruptcy 
 
 547 See Gillman v. Cont’l. Airlines (In re Cont’l. Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Section 
105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supplements courts’ specifically enumerated bankruptcy powers by authorizing 
orders necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 548 Id. (“However, section 105(a) has a limited scope.  It does not ‘create substantive rights that would 
otherwise be unavailable under the Bankruptcy Code.’”) (quoting Pepperman, 976 F.2d at 131) (immediately 
thereafter quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)). 
 549 The Third Circuit’s confusion is not atypical.  For example, the court in Eddy v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 
Co. (In re Medical Asset Mgmt., Inc.), 249 B.R. 659, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000), stated that the “scope of 
§ 105(a) is limited in that it only supplements powers specifically enumerated in the Bankruptcy Code” and 
that the statute does not permit bankruptcy courts to “create substantive rights that otherwise are unavailable 
under the Bankruptcy Code.”  Id.  This is a classic statement of the narrow view of § 105(a).  But in the very 
next paragraph, the Eddy court explained that bankruptcy courts may “direct allocation of tax payments” 
where “necessary to effectuate a successful reorganization or for some other similar purpose,” id., a conclusion 
compatible only with the broad view since tax designation orders are not provided for anywhere in the Code.  
For examples of other post-Energy Resources decisions embracing the narrow view, see supra notes 126–29, 
205, and 210. 
 550 See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305, 1311 (1st Cir. 
1993) (“Because section 105(a) is not a source of substantive rights, the bankruptcy court’s order was 
legitimate only to the extent that some other provision of the Code or other applicable law entitled the estate to 
receive the disputed funds.”) (emphasis added); Stratton v. Mariner Health Care, Inc. (In re Mariner Post-
Acute Network), 329 B.R. 481, 490 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (“Section 105(a) cannot create substantive rights 
that do not otherwise exist under the Bankruptcy Code or other applicable law.”) (emphasis added); Harold & 
Williams Dev. Co. v. Crestar Bank (In re Harold & Williams Dev. Co.), 163 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
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courts may employ §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) to issue orders that do not 
implement a specific section of the Code, such “untethered” orders may only 
grant relief that is allowable under other federal or state law.  Thus, to 
illustrate, bankruptcy judges may marshal assets,551 a generally available 
nonbankruptcy remedy,552 and order substantive consolidation,553 which is 
similar in effect to piercing the corporate veil.554  But nothing outside the 
Bankruptcy Code sanctions the involuntarily release of a creditor’s claim.555  
As a result, this objection concludes, non-debtor releases are beyond the 
bankruptcy court’s equitable power. 
Energy Resources defeats this argument.  There, the Supreme Court held 
that bankruptcy courts may issue tax designation orders “whether or not the 
 
1994) (“[T]he exercise of § 105(a) power should be used to achieve ends provided for by the Code itself or 
otherwise by law.”) (emphasis added). 
 551 See Me. Assoc. v. United States (In re Morahan), 53 B.R. 489, 492 (D. Me. 1985); In re Corso Stein 
Enters., Inc., 79 B.R. 584, 586–87 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.04[3] (Lawrence 
P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004). 
 552 See generally 53 AM. JUR. 2d Marshaling Assets §§ 1-59 (1996). 
 553 2 COLLIER ¶ 105.04[2] (“Substantive consolidation is the merging of the assets and claims of two or 
more estates.”). 
 554 See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 764 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Substantive consolidation ‘enabl[es] a 
bankruptcy court to disregard separate corporate entities, to pierce their corporate veils in the usual metaphor, 
in order to reach assets for the satisfaction of debts of a related corporation.’”) (quoting James Talcott, Inc. v. 
Wharton (In re Vending Machine Corp.), 517 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1975)).  But see In re Cooper, 147 B.R. 
678, 684 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (“Substantive consolidation is more extensive relief than piercing the corporate 
veil, because substantive consolidation is a complete merger of legal entities, while piercing the corporate veil 
is essentially a limited merger for the benefit of only one creditor or group of creditors.”). 
For other examples, see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Allied Stores Corp. (In re Federated Dept. Stores, 
Inc.), 133 B.R. 886, 888–89, 891–92 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (using § 105(a) to alter the dividend and voting 
rights of preferred shareholders of the debtor’s stock and explaining that “the controlling state law very clearly 
allows the requested relief from the Bankruptcy Court”); Harold & Williams Dev. Co., 163 B.R. at 78, 80–81 
(using § 105(a) to compel a bank to disgorge the proceeds of a bankruptcy sale of real property that the 
conducting officer should, under state law, have paid to a municipality to satisfy tax liens with priority over the 
bank’s deed of trust). 
 555 See Goss Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 267 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Federal 
courts . . . have no authority to force a settlement.”) (collecting authorities).  Actually, as Professor Brubaker 
points out, there is one context in which a court may impose a release on a non-consenting party—when the 
party is a member of a mandatory, non-opt-out class, certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(1)(B).  See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 975 (“Indeed, the only nonbankruptcy context in which a court 
can impose a settlement upon a nonconsenting claimant is through a court-approved settlement of a 
mandatory, non-opt-out class action . . . .”); id. at 979 (“With respect to the kinds of money damage claims 
discharged via non-debtor releases, a mandatory class action is available only if the defendant is considered a 
‘limited fund’ because the total of the class members’ individual claims may exceed a defendant’s resources.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  But, Professor Brubaker correctly observes, “Non-debtor releases . . . 
permit a court to impose a mandatory class settlement of non-debtor actions in circumstances where a 
mandatory class is impermissible under nonbankruptcy law.”  Id. at 973. 
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payments at issue are rightfully considered to be involuntary.”556  As noted 
previously, however, under IRS rules, “involuntary” payments are subject to 
allocation by the government,557 a position universally endorsed by the 
courts.558  Tax allocation orders thus constitute a permissible remedy in 
bankruptcy that is unavailable to taxpayers under nonbankruptcy law.559  
Accordingly, lack of availability outside bankruptcy is no objection to an order 
issued pursuant to § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6). 
 
 556 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 548–49 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 557 See IRS Policy Statement P-5-60(7) (1993), reprinted in 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL—
ADMINISTRATION § 1.2.1.5.14 (CCH Rev. 2000) (“The taxpayer, of course, has no right of designation 
[between trust fund and non-trust fund taxes] of payments resulting from enforced collection measures.”); 1 
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL—ADMINISTRATION § 5.9.15.2(2) (CCH Rev. 2006) (noting that “[p]ayments 
received through the bankruptcy proceeding are considered involuntary payments” and that such payments are 
allocated to the debtor’s various tax liabilities according to IRS policy). 
 558 60 AM. JUR. 2d Payment § 69 (2003) (“[W]hen a payment is involuntary, IRS policy is to allocate the 
payments as it sees fit, and this rule has been uniformly followed by the courts in the interest of orderly 
administration.  A court will not direct the application of funds in any particular manner in such cases.”) 
(footnotes omitted); id. (“Payments made by a taxpayer involved in a bankruptcy proceeding have been held to 
be involuntary.”); see also Harker v. United States (In re Harker), 357 F.3d 846, 849 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The IRS 
may apply involuntary payments to whichever liability of the taxpayer it chooses.”); Tull v. United States, 69 
F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1995) (same) (case involving the trust fund tax penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 
(2000)); Fullmer v. United States (In re Fullmer), 962 F.2d 1463, 1468 (10th Cir. 1992) (“A taxpayer cannot 
direct the application of involuntary payments . . . .”) (holding that “payments made to the IRS pursuant to a 
Chapter 11 proceeding” are involuntary), abrogated on other grounds, Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 
530 U.S. 15 (2000); United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Most courts that have 
considered the issue have concluded that payments made in the bankruptcy context are involuntary.”) (case 
involving the trust fund tax penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2000)); DuCharmes & Co. v. State of Michigan, 
852 F.2d 194, 196 (6th Cir. 1988) (“When the payment is considered ‘involuntary,’ however, the IRS makes 
the allocation, applying the money first to non-trust fund taxes.”) (further holding that payments made by a 
chapter 11 debtor are involuntary). 
 559 While court orders allocating involuntary tax payments are not available under nonbankruptcy law, 
such orders do not actually conflict with nonbankruptcy law because the IRS rules that tax designation orders 
override lack the force of law.  See Fargo v. Comm’r, 447 F.3d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The Internal 
Revenue Manual does not have the force of law and does not confer rights on taxpayers.  This view is shared 
among many of our sister circuits.”); Marks v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 983, 985 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“It is well-
settled . . . that the provisions of the [Internal Revenue Manual] . . . are not codified regulations, and clearly do 
not have the force and effect of law.”); United States v. Horne, 714 F.2d 206, 207 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); 
Hyler v. Comm’r, No. 11023-01L, 2002 WL 31890047 (U.S. Tax. Ct. Dec. 30, 2002) (“Policy statements in 
the Internal Revenue Manual do not confer enforceable rights on taxpayers.”); see also Energy Res. Co. v. IRS 
(In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 232 (1st Cir. 1989) (“As a general matter, the IRS cannot, in any 
obvious way, circumscribe, by using an internal rule, a court’s statutory powers.”), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990).  
And, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Energy Resources, nothing in the Internal Revenue Code barred the 
tax allocation orders at issue in that case.  Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 551; see also Brubaker, supra note 27, at 
1030 n.255 (“Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code . . . prevented prior application of reorganization plan 
payments [in Energy Resources] toward trust fund taxes.  Therefore, the bankruptcy court’s equitable order did 
not present a direct conflict between the reorganization policy and the non-debtors liability under the Internal 
Revenue Code.”).  The IRS rules at issue are set forth in note 557, supra. 
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Another “scope” objection is that the exercise of equitable power approved 
of in Energy Resources is narrower than a non-debtor release.  Tax allocation 
orders do not extinguish the liability of a third party.  Indeed, the Energy 
Resources Court expressly noted that the tax designations in dispute did not 
prohibit the IRS from pursuing responsible persons for the recovery of trust 
fund taxes.560  They merely forced the government to apply payments made by 
the debtor to trust fund taxes first.  However, third-party releases eliminate the 
obligations of non-debtors.  Thus, according to this response, while Energy 
Resources supports the broad view of §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), it does not 
sanction an interpretation of those laws under which bankruptcy courts have 
sufficient power to issue non-debtor releases. 
This argument is unpersuasive for three reasons.  First, there is a 
fundamental reason why the courts in the bankruptcies of Energy Resources 
and Newport did not attempt to enjoin the IRS’s tax collection efforts, even 
temporarily: the Tax Anti-Injunction Act explicitly prohibits such an order.  
That law provides, with a few minor exceptions, that “no suit for the purpose 
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom 
such tax was assessed.”561  Courts have almost uniformly concluded that this 
statute prohibits a bankruptcy court from using its equitable power to enjoin 
the IRS’s pursuit of responsible persons for trust fund taxes.562  And some 
expressly found that Energy Resources does not provide otherwise.563  
 
 560 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 550–51 (1990). 
 561 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2000). 
 562 See, e.g., LaSalle Rolling Mills, Inc. v. United States (In re LaSalle Rolling Mills, Inc.), 832 F.2d 390, 
392–94 (7th Cir. 1987) (Tax Anti-Injunction Act bars a bankruptcy court from using its powers under 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000) to prevent the IRS from collecting trust fund taxes from a responsible person); A to Z 
Welding & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 803 F.2d 932, 933 (8th Cir. 1986) (§ 7421 prohibits a bankruptcy court 
from restraining the IRS from collecting trust fund taxes from a responsible person); Ray Stevens Paving Co. 
v. United States (In re Ray Stevens Paving Co.), 145 B.R. 647, 650 (D. Ariz. 1992) (same); see also 2 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.02[3][e][ii], at 105-17 to 105-18 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996) 
(“[t]he majority of cases to consider the issue have found that Section 7421(a) prevents a court from enjoining 
government collection efforts against nondebtors[,]” including responsible persons).  In fact, the First Circuit 
recognized this principle in Energy Resources.  IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 
233 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing tax anti-junction decisions in support of the proposition that “so long as there is 
‘trust fund’ tax debt outstanding, nothing, including our opinion today, legally restrains the IRS from 
attempting to collect ‘trust fund’ taxes from ‘responsible’ individuals”), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990). 
 563 See In re Laminating, Inc., 148 B.R. 259, 262 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (concluding that Energy 
Resources does not provide any authority for overriding the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, particularly since the 
Supreme Court ruled “that its holding is actually in harmony with the tax code, as opposed to overriding the 
tax code provisions”) (emphasis removed); Ray Stevens Paving Co. v. United States (In re Ray Stevens Paving 
Co.), 145 B.R. 647, 650 (D. Ariz. 1992) (same); see also Steven C. Bennett, The Bankruptcy Code and the 
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However, the power of bankruptcy courts to issue injunctions outside the tax 
context is not restricted by an anti-injunction statute.  And a specific limitation 
on the authority of courts to restrain the IRS in the collection of taxes provides 
no guidance as to whether non-debtor claims of other creditors may be 
enjoined or released. 
Second, tax allocation orders have important similarities to third-party 
releases. To begin with, both permit the modification of non-debtor 
obligations.  The tax allocation orders upheld by the Supreme Court 
circumscribed the IRS’s ability to collect deficiencies from third parties.  In the 
absence of a tax allocation order, a responsible person is effectively a 
guarantor of the debtor’s entire tax liability.564  But with such an order, the 
responsible person only serves as a guarantor of the debtor’s trust fund taxes.  
Once those debts are paid, the IRS no longer has an alternative source of 
recovery in the event the debtor defaults on further plan duties.565  As the First 
Circuit summarized, “[T]he effect of [a tax allocation order] is to diminish the 
IRS’s ability . . . to obtain” full recovery on all tax debts,566 and to assist the 
responsible persons by decreasing “the likelihood that they will end up having 
personally to pay the ‘trust fund’ tax debts that the corporation owes.”567  
Likewise, a channeling release reduces a creditor’s odds of recovering in full 
by limiting its ability to pursue the parties shielded by the release.568  However, 
while both tax allocation orders and channeling releases reduce a creditor’s 
chances of receiving payment by restricting the sources from which the 
creditor may recover,569 neither actually abrogates the creditor’s legal right to 
payment.  Creditors impacted by a non-debtor release must receive payment in 
full unless the debtor’s plan of reorganization fails.570  Similarly, tax 
 
Anti-Injunction Act: Collectibility of Employment Tax Liabilities from Nondebtor “Responsible Persons”, 48 
TAX LAW. 349, 368–69 (1995) (arguing that Energy Resources does not undercut the decisions holding that 
the Tax Anti-Injunction Act bars the bankruptcy court from stopping the IRS’s attempts to collect trust fund 
taxes from responsible persons). 
 564 Energy Res. Co., 871 F.2d at 232. 
 565 See id. at 225 (noting that the IRS may not seek reimbursement from responsible persons for nontrust 
fund taxes, such as corporate income taxes). 
 566 Id. at 233. 
 567 Id. at 225 (emphasis removed). 
 568 See supra Part III.C; see also supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussion of channeling 
releases in the taxonomy section); supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text (comparison of channeling 
releases and provisional injunctions in the taxonomy section). 
 569 See In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 9 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (observing that in cases involving 
channeling releases, “[t]he claimants were not prevented from litigating their claims or from being full 
compensated; only the source of compensation was limited”) (emphasis added). 
 570 See supra notes 348–51 and accompanying text. 
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designations may not be used to reduce the IRS’s recovery under a chapter 11 
plan, unless the debtor defaults on its reorganization obligations.571  Finally, at 
least one court has observed that a tax allocation order is “the functional 
equivalent of a discharge for specific debts”572—i.e., a release.  Indeed, the 
district court in the Newport bankruptcy described the tax designation 
provision in the debtor’s plan as “exculpatory.”573  Given the parallels between 
tax allocation orders and third-party releases, the fact that the former do not 
actually extinguish claims is not a critical difference. 
Third, nothing in Energy Resources suggests that tax designation orders fall 
at the outer boundaries of a bankruptcy court’s authority under §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6).  If anything, the decision implies that the equitable powers 
conferred by the Code stretch well beyond the capacity to grant that type of 
relief.  The Supreme Court’s analysis of whether §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) 
permit bankruptcy judges to designate tax payments consisted of a single 
sentence.  After quoting the two equitable statutes, the Court summarily 
concluded that those laws “are consistent with the traditional understanding 
that bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify 
creditor-debtor relationships.”574  That was the High Court’s entire discussion 
of whether §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) provide bankruptcy courts with the power 
to allocate tax payments.575  Immediately thereafter, the Court turned to 
whether tax designation orders conflict with other provisions of the Code or 
nonbankruptcy law.576  If the Justices had thought that such orders are near the 
periphery of a bankruptcy court’s equitable authority, they likely would have 
presented far more analysis of §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6). 
While the objection to non-debtor releases based on the limited nature of 
tax allocation orders fails, it should be noted that a number of courts have tried 
to confine the impact of Energy Resources by interpreting its holding 
 
 571 See infra notes 580, 587, and accompanying text. 
 572 Wetherbee v. Willow Lane, Inc. (In re Bestway Products, Inc.), 151 B.R. 530, 538 n.27 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 1993) (citing Energy Resources for the proposition that “it may be permissible in extraordinary 
circumstances to approve the functional equivalent of a discharge for specific debts for someone other than the 
debtor pursuant to an order confirming a chapter 11 plan of reorganization”), aff’d, 165 B.R. 339 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1994). 
 573 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 8 (apparently quoting a transcript of the district court’s ruling 
from the bench). 
 574 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990). 
 575 Id. 
 576 Id. at 549–51. 
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narrowly.577  For example, the Supreme Court ruled that tax designation orders 
are permissible if “necessary to the success of a reorganization plan.”578  
Strictly construing this language, several courts have held that allocation is 
impermissible where the debtor is liquidating under either chapter 7 or chapter 
11 because a designation in those contexts is not essential to a plan of 
reorganization.579  And some decisions refused allocations where the effect 
was to diminish the IRS’s total recovery from the debtor.580  Commentators 
have also embraced a restrictive interpretation of Energy Resources.581 
 
 577 See, e.g., United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 129–30 (3d Cir. 1992) (“The vast majority of 
courts that have addressed the issue of the scope of the Energy Resources decision have declined to extend its 
application beyond the Chapter 11 reorganization context.”) (collecting authorities); In re T. Craft Aviation 
Serv., Inc., 187 B.R. 703, 710 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (“Circuit-level cases applying U.S. v Energy Resources, Inc. 
have read it strictly and applied it narrowly, so as to favor IRS as against corporate debtors-in-possession and 
their tax-dodging principals.”) (collecting authorities); In re Burgess, 171 B.R. 227, 229 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
1994) (“Courts which have interpreted Energy Resources have basically limited the holding to its facts.”) 
(collecting authorities); see also Kimberly Ann De Bias, Draining the Power of Energy Resources: Subsequent 
Case Law Preserves the Utility of I.R.C. § 6672, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 544 (1992) (“However, subsequent 
courts’ decisions addressing the issue of designation of tax payments in bankruptcy situations have been 
reluctant to apply Energy Resources and have limited the decision largely to its facts.”). 
 578 Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 548–49 (emphasis added). 
 579 See, e.g., United States v. Kare Kemical, Inc. (In re Kare Kemical, Inc.), 935 F.2d 243, 244 (11th Cir. 
1991) (holding that Energy Resources does not apply to chapter 11 liquidations because any allocations in that 
context are not necessary for the success of a reorganization); Sonntag v. United States (In re Equip. 
Fabricators, Inc.), 127 B.R. 854, 858 (D. Ariz. 1991) (same); In re Gregory Engine & Mach. Servs., Inc., 135 
B.R. 807, 810 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that the power to allocate tax payments may not be exercised 
in chapter 7 bankruptcies because any such designation will not facilitate a reorganization by the debtor); 
Milligan v. Davis (In re C.J. Milligan, Inc.), 252 B.R. 465, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2000) (same); see also 
United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 130 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing that the majority of decisions have 
limited the power to allocate to chapter 11 reorganizations because “the Court in Energy Resources 
consistently linked its holding with the fact of reorganization and the debtor’s need for rehabilitation”); In re 
Laminating, Inc., 148 B.R. 259, 261 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (noting that the majority of cases have restricted 
Energy Resources to reorganizations because of that decision’s emphasis on allocation “as a tool to aid in 
rehabilitating a debtor, a rationale that is not present in liquidation proceedings”). 
 580 See, e.g., Burgess, 171 B.R. at 230 (denying allocation of tax payments to older tax years and penalties 
requested in a chapter 13 reorganization where the effect would have been to discharge a greater portion of the 
IRS’s claim); In re Baker, No. 95-30947 HCD, 1996 WL 571764, at *8-*10 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Jul. 2, 1996) 
(holding that, while Energy Resources extends to chapter 13 reorganizations, allocation of payments to more 
recent tax years was not permissible here because it would discharge a greater portion of the IRS’s claim 
against the debtors); see also IRS v. Kaplan (In re Kaplan), 104 F.3d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
court in the bankruptcies of two responsible persons could not order the IRS to allocate payments made by the 
corporate employer to trust fund taxes first where the employer itself was not in bankruptcy); id. at 598 (ruling 
that the bankruptcy court could not retroactively designate to trust fund taxes the corporate employer’s 
payments to the IRS made before it entered bankruptcy). 
 581 See, e.g., Camp, supra note 533, at 329 (contending that Energy Resources should not be extended to 
chapter 11 liquidations and that ex post facto allocations should also be prohibited); Tal Marnin, Note, Trust 
Fund Taxes in Chapter 11 Liquidations: A Challenge to Energy Resources, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 231, 
235 (1995) (“This Note concludes that Energy Resources should be narrowly construed so as to apply only to 
true Chapter 11 reorganizations . . . .”). 
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However, other courts have adopted an expansive understanding, focusing 
upon the Supreme Court’s embrace of “the traditional understanding that 
bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-
debtor relationships.”582  These courts are critical of any attempt to draw a 
bright line between reorganizations and other bankruptcy proceedings.583  
Decisions in this line have extended the allocation power to liquidations under 
chapter 11584 and even chapter 7.585 
Fortunately, I do not need not take sides in this ongoing debate.  As noted 
above, I do not believe that non-debtor releases are permissible when the 
 
 582 Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 549.  See, e.g., In re T. Craft Aviation Serv., Inc., 187 B.R. 703, 709 (Bankr. 
N.D. Okla. 1995) (“The Supreme Court never stated that ‘orders of the type here’ were permissible only where 
‘necessary to ensure the success of [a] reorganization.’  A fair reading of the case is that Bankruptcy Courts 
may make allocation orders in various circumstances as part of their ‘broad authority to modify debtor-creditor 
relationships,’ for example to ensure the ‘success of a reorganization . . . .”’); In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 
980 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (“[I]n the absence of a prohibitive provision of the Bankruptcy Code, this court 
remains directed to give overriding consideration to equitable principles [reflected in § 105(a)].”) (citing, inter 
alia, Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 549). 
 583 See, e.g., T. Craft Aviation Serv., 187 B.R. at 709–10 (criticizing decisions ruling that the “only basis 
for an allocation order is necessity to success of a reorganization plan” in light of the fact that the Supreme 
Court “spoke in much more general terms of the ‘broad residual authority’ of the Bankruptcy Court”); In re 
Flo-Lizer, Inc., 164 B.R. 79, 82 (Bankr. S.D. Oho 1993) (disagreeing with those courts that have read Energy 
Resources narrowly and holding that the Supreme Court did not draw a “bright line between a non-liquidating 
Chapter 11 plan, and all other bankruptcy proceedings”), aff’d, 164 B.R. 749 (S.D. Ohio 1994).  Admittedly, 
some judges have adopted this construction reluctantly.  See, e.g., T. Craft Aviation Serv., 187 B.R. at 709–10 
(“Although the Supreme Court’s opinion supports the ‘broad authority’ of Bankruptcy Courts, it endorses a 
questionable use of such authority.”). 
 584 See, e.g., United States v. Deer Park, Inc. (In re Deer Park, Inc.), 136 B.R. 815, 818 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1992) (“We hold that the Energy Resources decision applies to a Chapter 11 liquidating plan as it is a valid 
form of reorganization provided for in the reorganization chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.”), aff’d, 10 F.3d 
1478 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Flo-Lizer, Inc., 164 B.R. 79, 82 (Bankr. S.D. Oho 1993) (holding that Energy 
Resources applies to chapter 11 liquidations), aff’d, 164 B.R. 749 (S.D. Ohio 1994).  In Flo-Lizer, the court 
granted an allocation of tax payments because the responsible persons agreed to continue working for the 
debtor without compensation, waived their priority wage claims, and contributed “significant personal assets” 
to the debtor’s liquidating chapter 11 plan.  Id.  Without this assistance, the debtor would have been forced into 
chapter 7 where the distributions to creditors would have been minimal.  Id. at 81. The judge thus concluded 
that the allocation was necessary to the success of the liquidating plan and therefore justified under the Code.  
Id. at 82. The Flo-Lizer court did, however, emphasize “the limited and unique circumstances here that call for 
the allowance of the requested designation.  Most liquidating chapter 11 proceedings would not fit within the 
parameters required to allow for such a ruling.”  Id. at 82; see also Deer Park, 136 B.R. at 819 (granting an 
allocation of payments to trust fund taxes where the responsible person, in reliance upon the designation, 
provided services to the debtor necessary to the success of the chapter 11 liquidating plan). 
 585 See, e.g., T. Craft Aviation Serv., 187 B.R. at 710 (holding that under Energy Resources bankruptcy 
courts have the authority to allocate tax payments in chapter 7 bankruptcies, but that such a designation was 
inappropriate in this case); see also United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 130 (3d Cir. 1992) (leaving 
open the possibility that allocation may be permissible in a chapter 7 case if it can be shown that the 
designation is “necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the” Code under § 105(a)). 
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debtor is liquidating.586  And the cases barring tax designation orders that 
decrease the IRS’s total recovery are consistent with the prohibition on actual 
releases that I endorsed earlier—third-party releases are impermissible when 
the impacted creditors are not promised payment in full on the extinguished 
claims.587 
In short, the limitations that some authorities have placed on Energy 
Resources are simply irrelevant to the validity of non-debtor releases in chapter 
11 reorganizations where the modified Master Mortgage test is satisfied. 
3. The Equitable Authority of Bankruptcy Courts to Allocate the Risk of 
Plan Failure 
There is one, final anti-release argument based upon the two equitable 
statutes that must be addressed before I may conclude that §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) provide bankruptcy courts with sufficient power to issue third-party 
releases.  According to this objection, even if the broad view of §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) is correct, non-debtor releases do not comport with equity because 
they place the risk of plan failure on the releasing creditor rather than the 
benefiting non-debtor.588  Therefore, a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers 
only permit the issuance of provisional injunctions; non-debtor releases are 
prohibited.589 
However, in Energy Resources, the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy 
courts may use the equitable authority granted by §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) to 
issue orders that shift the risk of plan default from a third party to a creditor.590  
The High Court also ruled that such orders are permissible whenever it is 
 
 586 See supra notes 333–38 and accompanying text. 
 587 Tax allocation orders that decrease the IRS’s recovery potentially violate the “best-interests” test of 
§ 1129(a)(7) because they effectively discharge tax liabilities that the government would otherwise recover if 
the debtor liquidated.  Cf. In re Senise, 202 B.R. 403, 410 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (“The Supreme Court 
specifically limited its holding to the facts by stating that the designation order does not compromise the 
Government’s right under the Bankruptcy Code to be assured that its full tax claim will be paid off in six 
years.”); In re Burgess, 171 B.R. 227, 230 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (“Energy Resources should not be 
interpreted as enlarging a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers to include the avoidance of a tax liability 
‘which would in the ordinary course of things be nondischargeable.’”) (quoting In re Lambert, 124 B.R. 345, 
347 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991)); In re Baker, No. 95-30947 HCD, 1996 WL 571764, at *8-*10 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ind. Jul. 2, 1996) (same). 
 588 As noted previously, plans of reorganization containing channeling releases generally do not guarantee 
that creditors impacted by the release will receive payment in full on their claims.  See supra notes 77–78 and 
accompanying text; see generally supra Part III.C. 
 589 See supra Part III.C. 
 590 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 548–50 (1990). 
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necessary to the success of a reorganization.591  Energy Resources thus 
undermines the contention that non-debtor releases improperly shift the risk of 
plan failure from non-debtors to creditors and demonstrates that this type of 
relief is entirely equitable. 
Tax allocation orders decrease the likelihood that the IRS will receive 
payment in full because they mandate that liabilities guaranteed by a third 
party—the liabilities for trust fund taxes—be extinguished first.592  Should the 
plan fail after the debtor has paid its trust fund taxes, but before all nontrust 
fund tax debts are satisfied, the IRS has no alternative source from which to 
recover its deficiency.593  In the absence of a tax designation order, however, 
the IRS may apply the debtor’s chapter 11 payments to the nonguaranteed 
liabilities first.  This application protects the IRS because, if the debtor 
defaults, the responsible person remains liable for any outstanding trust fund 
taxes.  Therefore, tax allocation orders shift the risk of plan failure from the 
guarantors of the debtor’s tax obligations (responsible persons) to the IRS by 
circumscribing the government’s ability to pursue the guarantors in the event 
of a default.594 
Non-debtor releases have precisely the same effect in comparison to 
provisional injunctions—they decrease the likelihood that a creditor will 
receive payment in full by permanently barring the creditor from pursuing a 
co-obligor of the debtor rather than merely restraining the creditor from such 
action temporarily or until the debtor defaults.595  To illustrate, the channeling 
release in Robins prevented the Dalkon Shield claimants from attempting to 
recover against the debtor’s coliable joint tort-feasors.596  If the A.H. Robins 
plan had failed before the tort creditors received full payment for their injuries, 
the creditors would have possessed no alternative source of recovery.  But if 
the plan had merely contained a provisional injunction, the Dalkon Shield 
claimants could have pursued other parties responsible for their injuries in the 
 
 591 Id. at 549. 
 592 Id. at 550. 
 593 Id. 
 594 See id. at 548–50. 
 595 Channeling non-debtor releases may also extinguish independent claims against third parties and 
transfer the responsibility of payment to the debtor.  But generally channeling releases involve a debtor and a 
third party that are co-obligors.  See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 596 See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 700–01 (4th Cir. 1989); see also 
In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. 396, 415–16 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (the debtor’s plan contained a non-debtor 
release that barred purchasers of silicone breast implants from suing the debtor’s shareholders, who were 
alleged to be joint tort-feasors with Dow Corning). 
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event of a default.  Thus, by including a channeling non-debtor release instead 
of a provisional injunction, the A.H. Robins plan of reorganization transferred 
the risk of plan failure from third parties to creditors, just like the tax allocation 
orders in Energy Resources. 
In sum, the type of risk shifting endorsed by Energy Resources is nearly 
identical to that which takes place if a non-debtor release is contained in a 
chapter 11 plan rather than a provisional injunction.  And the Supreme Court 
held that it is appropriate to reallocate risk in this manner when such action is 
necessary to the success of a reorganization.597  Therefore, the argument that 
channeling releases are inequitable must be rejected.  A bankruptcy court’s 
power under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) is not limited to the issuance of 
provisional injunctions. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court ignored the contention of Newport and 
the Energy Resources trustee that subjecting the IRS to the possibility of plan 
failure is sanctioned by § 1129(a)(9)(C)598—the statute that allowed a 
reorganizing debtor to pay its taxes within six years from the date of 
assessment.599  The Supreme Court apparently found no need to rely upon that 
provision and instead focused entirely on §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) in 
assessing whether it is equitable to shift the risk of plan default from a non-
debtor to a creditor.600  This thwarts any counterargument that it is permissible 
to alter the risk of plan failure only in the tax context where § 1129(a)(9)(C) is 
applicable. 
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court disregarded the respondents’ 
§ 1129(a)(9)(C) defense of tax allocation orders.  First, debtors are generally 
permitted to pay their creditors over extended periods of time lasting well 
beyond six years.601  Section 1129(a)(9)(C) thus grants the IRS a privilege 
most other creditors do not receive—all of its claims must be paid within six 
years of the date the taxes were assessed.602  In effect, § 1129(a)(9)(C) is 
intended to reduce the level of risk that may be imposed on the government in 
 
 597 See Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 546, 549. 
 598 See Respondents Brief, supra note 491, at 38; Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 546–51. 
 599 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (2000).  See supra note 430 for a discussion of a recent amendment to this 
statute. 
 600 Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 549. 
 601 See, e.g., In re McCall, No. 93-00632, 1997 WL 428580, at *3, *16 (Bankr. D.D.C. May 27, 1997) 
(creditors impacted by the channeling release scheduled to receive distributions over eight- or ten-year 
periods); In re Master Mortgage Invest. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 932 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (plan provided 
creditors would be paid over twenty years). 
 602 § 1129(a)(9)(C).  See supra note 430 for a discussion of a recent amendment to this statute. 
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a plan of reorganization.  It would be strange to interpret a statute designed to 
provide the IRS with additional protection as authorizing orders that actually 
lessen the government’s chances of recovery. Second, to the extent 
§ 1129(a)(9)(C) does apportion risk to the IRS, it does so in a manner that is 
entirely distinct from the way that tax designation orders do.  The statute 
permits a chapter 11 debtor to pay the IRS over time.  But tax allocations limit 
the IRS’s ability to pursue third parties.  Moreover, § 1129(a)(9)(C) shifts risk 
from the debtor to the IRS.  Allocation orders, in contrast, move risk from non-
debtors to the government.  Accordingly, as the Supreme Court correctly 
implied, § 1129(a)(9)(C) cannot be read as supporting the bankruptcy court’s 
authority to grant tax designations.  The power to shift the risk of plan failure 
approved of in Energy Resources flows solely from §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6). 
With the defeat of the final anti-release objection centered on §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6), it is now clear that the pro-release authorities are correct about the 
scope of a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers—they are sufficiently broad to 
permit the granting of channeling non-debtor releases.  But §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) may not be used in a manner that conflicts with another provision 
of the Code.  And the most well-accepted argument against non-debtor releases 
is that they are prohibited by § 524(e).  It is to this argument that I now turn. 
B. Energy Resources and § 524 
The majority of anti-release courts, as well as several commentators, 
believe that the language of § 524(e) prohibits non-debtor releases.603  Several 
of these authorities bolster their conclusion by reference to practice under prior 
laws604 and to what they perceive to be the policy behind § 524(e)—that 
bankruptcy only offers protection to debtors willing to submit fully to the 
jurisdiction of the system.605  Pro-release courts and commentators counter that 
the express words of § 524(e) merely identify the impact of the debtor’s 
discharge; the statute says nothing about the power of a bankruptcy judge to 
extinguish claims via an independent order issued pursuant to § 105(a) or 
§ 1123(b)(6).606  Given the statute’s clear language, previous versions of 
§ 524(e) and any policies underlying that provision are simply irrelevant.607  
 
 603 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 604 See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
 605 See supra notes 195–204 and accompanying text. 
 606 See supra notes 278–80 and accompanying text. 
 607 See supra notes 281–83 and accompanying text. 
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Pro-release authorities thus conclude that § 524(e) does not bar third-party 
releases. 
Energy Resources provides the answer yet again.  That case establishes that 
the Supreme Court’s “plain-meaning” approach to statutory interpretation 
applies when considering whether an order issued under the equitable statutes 
conflicts with a more specific provision of the Code.  Therefore, since the clear 
language of § 524(e) fails to prohibit or even address non-debtor releases, the 
statute does not bar such relief. 
Supreme Court precedent firmly settles that if the words of a statute are 
clear, the provision must be understood according to its plain meaning.608  The 
Court has consistently used this interpretive approach in construing the 
Bankruptcy Code.609  And it did so in Energy Resources. 
There, the IRS contended that tax allocation orders conflict with three 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.610  The first, § 507(a)(8), grants priority 
status to various tax claims.611  The second, § 523(a)(1)(A), makes such 
priority claims nondischargeable in the bankruptcy of an individual debtor: “A 
discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title 
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt for a tax or a customs 
duty of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) 
 
 608 See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (“[W]hen the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is 
not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)); U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of 
America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454 (1993) (“A statute’s plain meaning must be enforced . . . .”); Connecticut 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must 
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.  When the 
words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.”) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 609 See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established that ‘when the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is 
not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 6)) 
(construing various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code); Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 240–41 (“[A]s long as 
the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the 
plain language of the statute.”) (holding that the language of 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000) with respect to 
postpetition interest for oversecured creditors is sufficiently clear to avoid referring to legislative history); id. 
at 242 (“The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters.’”) (quoting 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
 610 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 32–33; Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 14. 
 611 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2000). 
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of this title . . . .”612  And the third, § 1129(a)(9)(C), required that the holder of 
a priority tax claim receive payment in a chapter 11 case within six years of the 
date of assessment: 
[W]ith respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of 
this title, the holder of such claim will receive on account of such 
claim deferred cash payments, over a period not exceeding six years 
after the date of assessment of such claim, of a value, as of the 
effective date of the [chapter 11] plan, equal to the allowed amount 
of such claim.613 
These statutes, however, say nothing about the allocation of tax payments.  As 
the Supreme Court elucidated, 
It is evident that these restrictions on a bankruptcy court’s authority 
do not preclude the court from issuing orders of the type at issue 
here, for those restrictions do not address the bankruptcy court’s 
ability to designate whether tax payments are to be applied to trust 
fund or non-trust-fund tax liabilities.614 
In other words, since nothing in the language of §§ 507(a)(8), 523(a)(1)(A), 
and 1129(a)(9)(C) concerned the allocation of tax payments, those provisions 
do not forbid tax designation orders. 
Comparable reasoning is applicable to the asserted conflict between 
§ 524(e) and non-debtor releases issued under § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6).  
Section 524(e) states that the “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect 
the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such 
debt.”615  Like the specific provisions in Energy Resources, this statute says 
nothing about the allegedly contradictory use of the equitable statutes; § 524(e) 
makes no mention of third-party releases.  Instead, as explained by many pro-
release (and even a few anti-release) authorities, the plain language of the 
legislation simply identifies the impact of the debtor’s discharge—the 
discharge, by itself, does not “affect the liability” of any third party.  Section 
 
 612 § 523(a)(1)(A). 
 613 § 1129(a)(9)(C).  See supra note 430 for a discussion of a recent amendment to this statute. 
 614 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 550 (1990); accord Energy Res. Co. v. IRS (In re 
Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 231 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[N]othing in the bankruptcy statute limits, in any 
relevant way, the bankruptcy court’s power to allocate [payments] when the creditor is the IRS.”), aff’d, 495 
U.S. 545 (1990). 
 615 § 524(e). 
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524(e) leaves open the prospect of orders, independent of the discharge, that 
otherwise affect the liability of non-debtors.616 
At least two decisions from anti-release jurisdictions—more specifically, 
from jurisdictions in which courts have found that § 524(e) prohibits third-
party releases—concede that § 524(e) does not expressly bar non-debtor 
releases.617  Perhaps that is why a number of anti-release authorities attempted 
to reinforce their position by highlighting (1) the operation of § 524(e)’s 
predecessors under the Bankruptcy Act, and (2) what they contend is the policy 
behind the statute.618  On the latter point, anti-release courts and commentators 
assert that the elimination of debts, the primary form of bankruptcy relief, 
should only be available to parties that file for bankruptcy—i.e., to parties that 
grant the courts full authority over their financial affairs.619  When a court 
eliminates the liabilities of non-debtors, it provides this cardinal bankruptcy 
remedy without demanding that the beneficiary observe the Code’s parallel 
obligations,620 upsetting the “careful balance between . . . debtor’s rights      
and . . . creditor’s rights that Congress struck in creating the bankruptcy  
system . . . .”621 
However, the IRS made a virtually identical structural argument in Energy 
Resources, contending that tax allocation orders disrupt “the balance struck by 
 
 616 See supra notes 278–83 and accompanying text. 
 617 In Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit stated that § 524(e) 
“does not by its specific words preclude” third-party releases.  Id. at 1050 (further concluding that res judicata 
barred any contention that the third-party release at issue was invalid).  However, subsequently the same court 
held that the statute does prohibit such relief.  See Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 760 (5th 
Cir. 1995).  Similarly, while the Tenth Circuit ruled that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases in 1990, see 
Landsing Div. Properties-II v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 
F.2d 592, 601–02 (10th Cir. 1990), a district court within that circuit subsequently offered an alternative 
understanding of the statute, see In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 10 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (“This Court does 
not believe that Section 524(e) was intended to prohibit [non-debtor] releases.  Rather, Section 524(e) was 
intended to insure that co-debtors or guarantors (who are not debtors in the bankruptcy case), and their 
property, are not automatically released from the debt or guaranty upon the discharge of a debtor, and that 
rights of creditors are not impaired by the debtor’s discharge.”) (emphasis removed).  The district court 
ultimately concluded that non-debtor releases are invalid in light of the narrow view of § 105(a).  For a fuller 
discussion of Digital Impact, see supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text; see also Keene Corp. v. Acstar 
Ins. Co. (In re Keene Corp.), 162 B.R. 935, 947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Although Section 524(e) speaks in 
terms of ‘discharge’, [sic] its scope is greater.”) (ruling that § 524(e) prohibits bankruptcy court orders that 
prevent creditors from enforcing disallowed and subordinated claims against guarantors, sureties and escrows). 
 618 See supra notes 175, 195–204, and accompanying text. 
 619 See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text. 
 620 See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 621 Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 761 (D. Utah 
1985); see also supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. 
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Congress” in §§ 507(a)(8), 523(a)(1)(A), 1129(a)(9)(C) and elsewhere in the 
Code concerning tax collection and competing bankruptcy policies.622  And the 
Energy Resources Court offered a concise rebuttal to this position: while a 
prohibition on tax designation orders “might be desirable from the 
Government’s standpoint, it is an added protection not specified in the Code 
itself.”623  Once again, the plain language of the Code controlled.  Similarly, 
given the clear wording of § 524(e), there is no need to consider either 
§ 524(e)’s policies or its antecedents; a prohibition on non-debtor releases is 
“not specified” in that statute. 
It is true that some pro-release authorities criticized the anti-release position 
with respect to § 524(e) by observing that the Supreme Court generally takes a 
plain-meaning approach to the Code.624  But these authorities overlooked 
Energy Resources.  The significance of that case is this: Energy Resources 
demonstrates that the plain-meaning approach applies in precisely the 
circumstances of the non-debtor release debate—when courts address whether 
specific sections of the Bankruptcy Code limit the equitable powers conferred 
by §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6).  In fact, the High Court used the same 
interpretive methodology in addressing whether tax allocation orders 
contravene the nonbankruptcy statute at issue in that case.  In response to the 
government’s contention that tax designations conflict with § 6672 of the 
Internal Revenue Code625 because they permit debtors to pay their 
nonguaranteed liabilities first, the Court simply offered this: “§ 6672, by its 
terms, does not protect against this eventuality.”626  In short, Energy Resources 
lends considerable additional weight to the pro-release understanding of 
§ 524(e). 
While a plain-meaning approach to the relationship of §§ 105(a), 
1123(b)(6), and 524(e) supports the legitimacy of non-debtor releases, such a 
methodology might be invalid if it led to an absurd result.627  Thus, for 
example, if the pro-release construction of § 524(e) made the statute pointless 
or redundant, recourse to extra-textual sources would be appropriate.  But the 
pro-release interpretation is entirely reasonable.  Under that reading, § 524(e)’s 
 
 622 Reply Brief, supra note 459, at 12–13; accord Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 438, at 32–33. 
 623 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 550 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 624 See supra notes 281–82 and accompanying text. 
 625 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2000). 
 626 Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added). 
 627 See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (“[W]hen the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is 
not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
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purpose is to prevent the release of co-obligors by operation of law.  As noted 
in the general introduction to § 524,628 without § 524(e), the debtor’s discharge 
might automatically extinguish claims of guarantors and other co-obligors 
under nonbankruptcy law governing suretyship, which provides that the release 
of a primary obligor discharges any party that is secondarily liable.629  
Bankruptcy would therefore severely undermine the effectiveness of 
contractual guaranties, among other detrimental results.  Section 524(e) 
prevents any such outcome. 
One commentator disputes this reasoning.  Section 524(a) specifies that a 
discharge only (1) voids judgments that establish “personal liability of the 
debtor,” and (2) enjoins efforts to recover claims “as a personal liability of the 
debtor.”630  Peter Meltzer contends, therefore, that § 524(e) is redundant on the 
pro-release understanding; § 524(a) already limits the impact of the discharge 
to the debtor in bankruptcy.631  But § 524(a) is not sufficiently specific.  
Subsection (a) says nothing that would prevent nonbankruptcy law from 
treating the discharge of the debtor as a release of a co-obligor; it simply does 
not discuss the possible indirect impacts of the discharge on third parties 
pursuant to other law.  That is why § 524(e) is necessary.  It expressly 
overrides any federal or state legal principles that would exculpate third parties 
in light of the debtor’s discharge: “[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not 
affect the liability of any other entity on . . . such debt.”632 
 
 628 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 629 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 971–72 & n.46 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND 
GUARANTY §§ 39-44 & intro. note, at 167 (1996)); accord Feldstein, supra note 27, at 30 (“[W]ithout section 
524(e), the discharge of a principal obligor in bankruptcy might be construed to exonerate a guarantor or to 
provide other suretyship defenses under applicable state law . . . .”); see also In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 
B.R. 1, 10 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (“Section 524(e) was intended to insure that co-debtors or guarantors . . . are not 
automatically released from the debt or guaranty upon the discharge of a debtor . . . .”) (emphasis removed). 
 630 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1), (2) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 631 Meltzer, supra note 27, at 8–10. 
 632 § 524(e) (emphasis added); see also Feldstein, supra note 27, at 30 (“[S]ection 524(e) makes clear that 
the discharge afforded the debtor/principal obligor under section 524(a) was not intended to benefit or affect 
the liabilities of third parties for the obligations of the debtor.”). 
Meltzer also contends that reading § 524(e) to permit releases is inconsistent with the broad view of 
§ 105(a): “Paradoxically, this . . . requires simultaneously a narrow approach to § 524(e) and a broad approach 
to § 105(a).”  Meltzer, supra note 27, at 22 n.69.  But the Energy Resources Court adopted just such a 
“paradoxical” approach to the Code when it embraced the broad view of §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) and a strict 
construction of §§ 507(a)(8), 523(a)(1)(A), and 1129(a)(9)(C).  See United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 
545, 549–50 (1990).  The Court’s interpretive conclusions are well-justified.  Like § 524(e), §§ 507(a)(8), 
523(a)(1), and 1129(a)(9)(C) are narrowly drafted provisions.  Sections 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), on the other 
hand, are not.  Section 105(a), in particular, provides that bankruptcy courts “may issue any order, process or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”  § 105(a) (emphasis added).  
This wording is exceedingly broad.  See Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors 
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When interpreted through the lens of the Supreme Court’s plain-meaning 
approach, § 524(e) does not bar third-party releases.  The statute simply 
contains no prohibitory language.  Accordingly, the last of the primary issues 
concerning the validity of non-debtor releases must be decided in favor of the 
pro-release position. 
My analysis is not complete, however.  Two additional arguments warrant 
consideration.  The first is a challenge to third-party releases based upon 
§ 524(a) (as opposed to § 524(e)), and is addressed immediately below.  The 
second is a counterargument that flows from the language of Energy Resources 
itself and is presented in Part V.C. 
In American Hardwoods, the Ninth Circuit used § 524(a) to support its 
conclusion that non-debtor releases are forbidden.  The release sought in that 
case took the form of a permanent injunction.633  The court ruled that the 
requested injunction was indistinguishable from a discharge: “A discharge 
under section 524(a)(2) does not void ab initio a liability.  Rather, section 524 
constructs a legal bar to its recovery.  A discharge is in effect a special type of 
 
(In re Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors For Dornier Aviation, N.A., Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 
2006) (“In light of the broad language of § 105(a) . . . .”); Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd., 
Inc.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that § 105(a) contains “broad, general language”); 2 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01, at 105-5 to 105-6 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (“Section 
105(a) is an omnibus provision phrased in such general terms as to be the basis for a broad exercise of power 
in the administration of a bankruptcy case.”).  As the Eleventh Circuit has explained: 
[Section] 105 uses the broad term “any” which encompasses all forms of orders including those 
that award monetary relief.  The term “any” should be given this broad construction under the 
“settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has 
some operative effect.”  United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (parallel 
citations omitted).  The broad term “any” is only limited to those orders that are “necessary or 
appropriate” to carry out the Bankruptcy Code.  Therefore, the plain meaning of § 105(a) 
encompasses any type of order, whether injunctive, compensative, or punitive, as long as it is 
“necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Bankruptcy Code. 
In re Jove Engineering, Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1554 (11th Cir. 1996).  The provision is so expansive that 
courts hesitate to give full effect to its “literal breadth.”  See 641 Assoc., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. 
(In re 641 Assoc., Ltd.), Bankr. No. 91-11234S, Adv. Nos. 93-0363S, 93-0456S, 1993 WL 332646, at *7 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1993) (“Despite the possible interpretation of the literal breadth of [§ 105(a)] to 
allow a bankruptcy court to do anything, even sua sponte, irrespective of state law, federal law, or other Code 
provisions to the contrary . . . , applicable case authority has limited the powers of the bankruptcy court under 
this Code section.”); accord Noonan v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv. (In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc.), 124 
F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Although expansively phrased, § 105(a) affords bankruptcy courts considerably 
less discretion than first meets the eye . . . .”).  Accordingly, there is no “paradox” in reading § 524(e) narrowly 
and §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) expansively. 
 633 Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 622 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
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permanent injunction.  [Debtor] seeks the same.”634  Therefore, “the specific 
provisions of section 524 displace the court’s equitable powers under section 
105 to order the permanent relief sought by American [Hardwoods].”635 
While no other decision has endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s § 524(a) 
argument,636 the court’s contention that § 524(a) “displaces” the authority to 
issue a non-debtor release under § 105(a) is exemplative of a general approach 
to the equitable statutes adopted in other federal courts.  As articulated by the 
Seventh Circuit, “when a specific Code section addresses an issue, a court may 
not employ its equitable powers to achieve a result not contemplated by the 
Code.”637  In other words, even if a requested § 105(a) order is not expressly 
forbidden by anything in the Bankruptcy Code, when another more detailed 
provision grants comparable relief, any authority to issue the order under 
§ 105(a) is displaced.  Thus, to illustrate, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that 
bankruptcy courts may not use § 105(a) to compel an unsecured creditor to 
reimburse a trustee for certain expenses because § 506(c) expressly permits a 
trustee to recover the same expenses from secured creditors and does not 
mention unsecured parties.638 
The “displacement” theory is not universally accepted.  For example, 
§ 523(a)(8) provides that certain student loans generally are not 
dischargeable.639  The statute creates an exception where mandating repayment 
“would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents.”640  When that circumstance obtains, student loans are fully 
dischargeable.  Despite the all-or-nothing language of § 523(a)(8), a substantial 
number of courts have ruled that they may employ § 105(a) to partially 
 
 634 Id. at 626; see also § 524(a)(2) (“discharge in a case under this title . . . operates as an injunction”) 
(emphasis added). 
 635 Am. Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 626 (emphasis added). 
 636 But cf. Boyle, supra note 27, at 428–29, 437 (generally adopting the Ninth Circuit’s argument). 
 637 In re Fesco Plastics, Inc., 996 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 638 Architectural Bldg. Components v. McClarty (In re Foremost Mfg. Co.), 137 F.3d 919, 924–25 (6th 
Cir. 1998); see also Bird v. Carl’s Grocery Co. (In re NWFX, Inc.), 864 F.2d 593, 595–96 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that bankruptcy courts may not use § 105(a) to “enlarge[] the right of setoff beyond that allowed in 
[11 U.S.C. § 553 (2000)] because such relief is not consistent with the provisions of the Code”).  For an 
example of an “express,” as opposed to a “displacement,” type of conflict, see In re Unitcast, Inc., 214 B.R. 
1010, 1018 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997) (a bankruptcy court may not employ § 105(a) to alter the priority of 
claims as set forth in § 726(b)), aff’d, 219 B.R. 741 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 1998). 
 639 § 523(a)(8). 
 640 Id. 
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discharge student debts.641  These courts apparently do not believe that 
§ 523(a)(8) displaces their equitable powers. 
This debate is moot for our purposes because the critical first step in the 
§ 524(a) argument in American Hardwoods is erroneous: a non-debtor release 
is not a discharge.  “Discharge” is a term of art under the Bankruptcy Code.642  
As the Ninth Circuit itself has recognized, a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes 
all of a debtor’s liabilities, with limited exceptions.643  Under § 1141(d)(1), 
“Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the order 
confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan . . . discharges the debtor from 
any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation.”644  Most non-debtor 
releases, however, only extinguish selected claims against the benefiting 
party.645  As the Second Circuit explained in Johns-Manville, releases of 
individual claims do “not offer the umbrella protection of a discharge in 
bankruptcy.”646  Only where a third-party release purports to eliminate all, or 
substantially all, of the third party’s debts—i.e., where the third party is 
receiving a full “non-debtor discharge”—does the release plausibly constitute a 
bankruptcy discharge, and thus fall within the scope of § 524(a) (and 
§ 1141(d)(1)).647  Moreover, non-debtor releases may only enjoin claims that 
are otherwise entitled to full payment under the debtor’s plan of 
reorganization.648  Discharges, however, may bar recovery on claims for which 
 
 641 See, e.g., Kapinos v. Graduate Loan Ctr. (In re Kapinos), 243 B.R. 271, 276–77 (W.D. Va. 2000) 
(contending that a “majority of courts have held that bankruptcy courts are empowered to partially discharge a 
debtor’s student loans by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 105,” even though 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) only provides for the 
complete discharge of such debts). 
 642 Wainer v. A.J. Equities, Ltd., 984 F.2d 679, 684 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 643 Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996); accord In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924, 
930 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 644 § 1141(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
 645 See supra notes 44–48, 194, 298, 320, and accompanying text. 
 646 MacArthur v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding 
that an insurance third-party release was valid because it only prohibited certain lawsuits and did “not offer the 
umbrella protection of a discharge in bankruptcy”); see also Brubaker, supra note 27, at 995 (“Of course, the 
‘discharge’ effected by a non-debtor release is only a partial discharge, and not nearly as broad and all-
encompassing as that available through an actual bankruptcy filing.”). 
 647 But see In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 243 n.22 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (contending that 
there was no substantive difference between an insurance company “release” and a “discharge” and that 
“[q]uibbling over the terminology is unproductive”); cf. In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 503 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (“A discharge in bankruptcy is an involuntary release by operation of law of creditor 
claims against an entity . . . .”) (emphasis added); In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 476 (E.D. Mich. 
2000) (same) (but still approving of the non-debtor release at issue), rev’d on other grounds, 280 F.3d 648 (6th 
Cir. 2002); Starr, supra note 27, at 487 (same). 
 648 See supra notes 348–51 and accompanying text. 
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the creditor will never receive payment in full.649  In sum, because non-debtor 
releases and discharges are distinguishable, §§ 524(a) and 1141(d)(1) do not 
displace the authority to grant releases under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6). 
C. Energy Resources and Conflicts Between Equitable Orders and 
Nonbankruptcy Law 
In Energy Resources, the Supreme Court explained that “[e]ven if 
consistent with the Code . . . a bankruptcy court order might be inappropriate if 
it conflicted with another law that should have been taken into consideration in 
the exercise of the court’s discretion.”650  The Court thus addressed whether 
tax allocation orders contravene § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code.651  Even 
though the High Court held that no discord exists between that statute and a 
designation order,652 the opinion raises an important question—to what extent 
may bankruptcy courts use their equitable power to override nonbankruptcy 
law?  This inquiry is highly pertinent to the validity of third-party releases 
because such releases eliminate liability that non-debtors would otherwise face 
under federal and state law.653 
 
 649 See Ian Dattner, Chapter 11 Protection: Whom Are We Protecting?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
287, 292 (2005) (“A reorganization plan need not pay all creditors in full.  In fact, because most companies 
entering Chapter 11 are insolvent, creditors rarely receive full dollar value.”). 
 650 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 550 (1990). 
 651 Id. at 550–51. 
 652 Id. at 551. 
 653 See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1017 n.209 (“[S]upplementary implementation sections such as 
§ 1123(b)(6) merely beg the question whether non-debtor releases are in fact ‘appropriate’ provisions of a 
plan.  That question inevitably requires consideration of the fact that non-debtor releases directly contravene 
nonbankruptcy law that would impose liability on the released non-debtors.”) (immediately thereafter quoting 
the same passage from Energy Res., 495 U.S. at 551, that I quoted in the text at the beginning of the 
paragraph); see also id. at 1010 (“Implicit in the idea that a non-debtor release is appropriate where necessary 
to the debtor’s successful reorganization is the assumption that the reorganization policy is supreme, and in 
furtherance thereof, a bankruptcy judge can unilaterally override legitimate policies embodied in 
nonbankruptcy law that would place liability upon the released non-debtors.”).  Even channeling releases, 
which provide the creditor with payment in full, are inconsistent with nonbankruptcy law.  First, in the absence 
of a release (or a provisional injunction), nonbankruptcy law would permit the creditor to recover from the 
non-debtor at the latest upon confirmation of the chapter 11 plan and the lifting of any non-debtor stay.  See 
Meltzer, supra note 27, at 26 n.83 (observing that channeling releases in plans that provide payment in full 
over time precludes a claimant “from recovering on its claim from source that could afford to pay it 
immediately”).  Second, if the debtor defaults on its plan obligations, a not atypical occurrence, the creditor is 
denied the promised full recovery.  See supra, Part III.C.; see also Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1029: 
In many cases, of course, non-debtor liability law and policy assumes its greatest significance in 
precisely the context in which non-debtor releases are approved; nonbankruptcy law gives the 
creditor another source of recovery in the event the debtor is unable to fully pay the creditor 
because of financial difficulties.  Thus, the propriety of a necessary non-debtor release directly 
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It is critical to note, first, what is not at issue.  There is little doubt that 
§ 105(a) orders enforcing more specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
may override nonbankruptcy law.  Because such “tethered” orders are merely 
implementing other enactments, the bankruptcy statute being enforced is the 
one prevailing over contrary federal or state law, not § 105(a).  For example, a 
bankruptcy court may grant a § 105(a) injunction barring a creditor from 
attempting to enforce its interest in estate property sold “free and clear” 
pursuant to § 363(f) of the Code.654  In that circumstance, state law governing 
the creditor’s interest is really trumped by § 363(f) rather than § 105(a).655  
And there is no question that express dictates in the Bankruptcy Code like 
§ 363(f) prevail over nonbankruptcy rights.656  Properly understood, then, the 
issue is this: may untethered § 105(a) orders—orders implementing general 
bankruptcy policies—override nonbankruptcy law?  Not surprisingly, the 
authorities are split on this issue. 
Numerous decisions hold that bankruptcy courts may not use their general 
equitable powers to modify nonbankruptcy rights.657  This proposition is often 
 
pits the reorganization policy against these legitimate nonbankruptcy policies underlying non-
debtor liability. 
But see In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 666–67, 686 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) 
(holding that a non-debtor release that extinguished the contribution claims that partners, who did not 
contribute assets to the estate, could assert against contributing partners, was not inconsistent with state law). 
 654 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000); supra notes 132–33, 228–33, and accompanying text. 
 655 See P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc. v. Virginia (In re P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc.), 189 B.R. 90, 96 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (“Based on the conflict between 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) and [Virginia law], the court will 
exercise its equitable power [under § 105(a)] and award the injunction.”) (issuing an injunction prohibiting 
“any act to collect an interest in the bankruptcy estate in contravention of a court order to sell the property free 
and clear . . . under § 363(f)(5)”); see also In re Jaras International, Inc., 81 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1987) (holding that § 105(a) permitted the court to modify an attorney’s state law retaining lien where the 
possessory rights created by the lien conflicted with the court’s § 542(e) power to order a debtor’s attorney to 
produce information and records). 
 656 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 n.9 (1979) (“[I]t has been settled from an early date that 
state laws to the extent that they conflict with the laws of Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, 
on the subject of bankruptcies are suspended.”); Johnson v. First Nat’l. Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 
273 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have 
the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws throughout the United States.  Where Congress has chosen to 
exercise its authority, contrary provisions of state law must accordingly give way.”); In re Roach, 824 F.2d 
1370, 1373 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); see also Noonan v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. 
Soc., Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Congress quite obviously intended to invest debtor estates and 
their representatives with certain rights, some of which may augment prepetition rights possessed by the debtor 
under nonbankruptcy law.”). 
 657 See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Highland Superstores, Inc. (In re Highland Superstores, 
Inc.), 154 F.3d 573, 578–79 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Bankruptcy courts simply do not have free rein to ignore a 
statute in the exercise of their equitable powers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105.”); Noonan v. Sec’y of Health and 
Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Bankruptcy Code § 105(a) 
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justified by reference to Butner v. United States,658 where the Supreme Court 
explained that state law governs the establishment of property rights in 
bankruptcy absent clear preemption by a federal bankruptcy statute.659  Courts 
adopting this “restrictive” understanding have denied requests made under 
§ 105(a) to create or alter liens,660 to discount damages for breach of contract 
 
may not be invoked to alter substantive debtor rights defined under the applicable nonbankruptcy law.”); 
Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305, 1311 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Nor 
does section 105(a) authorize courts . . . to expand the contractual obligations of the parties.”); Forlini v. 
Northwest Savings, F.A., 200 B.R. 9, 12 (D.R.I. 1996) (§ 105(a) does not grant bankruptcy courts “‘carte 
blanch’” to alter the contractual duties or override state and federal statutes); Willcox v. Stroup (In re 
Willcox), 329 B.R. 554, 579 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2005) (“[T]his Court cannot use equity to create new substantive 
rights or to override the provisions of state law.”); In re Brick Hearth Pizza, Inc., 302 B.R. 877, 881 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 2003) (“[T]he ‘equity power’ under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) cannot be applied to circumvent unequivocal 
provisions of substantive law, including relevant state law that is not expressly superseded by the Bankruptcy 
Code.”); In re Sendmygift.com, Inc., 280 B.R. 667, 679 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) (“‘Equity,’ in its general 
sense, cannot lie in a bankruptcy case to override an explicit requirement of nonbankruptcy law that governs 
the validity of a claim.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship (In re Three Flint Hill 
Ltd. P’ship), 202 B.R. 706, 712 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (“Neither does § 105(a) empower the bankruptcy court 
to override state law.”), subsequently affirmed, 103 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1996); 641 Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real 
Estate Fin., Inc. (In re 641 Assocs., Ltd.), Bankr. No. 91-11234S, Adv. Nos. 93-0363S, 93-0456S, 1993 WL 
332646, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1993) (“There is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code allowing a 
bankruptcy court to disregard state-law contractual rights.”); Amatex Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re 
Amatex Corp.), 97 B.R. 220, 226 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (“[T]his court is not authorized, pursuant to § 105(a), 
or any other authority, to disregard established state law principles in providing relief to the Debtor.”); see also 
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[2], at 105-7 to 105-8 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) 
(contending that § 105(a) “does not allow the bankruptcy court to override . . . mandates of other state and 
federal statutes”). 
 658 440 U.S. 48 (1979).  For decisions from the previous footnote relying upon Butner in reaching their 
conclusion regarding the relationship of § 105(a) and nonbankruptcy law, see Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. 
Highland Superstores, Inc. (In re Highland Superstores, Inc.), 154 F.3d 573, 578 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Butner, 440 U.S. at 54); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship (In re Three Flint Hill 
Ltd. P’ship), 202 B.R. 706, 709 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 56), subsequently affirmed, 
103 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1996); Amatex Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Amatex Corp.), 97 B.R. 220, 225 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 55–56). 
 659 Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 n.9 (“[S]tate laws are . . . suspended only to the extent of actual conflict with 
the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress.”) (decided under the Bankruptcy Act); id. at 55 
(“Property interests are created and defined by state law.”); accord Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. 
Greene, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946) (“What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the 
bankrupt at the time a petition is filed, is a question which, in the absence of overruling federal law, is to be 
determined by reference to state law.”); Johnson v. First Nat’l. Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 273–74 
(8th Cir. 1983) (“It is equally well-settled, however, that state laws are suspended only to the extent of actual 
conflict with the bankruptcy system provided by Congress, so that in the absence of any conflict between the 
state and bankruptcy laws, the law of the state where the property is situated governs questions of property 
rights.”) (subsequently citing and quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 55); In re Kennedy, 158 B.R. 589, 597 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 1993) (“[S]tate law rights must prevail absent specific and clearly expressed congressional intention to 
preempt state law.”). 
 660 See In re Brick Hearth Pizza, Inc., 302 B.R. 877, 880–81 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003) (holding that the 
court could not use § 105(a) to grant a lawyer-creditor the equivalent of a lien on the retainer paid by the 
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based on the debtor’s creditworthiness,661 to mandate payment under an 
insurance policy before the duty to pay arises,662 or to extend the life of expired 
contracts.663  Perhaps most poignantly, one court recently ruled that § 105(a) 
does not permit the allocation of tax overpayments because, unlike in Energy 
Resources, a federal statute expressly grants the IRS the right to designate the 
liabilities to which such payments apply.664 
Other authorities, however, indicate that nonbankruptcy law is not an 
absolute bar to the exercise of equitable power.  Besides granting third-party 
releases,665 courts embracing this “permissive” approach have used § 105(a) to 
override federal and state law by disallowing punitive damages claims,666 
 
debtor-client because the creditor did not have an actual lien on the retainer under Minnesota law) (“[T]he 
Bankruptcy Court cannot invoke § 105 to create some sort of ‘de facto priority claim’ in the nature of a first 
and preemptive call on the specific asset of a retainer deposit.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Three Flint 
Hill Ltd. P’ship (In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship), 202 B.R. 706, 709, 712 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (holding that 
the court could not employ § 105(a) to expand the scope of a creditor’s lien to property free of the lien under 
state law), subsequently affirmed, 103 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 661 Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Highland Superstores, Inc. (In re Highland Superstores, Inc.), 154 
F.3d 573, 578–80 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 662 Amatex Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Amatex Corp.), 97 B.R. 220, 225–26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1989) (holding that the court could not use § 105(a) to compel the debtor’s insurers to pay their complete 
coverage liability prior to the debtor becoming legally liable for that amount because such an order would “fly 
directly in the face of very basic tenets of Pennsylvania insurance law”). 
 663 P & J Marketing, Inc. v. Old Chepachet Village, Inc. (In re P & J Marketing, Inc.), 142 B.R. 608, 610–
11 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (holding that § 105(a) did not permit the court to renew an expired option to buy 
contained in the debtor’s lease); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.05 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 
2005) (“[S]ection 105 does not allow the bankruptcy court to breath life into contractual agreements that have 
expired by their own terms.”) (collecting authorities).  More important than any conflict with state law, 
however, forcing a party to renew its agreement with the debtor may violate the Constitution.  See, e.g., U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (“nor shall any person be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”). 
 664 In re Lybrand, 338 B.R. 402, 406–07 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2006) (“The most significant distinction 
between Energy Resources and this case is that Energy Resources did not involve the allocation of a refund, 
which is governed by a specific statute, 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a)(2000).”).  Section 6402(a) provides that in “the 
case of any overpayment, the Secretary . . . may credit the amount of such overpayment, including any interest 
allowed thereon, against any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on the part of the person who made 
the overpayment . . . .”  26 U.S.C. § 6402(c) (2000). 
 665 In Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), the High Court stated that “[u]nless some federal 
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why [property interests] should be analyzed differently 
simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”  Id. at 55 (emphasis added).  At 
least one pro-release court relied upon this language to distinguish the case.  See In re Heron, Burchette, 
Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 685–86 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (distinguishing Butner because the third-
party release in the debtor’s plan was the only way to serve “the federal interests underlying chapter 11”) 
(emphasis added). 
 666 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555, 562 (E.D. Va. 1988) (“Equity provides this Court the 
power to disallow punitive damages if the Court determines that such an allowance would frustrate the 
successful reorganization of the company.  It is this Court’s finding that punitive damages must be disallowed 
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partially discharging student debts,667 modifying the scope of liens,668 and, 
notably, allocating tax overpayments despite the existence of the statute 
granting that right to the IRS.669 
The language of Energy Resources supports the permissive understanding.  
There, the Supreme Court stated that “a bankruptcy court order might be 
inappropriate if it conflicted with another law that should have been taken into 
consideration in the exercise of the court’s discretion.”670  The phrase “might 
be inappropriate” strongly intimates that contravention of nonbankruptcy law 
is merely a factor bankruptcy judges must consider in deciding whether to 
grant relief under the equitable statutes.  Accordingly, §§ 105(a) and 
1123(b)(6) permit orders that override federal or state law if the bankruptcy 
court determines, “in the exercise of [its] discretion,”671 that the interests 
underlying the order outweigh the policies served by conflicting law.672 
 
if Robins is to be given the opportunity provided under Chapter 11 to successfully reorganize and function as a 
viable entity.”); In re Apex Oil Co., 118 B.R. 683, 699–700 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (“[I]t is well-accepted that 
the Court has the inherent equitable power to disallow, limit, or subordinate Claims for punitive or exemplary 
damages or fines, penalties, or forfeitures.”) (disallowing virtually all claims for punitive and exemplary 
damages, fines, penalties, and forfeitures where such relief was necessary to the success of the debtor’s 
reorganization). 
 667 See, e.g., Kapinos v. Graduate Loan Ctr. (In re Kapinos), 243 B.R. 271, 276–77 (W.D. Va. 2000) 
(contending that a “majority of courts have held that bankruptcy courts are empowered to partially discharge a 
debtor’s student loans by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 105,” even though 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) only provides for the 
complete discharge of such debts, and quoting United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990), in 
support of the decision to follow those courts). 
 668 See C & C Company v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Coal-X-Ltd., “76”), 103 B.R. 276, 279–80 (D. 
Utah 1986) (expressly overriding state law via § 105(a) by reducing the “value and extent” of a creditor’s lien 
in order to “effect a fair and equitable distribution of the estate’s limited assets”). 
 669 In re Moore, 200 B.R. 687, 687, 690–91 (Bankr. D. Or. 1996) (holding that, under United States v. 
Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990), § 105(a) permitted the court to allocate a tax overpayment to the IRS’s 
priority claims rather than the agency’s general unsecured claims because it was necessary to the debtor’s 
reorganization, even though the IRS would receive no distribution otherwise on its non-priority claim).  See 
generally § 6402(a) (granting the IRS the right to allocate tax overpayments). 
 670 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 550 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 671 Id. (emphasis added). 
 672 Id.; see also IRS v. Energy Res. Co. (In re Energy Res. Co.), 871 F.2d 223, 234 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(“[U]pon consideration of the reorganization plan as a whole, in so far as the particular structure or allocation 
of payments increases the risk that the IRS may not collect the total tax debt, is that risk nonetheless justified 
by an offsetting increased likelihood of rehabilitations, i.e., increased likelihood of payment to creditors who 
might otherwise lose their money.”), aff’d, 495 U.S. 545 (1990).  But see Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1030–33 
(arguing that bankruptcy courts are incapable of determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether the benefits of a 
reorganization “are more important than the indirect benefits produced by non-debtor liability”). 
The Energy Resources Court also explained that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) “are consistent with the 
traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-
debtor relationships.”  495 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added).  “Modifying” a creditor-debtor relationship might 
involve altering the nonbankruptcy rights of the parties.  But the cases cited by the Supreme Court in support 
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Of course, there are important limits on the use of equitable power to trump 
nonbankruptcy law.  As the High Court more recently explained in Raleigh v. 
Illinois Department of Revenue,673 bankruptcy courts “are not authorized in the 
name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling 
the validity of creditors’ entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy 
Code itself provides.”674  In other words, bankruptcy courts may not, “as a 
matter of course,” substitute equitable principles for governing substantive 
law.675  Where “extraordinary circumstances” are present, however, even some 
decisions in the restrictive line of authority acknowledge that the bankruptcy 
court’s equitable powers may override nonbankruptcy rights.676  And, as noted 
above, “extraordinary” or “unusual” circumstances are the only ones in which 
most pro-release courts, and this Article, contend that non-debtor releases are 
permissible.677  Indeed, even when all of the elements of the Master Mortgage 
test—or my amended version—are satisfied, the granting of a release is not 
automatic; the court must still exercise its discretion and decide, in the 
particular case, whether the release is warranted, all factors considered.678  
Thus, a court might conclude that a release satisfying Master Mortgage should 
not issue because the interests underlying nonbankruptcy law trump the 
reorganization policy in that action. 
 
of the quoted language suggest a narrower interpretation.  See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 303–11 
(1939) (identifying various examples of the use of bankruptcy equitable power, all of which appear to be 
consistent with nonbankruptcy law). 
 673 530 U.S. 15 (2000). 
 674 Id. at 24; see also In re Sendmygift.com, Inc., 280 B.R. 667, 679 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) (citing 
Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 15, among other authorities, for the proposition that “‘[e]quity, in a general sense, cannot 
lie in a bankruptcy case to override an explicit requirement of substantive nonbankruptcy law that governs the 
validity of a claim.”); cf. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 536, 540–41 (1996) (holding that bankruptcy 
courts may use their powers of equitable subordination under § 510(c) to subordinate claims based on the facts 
of a particular case, but may not create categorical rules of subordination in derogation of the priority scheme 
set forth in the Bankruptcy Code); accord United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 
U.S. 213, 216, 228–29 (1996) (following Noland). 
 675 Johnson v. First Nat’l. Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[T]o hold that a 
bankruptcy court may, as a matter of course, suspend the running of a statutory period of redemption pursuant 
to § 105(a), would be to enlarge the debtor’s property rights beyond those specifically set forth by the 
Minnesota legislature and by Congress in § 108(b).”) (emphasis added). 
 676 See, e.g., Johnson v. First Nat’l. Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1983) (“From the 
fundamental principles embraced by the Butner opinion, however, as well as from the language of § 105(a) 
itself, it follows that, absent a specific grant of authority from Congress or exceptional circumstances, a 
bankruptcy court may not exercise its equitable powers to create substantive rights which do not exist under 
state law.”); Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1440 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(quoting the language in the previous parenthetical from Johnson, 719 F.2d at 274); . 
 677 See supra notes 303–04, 322–23, and accompanying text. 
 678 See supra notes 358–59 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article contends that Energy Resources vindicates the pro-release 
position on every major issue concerning the validity of non-debtor releases.  
Therefore, under existing precedent, bankruptcy courts possess the equitable 
power to extinguish claims against third parties.  While Energy Resources 
resolves the legal dispute, a broader question remains—are non-debtor releases 
justified on policy grounds?  Should courts have the legal authority to grant 
this type of relief?  While the policy debate is generally beyond the scope of 
my undertaking here, certain aspects of it are worth brief consideration. 
Beginning with some pro-release observations, as indicated above, many 
courts believe that a third-party release can be essential to a debtor’s 
reorganization.679  Without this relief, for example, corporate insiders might 
refuse to contribute funds or time to the debtor’s plan, making continued 
operations impossible.680  Since promotion of reorganizations is the central 
policy of chapter 11, releases may be defended on the ground that they serve 
this cardinal goal.  In addition, by consolidating adjudication of related claims 
into a single forum, non-debtor releases “can eliminate piecemeal litigation and 
curb costs significantly.”681  They might also bring “global peace” to mass tort 
disputes and allow for timely payments to thousands of injured parties.  In 
short, as one commentator concluded, permitting non-debtor releases gives 
courts the “flexibility to act in the best interests of all parties concerned.”682 
Turning to the anti-release position, the availability of provisional 
injunctions casts doubt on the “necessity” of many non-debtor releases.  A 
provisional injunction provides substantially similar relief, but places the risk 
of plan failure on the benefiting third party.  Of course, the non-debtor may 
hold out for a release to guarantee its future security.  But the cases in which a 
provisional injunction will not suffice should be few and far between.  
Consistent with this analysis, Professor Brubaker contends that non-debtor 
releases are seldom necessary to the debtor’s reorganization.683  Such relief is 
more likely to serve as a form of costless compensation to the third party than 
 
 679 See, e.g., supra notes 291–92, 298, and accompanying text. 
 680 See NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 32, at 534–35; see also Boyle, supra note 27, at 422 
(suggesting that non-debtor releases may be necessary to “ensure cooperation” of third parties or “generate 
non-debtor contributions to the reorganization that the non-debtor otherwise would not have made”). 
 681 NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N., supra note 32, at 535. 
 682 Inman, supra note 27, at 648 
 683 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1021. 
SILVERSTEIN GALLEYSFINAL 2/19/2007  2:08:42 PM 
138 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23 
as an incentive for funding required to prevent the debtor’s liquidation.684  
Indeed, Judith Starr hypothesizes that permitting non-debtor releases creates an 
incentive for managers to move troubled corporations into bankruptcy where 
the plan of reorganization might extinguish their personal liabilities.685  
Professor Brubaker also asserts that it “is nearly impossible to verify or 
disprove in any reliable manner” whether a particular release will mean the 
difference between a successful reorganization and termination of the debtor’s 
business.686  And even if such a determination were feasible, he continues, 
bankruptcy courts are ill-suited to weighing the benefits of a successful 
reorganization against the burdens imposed by vitiating nonbankruptcy rights 
through the release.687  Finally, Peter Boyle suggests that third-party releases 
may undermine the “integrity of guaranties,” which could impact the cost of 
financing,688 and limit the usefulness of joint and several liability.689  Perhaps it 
was such observations that ultimately convinced the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission to counsel that Congress amend the Code to permit only 
voluntary releases.690 
It is difficult to assess these policy arguments.  Few, other than Professor 
Brubaker’s, have been substantially developed.  What is needed at this stage is 
greater investigation into the empirical details.  Whatever the result of that 
inquiry, the final decision should be made by Congress.  Non-debtor releases, 
even of the channeling variety, are a drastic form of relief.  They implicate 
clashes between critical policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and other 
federal and state law.  The availability of such relief is an issue best resolved 
by a legislative body after diligent consideration of the countervailing values. 
 
 
 684 Id. at 1023–26. 
 685 Starr, supra note 27, at 486 (“Moreover, giving insiders the ability to force a settlement on unwilling 
creditors, without requiring them to take on the burdens associated with filing for bankruptcy, creates a moral 
hazard for insiders of troubled companies.”).  But see Inman, supra note 27, at 648 (anti-release authorities 
have “not . . . sufficiently argued . . . that to give courts the power to permanently enjoin suits against non-
debtors will provide a mechanism of escape for nondebtors and unfairly prejudice claimants”). 
 686 Brubaker, supra note 27, at 1027 & n.48. 
 687 Id. at 1030–32. 
 688 Boyle, supra note 27, at 422, 443. 
 689 Id. at 444. 
 690 See NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 32, at 538 (“[T]he Commission’s Recommendation 
would permit only voluntary releases.”); see also id. at 534 (“Congress should amend sections 1123 and 524(e) 
to clarify that it is within the discretion of the court to allow a plan proponent to solicit release of nondebtor 
liabilities.  Creditors that agree in a separate document to release nondebtor parties will be bound by such 
releases, whereas creditors that decline to release their claims against nondebtor parties will not be bound to 
release their claims.”). 
